

OBLOM, Marshal Zhukov's Last Battle.

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OBLOM

Marshal Zhukov's last battle

The second book of the Chronicle of the Great Decade trilogy, a prequel to the bestselling Kuzkin's Mother trilogy

The new book by the outstanding historian, writer and military analyst Victor Suvorov - the second part of the trilogy "Chronicle of the Great Decade", a grand historical reconstruction of the events of 1956-1957, when Nikita Khrushchev, with the support of Marshal Zhukov removed from the leadership of the Soviet Union former closest associates of Stalin, and Zhukov secretly prepared a military coup to oust Khrushchev and establish sole power in the country. Reconstructing the events of those years and putting known and little-known facts into a single mosaic, the author tells about the struggle for power in the leadership of the USSR, about the conspiracy of Zhukov and his associates against Khrushchev, about the disclosure of this conspiracy through a chain of coincidences and about the most complex covert operation to isolate and remove Zhukov from power.

This is a book about how the system of governing the country changed after the abolition of Stalin's practice of systematic violent change of the governing elite, how a new generation of young party leaders began to make a career in power, a few years later replaced Khrushchev at the helm of government, what alternative scenario for the development of the USSR was preparing to realize Zhukov, and why Khrushchev, who made many mistakes during his reign, still deserves recognition for saving the country and the world from Zhukov.

The book contains more than 60 photographs, including rare images from Russian and foreign archives, published in Russia for the first time.

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Epilogue

The fates of some participants of the events described in this book. - S. M. Shtemenko. - EA Furtseva. - NP Firyubin. - Y. S. Bulanov.

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*In memory of Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, a
great scout of the past, who
was the first to solve the mystery of
Stalin's mysterious death.*

*power is that he possessed
to themselves.*

*being a jerk anymore!
image.*

*One of the secrets of Khrushchev's rise to
a talent for making everyone feel superior*

He got the power, but he couldn't get out of

He was made for this

Mikhail Weller

Bummer

Noun, inanimate, masculine. It is formed from the verb *to break with* the prefix *ob-*.

Values:

1. What broke off, broke off.
2. A fracture site, a break.

The place where the turning point took place, which is described on the pages of this book, is the capital of our Motherland, Moscow. In 1957, in Moscow, the fate of the country and the whole world turned together with the fate of the failed dictator, four times Hero of the Soviet Union, Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov Georgy Konstantinovich, who wanted absolute power and was preparing a coup d'état.

In Russian jargon, the word "bummer" has other meanings: failure, failure, crash, collapse, kirdyk, tryndets, kranty. To describe the situation in which Zhukov found himself, these meanings also fit perfectly.

PREDICTION

From June 1957, a duumvirate was established in the Soviet Union: Zhukov and Khrushchev ruled the country. Officially, Khrushchev was in charge, but he was in charge only because Zhukov decided so.

The relationship between these rulers was not easy. An inevitable battle was looming. Its outcome was predetermined by a few people, among whom were:

- first deputy chief of the GRU, Lieutenant General Mamsurov,
- the head of the GRU, Colonel General Shtemenko,
- the Soviet Union's ambassador to Yugoslavia, Firyubin.

The first deputy chief of the GRU, Mamsurov, died in 1968 (by then he had become a colonel-general). And two years later, military fate threw me, a young officer, into the Intelligence Department of the Volga Military District Headquarters, that is, into the GRU structure. Many people knew and remembered Mamsurov here. There was someone from whom I could learn things that were not written about in the newspapers.

In the future, I was to serve in the central apparatus of the GRU. The chain of command here is akin to the pyramid of Cheops. I am at the base, and at the very top is the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Army General Shtemenko. It is clear that Army General Shtemenko had no idea of my existence - the heights of flight were too different, but I had the opportunity to learn about Army General Shtemenko what was not commonly reported even in the most truthful memoirs.

I had the opportunity to work under diplomatic cover. At the dizzying heights of Soviet diplomacy sat the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Comrade Nikolai Pavlovich Firyubin. The very same. Obviously, there was no reason for him to know of my existence, but I had the opportunity to ask questions of knowledgeable people about how Comrade Firyubin had climbed to those heights.

heights.

My direct superior, the chief of the Geneva GRU residency, not only knew Shtemenko and Mamsurov well in his time, but was a direct participant in the events of 1957, which will be discussed in this book. And my direct

boss was Zoya Vasilyevna Mironova, the USSR permanent representative to the European branch of the UN and other international organizations in Geneva. It is clear, she is an ambassador, and I am just an attaché, but the Permanent Mission of the Soviet Union to the European branch of the UN is a fairly compact structure. When carrying out the ambassador's assignments and reporting on the work done, I could sometimes ask a question about the heroic past when I was in the mood.

I must say that people tend to talk about their adventures that had a happy ending. I had the opportunity to ask questions, and I used it extensively, but carefully. Small pieces of information formed a clear picture.

At the beginning of the new millennium, some secret documents from the Soviet archives concerning the events of 1957 were published. This new information lay on top of the old, not destroying it, but enhancing its clarity and vividness. Reconstructing the past from small fragments, like a broken Roman amphora, I allowed myself to include in the narrative dialogues that have never been recorded anywhere. But this is not a play of fancy, but an attempt to fill those voids for which no missing small shards could be found. If a mosaic is missing one piece, knowing what is around the empty space, one can easily figure out what is missing. That's what I did.

These dialogs are not what the participants in the events uttered, but what I think they might have uttered in a given situation.

I'm not sure I've gotten to the bottom of it at all. I did my best, let others come and do better.

PROLOGUE

Take off your clothes," she smiled dazzlingly and tucked a brown strand behind her pink ear.

- At all?

- Down to your underwear.

Deputy Chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General Mamsurov Khadzhi-Umar Dzhiorovich obeyed.

He was suddenly summoned to the Kremlin polyclinic. He tried to push back the time of his appointment, citing his busy schedule, but was given a clear explanation. All his medical documents had arrived in Moscow from the Prikarpatya Military District, where General Mamsurov had recently been commander of the 38th Army. Neither hack doctors in Lvov, nor doctors in Moscow found anything suspicious. But in the capital of our Motherland rose a foreign luminary, who checked last year's X-rays of the top leadership of the Soviet Union, and what did not notice home-grown esculapists, did not escape the keen foreign eye. That's why the lieutenant-general had to arrive immediately - the sun was not waiting, it might roll over the horizon.

It is clear that state affairs are more important than the health of a lieutenant-general, but one does not live long with such a diagnosis anyway. That's why it's better for the lieutenant-general to postpone state affairs for a day or two. It is necessary to take urgent measures before all is lost.

The Lieutenant-General arrived at the specified address on the specified date and assessed the situation. I dare to report that the polyclinic he found himself in did not look like a medical institution - it was more like a luxurious sanatorium or a greenhouse in the mansion of Savva Morozov, one of the richest men in Russia at the beginning of the 20th century. There is silence, peace, luxurious soft carpets in which your feet sink. There are colored stained glass windows and a magical garden of tropical plants. There is no crowding, no queues. To

It is convenient: you do not wait for a call to the doctor, but the doctor waits for your arrival.

The smashing sister pointed out where to hang the general's uniform and where to hang the pants with wide double stripes, and disappeared behind the door.

At that very moment, a luminary - a small, dense, bald man - entered through another door.

Lieutenant General Mamsurov, First Deputy Chief of the GRU, raised his eyes at the doctor and sat down.

Comrade Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, stood calmly in front of him and scrutinized him.

All in white.

If you decide to break the will of a strong man, the science called agent psychology recommends that you start by scaring him badly. It is desirable that the threat be real, tangible, deadly. It would also be good at the last moment, when a person is a little accustomed to one threat, suddenly put him in front of a new, completely unexpected trouble. Also deadly.

And have a conversation with him right away.

Before a serious conversation, it wouldn't hurt to undress a man - if not completely, at least down to his underwear. One thing - a tall, slender, muscular, broad-shouldered, black-haired with graying young handsome lieutenant general in a strict, Stalinist taste cut tunic with a standing collar, in gold epaulettes, with the "Gold Star" of the Hero of the Soviet Union on the chest, with a bar of orders, including three orders of Lenin, four orders of the Red Banner, the Order of Kutuzov 1st degree and the Order of Suvorov 2nd degree. And quite another - the same man, but without golden epaulettes and stripes, without the "Gold Star" and standing collar, in pathetic blue underpants down to the knee in front of the highest chief of our great Motherland.

I am not at all sure that the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Comrade Nikita Khrushchev, ever studied agent psychology, but I have no doubt that sometimes he had an epiphany, and at such times he felt human psychology with all his being. In his gut.

By some special animal instinct Nikita felt that General Mamsurov's meeting in the Kremlin clinic should be organized in this way and in no other way. Khrushchev was absolutely sure that a cheerful chucklehead should call Mamsurov. She should chirp foolishly and joyfully about the fatal illness: here, Comrade General, what an attack has befallen you, you are a man in the prime of life, who would have thought....

In Khrushchev's understanding, General Mamsurov should be met in a

luxurious reception room by a person of a somewhat different plan - a thoughtful, silent, seductive sister with a mysterious smile of a lecherous Dzhokonda at the very corners of her lips. To remind with all her appearance of the joys of life, which for the general so suddenly and sadly ends: you, general, in a couple of months, or even weeks, will die, we all will live.

That's exactly how it was arranged. There was chirping on the telephone, there was a nurse in a starched robe, under which the absence of a skirt and blouse was evident. She flew away, and Khrushchev appeared in front of the general. He took a long look at the general standing in his underwear, and then decisively pointed to a white stool:

- Have a seat.

It was something between an invitation and an order. Any superior, be it the commander of a three-man crew or the Commander-in-Chief with millions of people under his command, must assess the situation before giving an order: will his subordinates obey it? If there is even the slightest possibility of disobedience, the order should be refrained from being given.

If you're sure they're gonna do it, command them!

If you are not sure, don't say a word! Stall for time, cunning, look for other methods of influence, for there is nothing more horrible and pathetic than a scene of disobedience to a commander. Once disobeyed, they will never obey again.

Khrushchev understood: the general, who found himself in such a strange position, would like to shrink into a lump, to cover his bodies at least with his hands.

If the case had taken place on a Black Sea beach, everything would have looked different. The General's arms, chest and shoulders were full of strength, his legs were as slender as an Arabian stallion's, and he had cubes on his stomach

of muscle instead of the usual general's potbelly. Mamsurov would not be ashamed to play ball on the beach in his underwear in front of ladies of any degree of arrogance.

But this isn't a Black Sea beach. And he's not in front of the ladies, that's the difference.

To sit down is to reduce the visible part of the naked body.

To sit down means to enclose the table a bit.

So the order to sit down was a relief, if not a salvation, for the general. He himself was irresistibly anxious to sit down. And having received something

between an invitation and an order, he sat down.

It was a double psychological victory for Khrushchev.

One: the general obeys.

Second: this mighty man no longer towers over Khrushchev, who is as fat as a colobok.

Neither Mamsurov nor Khrushchev were thinking about psychological effects at that moment. Khrushchev simply felt even more confident. Mamsurov even less so.

- Tell us, Comrade General.

- Tell me what?

- All of them.

- All of them?

- Tell me something I don't know. Well, I know everything. Your GRU has set up some kind of special center. And they didn't consult me. Did they forget, or what?

The most important thing in this situation is not to give away the source of your knowledge and its limits even by a hint.

The situation for General Mamsurov is unbelievable: the only people who knew about the GRU Special Purpose Center besides him were the creators of the Center - Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov and the head of the GRU, Colonel General Shtemenko. Neither the former nor the latter had any reason to talk about it, no profit. The case is justiciable. It's a firing squad case. Under Comrade Stalin, for such tricks were put to waste without even going into details. How could Khrushchev know about the GRU's Special Purpose Center? He couldn't! He couldn't, that's all! But he knows! He knows everything!

What should a general do in a situation where he is pinned down like a rat with a shovel? Run into the hallway? In blue underpants?

The thought that he had been caught even gave Mamsurov some relief for a moment. The general remembered the fatal diagnosis. He realized that there was no diagnosis. It was a trap. He was lured into a mousetrap. The General is healthy. But is the second misfortune easier than the first? If Khrushchev had arranged the meeting so meticulously, there must be a team of burly orderlies waiting outside the door with a straitjacket at the ready.

Here would be a picture: someone in underpants jumps out into the luxurious corridor of the Kremlin polyclinic and rushes to the exit. Here the orderlies don't even need prior instructions. It is clear without instructions: he

is overworked. Such people are tied up in sheets.

The paramedics will pounce on a strange client in underpants who runs where it is not customary to run in underpants.

The orderlies know their stuff.

The orderlies will give you a proper shot in the ass.

Then Khrushchev has a fan of possibilities. The easiest one is to kill Mamsurov immediately. Medical murders are the easiest.

The general imagined a syringe in the hands of a smashing sister dressed in a starched robe. He realized that in any case they would not let him out of this golden cage for nothing. The choice is simple: either he gives up and goes over to Khrushchev's side, or the diagnosis of a fatal, incredibly fast progressing disease will be confirmed. For another ten days he will be delirious and convulsing in these sparkling white wards, not recognizing the people around him.

- Nikita Sergeyevich, let me put my pants on.

This is the white flag of surrender.

- Get dressed, General. And tell me everything from the beginning.

- Since?

- I'm listening.

- This story, Nikita Sergeyevich, began at the XX Congress of the CPSU...

CHAPTER 1

1

In the whole world history it is impossible to find an event equal in its meanness to the XX Congress of the CPSU.

The idea of the Congress can be expressed in four words: Stalin is to blame for everything.

It turned out that Lenin, who had used German money to corrupt the Russian army, illegally seized power in the country, dissolved the Russian army on the eve of victory in World War I and surrendered the country to the Kaiser's mercy, was not to blame for anything.

It appeared that nothing was to blame for the Bolsheviks who had dispersed the Constituent Assembly, whose delegates had been elected by the people of the country to determine its future after the fall of the monarchy.

It turned out that Sverdlov, who signed the order to physically exterminate the Cossacks, was not guilty of anything.

It turned out that Tukhachevsky, Blucher, Uborevich, Yakir and a whole bunch of their kind, who openly and in print called their rule an occupation, who exterminated millions of citizens of their country who did not want to live under the rule of the occupiers, were not guilty of anything.

It turned out that even the most loyal Stalinists were not guilty of anything. Nikita Khrushchev, the executioner of Moscow and Ukraine, was simply following orders. What could he do if Stalin ordered it?

And all the members of the Politburo were just following Stalin's orders. And all the members of the Central Committee. And the ministers. And marshals. And generals. And the Chekists. And prosecutors. And judges. And guards.

They knew nothing. They knew nothing. They obeyed.

Lieutenant General Zavenyagin Avraamiy Pavlovich, former head of Norilsk Lag, former deputy head of the NKVD and former deputy head of the NKVD, sat in the hall of the XX Congress and beat his hands. It turns out that Avraamiy Palych, too, did not do anything

knew about the camps. So he didn't even know they existed either.

And sitting in that hall was Hero of Socialist Labor, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Lieutenant General (later Army General, Professor, Laureate and so on and so forth) Komarovskiy Alexander Nikolaevich, our great military

builder. "Soviet Military Encyclopedia" (M.: Voenizdat, 1977. In eight volumes. Vol. 4. P. 260) reports that Comrade Komarovsky was the head of Glavpromstroy of the USSR. This information is an example of hatchet falsification: the big bosses, who composed articles for the encyclopedia, missed three letters in the lavish title of Comrade Komarovsky.

To clarify: Alexander Komarovsky was the head of Glavpromstroy of the USSR **Ministry of Internal Affairs**. And before that - the head of Glavpromstroy **of the USSR NKVD** and Glavneftespetsstroy of the USSR **NKVD**. A great builder, Comrade Komarovsky dug canals, built the Kuibyshev hydroelectric power plant, raised the Moscow University to the heavens, during the war he built the Chelyabinsk Metallurgical Plant, and after the war he headed the construction of nuclear industry facilities. It turns out that both Comrade Komarovsky and his boss Comrade Zavenyagin did not know who was digging in their pits and where the slave labor was coming from in the organizations they headed. Comrade Komarovsky did not realize on whose bones he was building the giants of socialist industry.

And sitting in that hall was Hero of Socialist Labor, a member of the Central Committee since Lenin's time, a member of the Politburo since 1935, Comrade Mikoyan Anastas Ivanovich. In the times of industrialization he led the sale of the Hermitage treasures to the damned capitalists at knowingly low prices. In 1934, at the XVII Congress of the Communist Party, he set a record: in a short report he mentioned Comrade Stalin 41 times, accompanying the great name with appropriate epithets. During the time of the Purge, Comrade Mikoyan repeatedly asked Comrade Stalin to increase the limits on firing squads; for example, on September 22, 1937, he sent Stalin a request to increase the firing squad rate for Armenia by 700 people. Comrade Yezhov proposed to Comrade Stalin to spare no limits for Comrade Mikoyan, instead of 700 people to allow an additional 1,500 enemies of the people to be shot.

Comrade Stalin was generous. He authorized it.

And now Comrade Mikoyan is sitting at a meeting of the XX Congress and listens with indignation to Comrade Khrushchev's speech about the times of Stalinism. Comrade Khrushchev himself also repeatedly asked Comrade Stalin not to be greedy and to increase the limits on executions. Comrade Mikoyan is shocked by Comrade Khrushchev's report. Comrade Mikoyan is furious at Stalin's arbitrariness and lawlessness.

And there sat at that congress noble jailers and great Soviet scientists, honored executioners and winners of Stalin's prizes for literature. With howls of indignation they greeted Khrushchev's new disclosures as if they too knew

nothing, as if they too had first heard about it only three years after Stalin's death, as if only the 20th Congress of the CPSU had opened their eyes.

I have always said and I will repeat many times: the Communists were fools and criminals. At the 20th Congress sat those who destroyed millions of people during collectivization, those who organized the export of bread abroad when the people of their own country ate frogs and mice, those who commanded millions of slaves on the great construction sites of socialism, those who in the war drove penalty battalions to slaughter, and those who in their immortal creations praised all this.

And these people, who ruled a great country, behaved at the congress as if their mental development was at the level of a village fool, who rides a stick through the streets, who knows nothing, remembers nothing, guesses nothing. Delegates to the XX Congress of the CPSU behaved the way once behaved shitting in a corner dared Commander Yakir. When Stalin was near, Yakir declared himself a faithful servant of Stalin, but, smiling at Stalin, preparing his overthrow. When Stalin was not around, Yakir crossed out his name from the holiday order. Once in the cellars of a famous institution, Yakir wrote a letter to Stalin: "I will die with words of love for you." On this letter Stalin scrawled a resolution: "Scoundrel and prostitute".

This is exactly how the delegates to the 20th Congress of the CPSU behaved - as scoundrels and prostitutes. Realizing that no one controls them, they began to denigrate the name of Stalin. At previous congresses, they all loved Stalin, and now it suddenly turned out that they all condemned Stalin. If even hated. And even fought against Stalin, keeping in their hearts loyalty to the bright Leninist ideals.

The 20th Congress of the CPSU was reminiscent of the process of mass pimping of thieves during the construction of the White Sea Canal - only there, on the canal, the Chekists drove tens of thousands of people to death by hunger, cold, frost and unbearable standards, and only those who pimped themselves, those who became agitators, activists, and tuff strikers survived. At the XXth Congress of the CPSU, the voluntary bitching of the Stalinist nomenklatura took place.

But if a miracle had happened, if Stalin had suddenly risen from the dead and entered the hall where the congress participants were sitting, these "exposers" would have rushed to kiss his boots. They are not used to it: it was their tongues that created the cult of personality. Wherever the wind blows, they would all turn around at once.

Under Lenin, Leninists.

Under Trotsky, Trotskyists.

Under Stalin, Stalinists-antitrotskyists.

Under Khrushchev, the Khrushchevites were anti-Stalinists.

Under Brezhnev - Brezhnevites-antikhrushchevites, i.e. Stalinists again, only not real, but operetta, tuff, like bitchy percussionists.

And not because all of them after the XX Congress of the CPSU slightly loosened the screws, that they were kinder than Stalin, but because they realized that without Stalin they could not keep in a cage the peoples of the Soviet Union and the socialist camp.

2

The 20th Congress of the CPSU was the most representative gathering of scoundrels and prostitutes in history. The stench of that stinking congress is still plaguing our people and other nations of the world. The harm of that Congress is that Marxism, Trotskyism, Leninism, socialism and communism were not exposed - instead, all the blame was blamed on Stalin, all the vices of the system were attributed to one man.

The 20th Congress of the CPSU is a gathering of falsifiers of history. Since that Congress, all our propaganda has talked about Stalin's camps, but our "exposers" for some reason have said nothing about the Leninist, Trotskyist, Sverdlovsk, Zinoviev camps,

of Kamenev, Rykov, Bukharin. Ever since that Congress, the agitators have been talking about Stalin's cruelty, about Stalin's torture, as if Lenin's sadism had not existed at all.

As the 20th Congress of the CPSU decided, so we are still living. And here is an example. In 1997 in Moscow the International Foundation "Democracy" published a collection of documents "Lubyanka. VCHK-OGPU-NKVD-NKGB-MGB-MVD-KGB. 1917-1960" (compiled by A. I. Kokurin and N. V. Petrov). The collection is terrific. But the preface is more amazing than the texts of the documents themselves. The compilers of the collection informed that some documents on punitive bodies for the period 1934-1960 are declassified and available to researchers, but the documents for 1917-1933 remain secret and are not available to researchers. What happened in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, please study, but what happened decades before that period cannot be studied.

And what is this separation barrier? Why are the documents from 1934 onwards partially open, while everything from before is behind a dozen seals?

The reason is simple. We are told: Stalin is to blame for everything, here are the confirmations. He, the villain, was in charge of everything and commanded everyone.

Starting from the late thirties, Stalin really was in charge and commanded everything. Here we have opened the confirmations: admire. But before this period, Stalin's power was not all-encompassing. And if you open earlier documents, it will be revealed that there were villains besides Stalin, and such that Stalin's level of atrocity was not even in the apprentice.

3

After the 20th Congress of the CPSU, attempts have been made all over the world to build a "good" socialism, but no one has succeeded in building such a socialism yet.

They say to me, "But in Sweden, socialism is good, it's wonderful! It is wonderful. I have nothing to object. But only lovers of Swedish socialism for some reason do not like to remember the simple secret of prosperity of this country. And it lies in the fact that Sweden was one of the world's leaders in science, culture and economy, and in addition, it profited from two world wars.

Everything Sweden is proud of was created when the economy was free. Then the socialists came to power. They were terribly kind people. It's easy to be kind when you have a huge inheritance. And everything in Sweden is pretty good - as long as the inheritance is not squandered. It's not an easy thing to do. In my memory, Sweden and Switzerland were recently the countries with the highest standard of living. Switzerland has remained so, and Sweden has slowly crept down. The process is underway. It's accelerating. The rate of decline is increasing. There are no scientists in Sweden anymore - they've gone to California. A significant part of the working population are government officials, employees of government agencies, i.e. bureaucrats.

Both of these trends have become very clear: the departure from the country of people capable of thinking and creating, on the one hand, and the growth of bureaucracy, on the other.

Good Swedish socialism has one small flaw - socialism ruins Sweden just like it ruins any other country. It is just that in Ethiopia the results of socialism are visible to everyone at once, while in the richest Sweden it takes some time before it is completely ruined. Otherwise, everything in this country is just fine.

But let us return to our sheep. The crime of the organizers and participants of the XX Congress of the CPSU is that they blamed all the responsibility for the economic failure of socialism on Stalin. After that, for decades our leaders (and not only our leaders) have been looking for a way to "good" socialism. But all paths somehow led either to the Stalinist model or to the collapse of the country.

4

The spirit of that congress of scoundrels and prostitutes still hangs over our country. Not only did the congress delegates pretend to be idiots who knew nothing and understood nothing, but with this feigned idiocy they also twisted our entire history.

It was at the 20th Congress of the CPSU that it was first announced that the Soviet Union was allegedly unprepared for war. It was at this Congress that the "shortage of even rifles" and the "decapitated army" were first announced.

In slinging mud at Stalin, Khrushchev blatantly lied. He told the delegates of the Congress that the Kiev Special Military District, where he was a member of the Military Council, did not even have enough rifles. And the delegates of the congress, all sorts of Sholokhovs and Simonovs, Komarovskys and Zavenyagins, expressed their noble indignation.

And the province went to write. The wise academicians immediately sat down to compose a six-volume "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union" (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1960-1965). How many tanks Hitler had, they reported: 3 410 machines (vol. 1. P. 384). But the number of our tanks was forgotten. Instead, they wrote: "*But the enemy's advantages were too great at that time for the covering troops to be able to stop his advance by bravery and self-sacrifice alone*" (ibid. Vol. 2. P. 7).

It turned out that the Germans had tanks, guns and airplanes, and we had nothing but bravery.

The engineers of human souls at the first blowing of the wind, like sensitive weathervanes, immediately turned in the direction indicated.

Comrade Konstantin Simonov, a six-time winner of Stalin's prizes and a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee, was a faithful Stalinist, but he too changed his ways instantly, like a bitch on the construction of the White Sea Canal. Konstantin Simonov creatively rethought his views and immediately became a loyal Khrushchevite, an ardent opponent of Stalin.

A familiar scenario: that's how all the scum from the educated strata of society rushed in March 1917 to enroll in the SR party, but as soon as the victory of the Bolsheviks became clear, they all rushed from the SR party to the Bolshevik party.

Shortly before the XX Congress, Konstantin Simonov in the newspaper "Pravda" bitterly lamented:

*There are no words to describe
All the intolerance of grief and sorrow.
There are no words to describe it,
How we mourn you, Comrade Stalin.*

Now all the grief of the candidate-laureate is gone, and he rushed to kick the late Stalin. He dashingly set up a novel (which is impossible to read to the end) under the title "Soldiers are not born", the leitmotif of which is the same: we were not ready for war, the army was decapitated, and do not know how to fight, because soldiers are not born, it is still necessary to learn. According to Simonov, the Germans won because they were born soldiers, so how could we compete with them?

Khrushchev and his acolytes Simonov, Nekrich, Sholokhov and others said many nasty things about our country, about our army, about our designers, about our industry, about our tanks and airplanes, about our soldiers and officers, about our generals, about Stalin. But the most vile lie was the claim that Stalin was supposedly afraid of Hitler.

5

For half a century, the legend about the historical role of the XX Congress of the CPSU has settled, hardened, petrified. It sounds like this: fair and gentle Khrushchev, even more fair and intolerant of lies Zhukov and Mikoyan joined them decided to expose the villain Stalin, and their only goal was to restore law and justice. But the evil Stalinists, led by Molotov and Kaganovich, resisted this.

This legend misses a key link.

It was Beria and Malenkov, not Khrushchev and Zhukov, who began to cleanse the country of Stalin's legacy. Their approach: not to cut down the cult of personality with a dissecting blow, but to put on the brakes. Beria and Malenkov cautiously, without ringing all the bells, little by little curtailed the most vivid manifestations of the cult. They stopped the publication of Stalin's

works, ordered to gradually remove from libraries books Stalin and about Stalin, remove his portraits and dismantle monuments, instructed the engineers of human souls to reduce the fervor of praise in the press, literature and art.

In addition - and this is the main thing - Beria and Malenkov began to change the economic structure of the country: they stopped dozens of giant construction projects that no one needed, from the "dead road" Salekhard - Igarka

to the Volga-Ural gravity canal. At Beria's suggestion, the functions of capital construction, including railroad construction, were removed from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the production and construction departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were transferred to the relevant ministries. On Beria's initiative, a broad amnesty was declared, hundreds of thousands of people were released from prisons and camps. Beria and Malenkov went further. They clearly planned to dissolve collective farms, that is, they were going to abolish slavery in the Soviet Union. Their goal was not loud revelations, but to turn the country's economy away from the ruinous path.

In two decades China will follow this path: without slinging mud at the deceased Mao, the country, under the leadership of smart people, first slowly and cautiously, and then vigorously and decisively shook off the "great ideas". The new Chinese leaders gave people economic freedom, the country has become an economic, industrial, technological, financial and military superpower, and Chairman Mao, who was not exposed after his death, is sleeping peacefully in a gilded coffin.

The path that Beria and Malenkov were trying to lead the country down was completely unacceptable to Khrushchev and Zhukov. Zhukov, on Khrushchev's orders, personally arrested Marshal of the Soviet Union Beria. Beria was tried and shot by Zhukov's subordinates.

Zhukov conducted atomic bomb tests at the Totsk test site to prove to the doubting leaders that Khrushchev's calculation of a military takeover of Western Europe was realistic. Through these exercises, Zhukov helped Khrushchev bring down Malenkov.

After that, Khrushchev and Zhukov needed loud revelations of Stalin, so that, having blamed all the troubles on Stalin, not to turn from the Stalinist path.

That the people should not be given freedom and land.

The border guards would kill anyone who tried to escape from the

Khrushchev-Zhukov paradise.

So that the majority of the country's population doesn't have passports.

So that this majority are not citizens of their own country.

So that the majority of this majority would work on collective farms, where no money was paid for work and where you could not escape without a passport even to a neighboring country.
small town.

The exposure of Stalin at the XX Congress was necessary for Khrushchev to seize power in the country. The tactic is simple: Stalin is bad, Khrushchev exposes him, therefore, Khrushchev is good.

The country was on the brink of economic collapse. Khrushchev seized power, blamed all crimes on Stalin, and started history "from scratch". This trick made it possible to prolong the agony of the country for dozens of years.

The loyal Stalinist Khrushchev was the first to officially oppose Stalin, while Molotov, Kaganovich and other associates of Stalin did not think of this, and therefore any of them Khrushchev could now declare them Stalinists and shove them down from the top of power.

This congress was even more important for the Minister of Defense, Marshal Zhukov of the Soviet Union:

By exposing Stalin, Khrushchev automatically exposed the Communist Party, whose leader for 30 years was Stalin.

Exposing Stalin, Khrushchev also exposed the punitive organs, which by Stalin's order created bloody lawlessness in the country.

There were three real forces in the country: the Party, the GB and the army. Khrushchev at the XX Congress smeared the Party and the GB with mud and blood, and only the army remained clean.

Khrushchev exposed Stalin as a talentless commander, thus giving Zhukov the opportunity to take the place of a brilliant military leader and savior of the Fatherland in the war against fascism.

The line of the 20th Congress of the CPSU was not to abandon either Stalin's domestic policy or foreign policy. The country was still living in a besieged camp. The country was governed by the only true ideology, a step away from which was considered an escape.

Khrushchev proclaimed: "Communism is the bright future of all mankind" - that is, he announced that Stalin's course for world revolution remained unchanged. And these words were not empty talk. The country invested all its energies in the production of weapons and only weapons. New approaches to solving the question of ensuring the happiness of all mankind

were also outlined. It is enough to remember that international terrorism sharply intensified in the year of the XX Congress of the CPSU thanks to the efforts of Khrushchev and Zhukov. That is why it happened.

From the first moment of the communist dictatorship, the leaders of the proletariat have tried to extend their economic and political power to the surrounding territories: "Give Warsaw! Give Berlin! We've already hit the Crimea!"

The Soviet leaders had two methods of struggle in their arsenal: liberation campaign (direct intervention) or revolution (inciting unrest in the enemy camp). They used both of these methods in turn or simultaneously.

After all the forces of the state had been squandered in the Civil War, Trotsky proposed that all the spiritual, intellectual, economic and natural resources of the Soviet Union be thrown into fomenting permanent revolution throughout the world.

Stalin had a different approach: to direct all the forces of the Soviet Union to the preparation of liberation campaigns, the enemies to clash in a suicidal battle, and when they exhausted and exhausted each other, to throw into battle the Red Army and liberate Europe and Asia from the horrors of capitalism.

Hitler thwarted Stalin's plan. So after World War II, the leaders of the Soviet Union found themselves in a strategic stalemate. The countries with free economies stood united in the face of the communist threat. It was impossible to pit them once again in a suicidal war. Khrushchev was left with only the path suggested by Trotsky: permanent revolution.

Since 1956, the Soviet Union has sharply increased ideological, personnel, military and financial support for so-called national liberation movements around the world. Secret centers for training both ordinary terrorists and organizers of guerrilla warfare were established in the USSR. Training was provided both by the KGB and the GRU. One of these centers was the Odessa Higher Combined Arms Command School, which was under tight control of the GRU. In this school was deployed the so-called "guerrilla faculty", which trained fighters from Asia, Africa and Latin America. In 1965, the faculty grew to such a size that the school had to be divided into Odessa and Kiev. The dark-skinned freedom fighters remained in Odessa, while the Soviet cadets were sent to Kiev.

Beginning in the mid-1950s, guerrilla warfare and related terrorist attacks around the world gained momentum, and soon spiraled out of the control of Soviet comrades.

But the further our leaders stretched their raking hands, the worse the

situation in the Soviet Union and the countries under its control became.

It could have gone up in flames at any moment.

6

Khrushchev had to spill the gruel brewed by himself at the XX Congress. Rumors about the crimes of Stalin and his secret police crawled across Europe. The entire socialist camp was shaken, and here's why.

The crimes of the communists in the territories of the former Russian Empire were no secret to anyone. During the Civil War, millions of citizens fled the country. The evidence was abundant; the book by Sergei Melgunov, "The Red Terror in Russia," was worth the price of admission alone.

After World War II, hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of former citizens of the Soviet Union who found themselves abroad did not wish to return to the homeland of the world proletariat. Each of them could become a witness to a high-profile trial on the crimes of the Communists. One such trial took place. And no one was able to refute what Viktor Kravchenko [\[2\]](#) told the court.

Enough has been said and written about the crimes of the communists to recognize the entire ideology and practice of communism as criminal. But the West did not do so. Someone had a very profitable business, exporting treasures and irreplaceable natural resources from the Soviet Union. Someone was on the payroll of the Kremlin and the Lubyanka. Someone was profitable to cross out the Soviet Union from the number of civilized states and forget about it completely, declaring that Russia is not Europe. And for most ordinary people, the result of the last soccer match between Arsenal and Chelsea was much more important than the deaths of millions in some distant, incomprehensible country isolated from the whole world.

Khrushchev's speech at the 20th Congress of the CPSU had a deafening effect, not because some unknown facts were revealed to the world, but because

because they have been officially confirmed by the chief communist of planet Earth. All those things which only yesterday the bought friends of the Soviet Union had called lies, slander and silly fabrications of hired bourgeois scribblers, suddenly turned out to be true. Khrushchev, without wishing to do so, actually put the communists of all countries of the world before a choice: each of them had to recognize himself either as a member of an organized criminal group or as a complete idiot who does not want to see and understand

anything.

Khrushchev's speech inflicted a mortal wound on the entire world communist movement. It has never again been able to rise to those shining heights of ostensible moral purity and justice from which the 20th Congress of the CPSU brought them down.

The situation had to be stabilized somehow. Khrushchev summoned his advisor, Shuisky Grigory Trofimych, and puzzled over the question: what shall we do?

Grigory Trofimych himself realized that at the XX Congress they had overreached a bit. That's why he stayed up at night, staring at the ceiling, looking for solutions, knowing that such a question would be asked. He found solutions, but he was in no hurry to report them until Khrushchev himself asked.

And so the question is asked. And immediately the answer was received. First: the International Festival of Youth and Students was planned for the next year, 1957, in Moscow. Nothing special was planned: bring three thousand deadbeats from different countries, feed them, feed them, tell them about the advantages of socialism. But what if we turn this festival into a world event, a celebration of peace and friendship? Not three thousand, but thirty thousand?

Nikita was on fire. And Trofimych just kept saying: invite American, German, Chinese, and French students from all over Africa, and from Japan, Guatemala, and Peru! Let's have a feast for the whole world! With songs and dances! In Moscow, paint the facades. The construction of the Luzhniki stadium is just about to be completed. One hundred thousand spectators! We'll organize a parade of participants at the stadium! The Roman god of war, Mars, went to war, and a white dove made a nest in his helmet. Since then, the white dove has been a symbol of peace. The dove brought Noah a fresh leaf to the ark as a symbol of hope. Let's release 100,000 white doves over the stadium! After that, no one will ever think of Stalin will remember. And our message to the world: under Stalin there was a prison of nations, and now, look, freedom!

Nikita Sergeyevich praised his advisor: a man does not sit in his office for nothing. Anything else?

There's more.

On July 13, the Americans announced that they would launch an artificial satellite next year, 1957. The first man-made moon will be American. And it will weigh a whopping 1.5 kilograms! We can't keep up with them. But why

not try? They'll launch it, and then we'll follow them: don't get too cocky! It'll be a sensation!

Key point

At the 20th Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev and Zhukov delivered a crushing blow to the Soviet Union. They were taking aim at Stalin, as it were. Khrushchev and Zhukov declared: Stalin was bad, he shot good communists. It appeared that Khrushchev and Zhukov had stopped this outrage by canceling the mass purges of the ruling class. The mass shooting of the leaders stopped. The pyramid of punishments turned upside down. Under Stalin, the higher a party secretary was, the more severe the punishment awaited him if he committed a mistake or a crime. Under the will of Khrushchev and Zhukov, everything became the opposite: the higher the position of the leader, the less punishment he received.

There are still some comrades who do not consider the 20th Congress of the CPSU a crime. They almost credit the 20th Congress to Khrushchev and Zhukov. At first glance, the abolition of mass purges of the ruling stratum is a positive phenomenon, but its negative consequences clearly outweighed the positive ones.

In a normal society, there is constantly a natural change of the country's leadership. In a socialist society, there is no mechanism of change and there cannot be. And here is why.

In socialist society there is no exploitation of man by man. Factories, power plants, oil pipelines, mines, railroads, newspapers, radio, television and everything else are in the hands of the state, that is, in the hands of state structures, that is, in the hands of officials, bureaucrats.

He who has achieved power owns it all. He has all the means in his hands to consolidate his power forever: on his order all kinds of Sholokhovs and Simonovs praise the wisdom of the leaders, various berries and hedgehogs guard their peace.

Those who do not break into power have nothing. He gets into full economic and, consequently, political, ideological and any other kind of dependence on the state, that is, on officials and bureaucrats.

Those who have not broken into power have no means of replacing those who have. He has no publishing houses, no money, no paper, no printing presses, no newspapers or magazines in which to describe the leaders who are mad with power, decayed, drunk and corrupt. Therefore, those who have

broken through cannot be replaced.

If you start composing jokes about the leaders or writing slogans on the walls at night, the secret police will find you out, catch you, and do what they do to enemies of the people. And rightly so: what are you, villain, against socialism? Do you want to bring back the exploitation of man by man? It's not enough to kill you, you bastard!

In a normal society, property is dispersed in the hands of different groups of people. This dispersed ownership is the economic basis for political diversity: each party has its own sources of funding.

Under socialism, property is in the hands of the state. That is why there can be only one political party. Other parties have nowhere to get money even for a modest room for storing party documents. There can be only one way to obtain funds: to snoop around enemy embassies, which, we agree, is contrary to the interests of the state and is suppressed by it.

There are scoundrels and scoundrels in every country. But because property is dispersed, all these scoundrels and crooks are dispersed in different political parties and groups. And they fight among themselves, which makes the society win and prosper.

And in a socialist society there is only one party, and that is the party of power. All scoundrels and scoundrels rush to this party. They are all gathered under one banner. Once in power, they do not want to leave, and society has no mechanisms to get rid of them.

Stalin used the only possible way in such a situation to improve the leadership caste - forced rotation of cadres. This process was called the purge of the party.

Stalin carried out purges on a regular basis. From the Communist Party - hence, from power - he chased out all those who had gotten fat, greedy, corrupt, failed in their assigned work.

Those ousted from key positions became more and more numerous. Their discontent had been accumulating for years and decades. At any moment, the discontent of hundreds of thousands of former secretaries and chiefs, chairmen and directors, commissioners and superintendents could boil over and erupt into a revolt. Therefore, Stalin had to not only expel, but starting from some stage and destroy the expelled.

Before World War II, Stalin purified the Communist Party. However, in the course of the war rose up, gained strength, tasted the sweetness of unlimited power new thousands of swindlers and swindlers. They engaged in theft and looting. They, who professed universal equality and social justice,

had stolen gold ringing in their hands, they decorated their houses, apartments and country houses with antique furniture from old European castles and paintings from European museums. The new nobility gained weight.

That is why after the war Stalin drove from the top of the corrupt Zhukov, Telegin, Kryukov and the like.

That's why after the war Stalin was preparing a new Great Purification.

That is why he was killed by his loyal associates and disciples.

Khrushchev and Zhukov organized the XX Congress of the CPSU in order to expose Stalin. But do not think that they did their black deed out of the goodness of their hearts, just do not ascribe to them nobility.

Both Khrushchev and Zhukov were guided by completely different motives. They sought to preserve the power of the Communist Party over the country and their personal power over the Communist Party.

The abolition of mass purges was terribly liked by secretaries of all ranks, and therefore all of them unanimously supported the line of the XX Congress. But

as soon as Khrushchev and Zhukov canceled the mass purges of the leadership, the country stagnated.

Here are examples.

Soviet Foreign Minister Comrade Gromyko remained in his post for 28 years, after which he was promoted.

Finance Minister Zverev has served 22 years in the same position.

Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Suslov - 35 years.

Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin is 26 years old.

General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Brezhnev - 18 years. If he had not died, he would have remained in the Kremlin for all time.

Lieutenant-General Kudryavtsev, head of the topographic service of the Soviet Army - 30 years.

Uzbekistan's host Rashidov is 24 years old.

USSR Prosecutor General Rudenko - 28 years old.

Minister of Foreign Trade Patolichev - 27 years old.

Minister of Railways Beshchev - 29 years old.

Chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee Baibakov - for a total of 22 years, simultaneously serving as Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers for 20 years.

Admiral Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, is 30 years old.

The list is enormous. Everyone can continue it himself. The servants of the people sat in their posts until they became senile, to the point of deepest

marasmus, and only death tore them from the ranks of fighters for the bright future of mankind.

Those who got to power pulled their relatives and acquaintances to the top. First of all, the sons and husbands of their daughters.

Brezhnev's son Yuri Leonidovich was a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, and a major general in the Soviet Army, without having served a day in the army.

Yuri Churbanov, Brezhnev's son-in-law, became First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs. Churbanov became a colonel at the age of 34 and a colonel general at the age of 44.

The irremovability of leadership spread like a bad disease among our brothers in the socialist camp. Comrade Janos Kadar, for example, ruled Hungary for 32 years. By the standards

In most Western countries, that's eight presidential terms without a break. But it was not because of Moscow's influence at all. It is an objective law of socialism. He who has seized all the property in the country rules until the more nimble overthrow him or until his death.

Wherever "social justice" triumphed, wherever property came under the control of the state, socialist ruling dynasties were established without our participation.

Power in Syria and Azerbaijan has passed from father to son, and in North Korea even to a grandson.

The 20th Congress of the CPSU abolished Stalin's practice of mass forced change of the leading stratum.

The result was the rotting of the country, its disintegration and demise.

Actors

AVRAHAMY PAVLOVICH ZAVENYAGIN. Born in 1901. During the Civil War at the age of 18 headed the political department of the division. After the war he worked for the party, a protégé of Khrushchev.

In January 1933, Zavenyagin was appointed director of the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine, which was being built by the hands of prisoners. In 1934 he became a candidate member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. In 1938, Zavenyagin was appointed head of the Norilsk Gulag of the NKVD of the USSR, and at the same time was appointed director of the Norilsk Mining and Metallurgical Combine, which was built exclusively by prisoners.

In March 1941, Zavenyagin was appointed deputy head of the NKVD, he was subordinated to four independent GULAGs (Main Directorate of Railway Construction Camps - GULZhDS, Glavpromstroy, Glavgidrostroy and the Main Directorate of Mining and Metallurgical Industry Camps - GULGMP) and two separate camp directorates (Dalstroy and the Directorate of Camps for the Construction of Kuibyshev Factories, ULSKZ, which in addition to the aircraft factories built Stalin's underground command post in Kuibyshev and the reserve capital of the Soviet Union).

In 1945, Zavenyagin became Beria's deputy in charge of the Soviet atomic project and was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general. In February 1955, he was appointed deputy chairman of the The USSR Council of Ministers and Minister of Medium Machine Building (the Ministry of Medium Machine Building was engaged in the production of nuclear weapons). At the 20th Congress of the CPSU, Zavenyagin became a member of the CPSU Central Committee. He was twice Hero of Socialist Labor, Stalin Prize laureate, holder of six Orders of Lenin.

In September 1956, at the Semipalatinsk test site, Avrahamy Pavlovich Zavenyagin, a member of the CPSU Central Committee, deputy head of the Soviet government and Minister of Medium Machine Building, supervised the preparation of a nuclear bomb for a military exercise on the topic "The use of tactical airborne troops following an atomic strike in order to hold the affected area until the advancing troops approached from the front". On September 10, 1956, during the exercise, Zavenyagin received a powerful dose of radiation and died on December 31 of the same year.

SERGEI MATVEYEVICH SHTEMENKO. After Beria's arrest, Army General Shtemenko, Chief of the General Staff, was removed from his post, demoted to lieutenant general and sent to serve in Siberia.

On September 13, 1954, on the eve of the atomic bomb exercise at the Totsk test site, Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov summoned Lieutenant General Shtemenko, Chief of Staff of the Siberian Military District, and had a conversation with him. Zhukov needed a man who could go for a very serious matter.

Shtemenko named Lieutenant General Mamsurov, commander of the 27th Rifle Corps of the 13th Army of the Precarpathian Military District.

Zhukov accepted the advice and did everything possible to ensure that Lieutenant General Mamsurov was elevated to the higher position of commander of the 38th Army of the Precarpathian Military District.

The second meeting between Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov and Lieutenant General Shtemenko, Chief of Staff of the Siberian Military District, took place after the 20th Congress of the CPSU. Zhukov asked whether Shtemenko had not changed his opinion of Mamsurov. Shtemenko confirmed his confidence.

In the previous book we traced the fate of Lieutenant General Shtemenko up to this point. On August 31, 1956, through the efforts of Zhukov, Lieutenant General Shtemenko was returned to Moscow, was appointed Chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff - GRU GSH.

GRIGORY TROFIMOVICH SHUISKY. Born in 1907. Graduated from the Ukrainian Communist University of Journalism. Worked in the editorial offices of Kiev newspapers "Communist" and "Komsomolets Ukrainy", in April 1941 was sent to work in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. And the master of Ukraine at that time was Nikita Khrushchev.

The tale of the first meeting between Khrushchev and Shuisky has several rather close variants. I pass on the one that seems to me the most probable.

So, a young fighter of the ideological front, who survived and rose in the years of the Great Purification, is waiting in the reception room to appear for the first time before the formidable member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, First Secretary of the Kiev Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine Nikita Khrushchev.

The history of mankind, I remind you, is a chain of coincidences. It turned out that we had to wait for a long time. Khrushchev left his office and returned. He had enough to do in April 1941. And so, once again leaving his office, Khrushchev did not have time at the last moment to suppress a grimace of anguish.

- What's wrong with you, Nikita Sergeyevich?

Nikita was embarrassed and confessed: he was tormented by a bureaucratic problem - hemorrhoids.

- Have you tried the folk method? In a sitting position, inhale deeply, hold your breath, exhale deeply, at that moment pull your exhaust pipe into yourself with all your might and hold it as long as you can. Repeat once or several times in a row, but that a day not less than a hundred times. And one more thing: wash a geranium leaf, wet it, roll it up in a tube and put it in...

right, in the exhaust pipe. A simple hole. Don't forget to drink clean water, at least two liters a day.

Khrushchev hummed vaguely, turned the conversation to another topic, asked who he was, where he came from, what he saw as his mission. the task in the new position, what he intends to preserve at the new place of work, and what he intends to break, destroy and mercilessly uproot.

We talked for about five minutes right in the reception area, without even sitting down. Nikita wished success to the young specialist and let him go.

And three days later he called me into his bright office and offered me a leather armchair to sit in. He sat down opposite me. It was not the chair by the desk, but the one by the wide window under the ficus tree. And a low table between them. On the table there was a bottle covered in ice, two crystal glasses and Kremlin-standard snacks.

Drinks.

Khrushchev thanked the young specialist: he felt better! In spite of the fact that he had been treated by the best Kremlin doctors for so many years.

Grisha Shuisky was horrified: how so? At the Kremlin doctors? How can you? But they all got a job there on the back of their hands!

Thus began the joint work of Khrushchev and Shuisky. It lasted for almost a quarter of a century. It is said that Shuisky cured Khrushchev, which is why he paid attention to him.

In my opinion, the reason was somewhat different. Any boss can tell who is a good cook and who is a bad one, which chauffeur is a skillful driver and which one is not so good, which secretary types documents on time and without mistakes and which one misses and confuses words and letters. But how can a big boss distinguish a good doctor from a charlatan?

No way. They all wear white coats and have glasses or pince-nez on a string. If they agree among themselves to call each other medical luminaries, how can they be accused of ignorance, if they repeat in chorus that medicine is powerless in this case?

Maybe, at the dawn of the workers' and peasants' power in 1918, the best specialists of the country were gathered in the Kremlin polyclinic. But then they, these best, pulled up their relatives, friends and acquaintances. To the free Kremlin bread. To closed distribution centers. To luxurious wards. To crispy robes. And those who had settled down in warm places by blagot, pulled up their acquaintances, friends and relatives.

Khrushchev had never thought about it, but hearing this from a young specialist, he appreciated it: he was not a fool.

Since then, Khrushchev was treated by folk healers, and was formally a patient of the Kremlin polyclinic.

CHAPTER 2

1

On October 23, 1956, it went up in flames in Hungary.

It all started with a student demonstration in Budapest. And the demonstration in Budapest began with the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Nikita Khrushchev, the leader of all communists on the planet, declared Stalin a criminal and a bloody tyrant. Khrushchev's speech at the XX Congress was declared secret, but it was immediately distributed to all party organizations and soon published in exactly one million copies. With this one speech Khrushchev dealt a fatal blow to the whole of international communism and shattered it into small fragments.

Let us try to imagine the situation in which the leaders of all countries where a political system in our image was established found themselves. Most of these countries were occupied by the Soviet Army. By order of Moscow, the leaders of all communist parties spent ten years praising Stalin, erecting monuments to him, publishing his works in millions of copies, declaring him the corypheus of all sciences, the genius of all times and peoples, and building the life of their countries in the manner taught by Comrade Stalin.

But the Great Leader and Teacher suddenly turned out to be a thug.

Our government was Soviet. From a young age I tried to figure out: who was it that we consulted and with whom? Khrushchev did not consult with the proletarian leaders of the socialist countries on the issue of the forthcoming exposure of Stalin, nor did he warn them of the forthcoming exposures. Khrushchev and Zhukov jumped off Stalin's streetcar. Together with them, the entire Communist Party of the Soviet Union jumped off.

All the other communists of the world were left fooled. It turned out that all communist leaders from Pyongyang and Peking to Tirana and Berlin faithfully served the bloody urkagan. Who should we consider all these leaders to be now? How to call them? How to believe them? How to follow their orders? And who are they? Proxies of a bloody ogre. Who else? That's what Khrushchev's speech said.

2

China, because of its greatness, broke away at once. It was forbidden to distribute the materials of the 20th Congress of the CPSU in China. Officially, there was no breakup at the state level yet, because China needed advanced

Soviet technologies, including aviation, missile and nuclear technologies. But in the most important area, ideological, the paths of the Soviet Union and China diverged instantly and forever.

Albania was not afraid of Soviet tanks because it was covered by Yugoslavia. Therefore, the Albanian leaders were not enthusiastic about the decisions of the XX Congress, and a few years later they broke away from the warm wing of Moscow.

And imagine the situation in which the leaders of the brotherly communist parties of Italy and France found themselves! In Kolyma the convicts washed gold, in Siberia they felled timber, the Soviet Union made a lot of money from this, and used this money to support the communist leaders of Canada and Uruguay, Argentina and the USA, and many more all over the world. These comrades lived cheerfully and carefree, calling the proletariat to the victory of communism. For decades, the truth about the Soviet Union burst onto the pages of newspapers and magazines in various countries. The communist leaders of Western countries called this truth a malicious slander of corrupt bourgeois scribblers. And suddenly, the chief communist of the planet completely confirmed all this "malicious slander" and added something from himself.

But the leaders of those countries whose peace was protected by the Soviet Army had it the worst. As China had done, they could not get away with it. What could these leaders do? To gather congresses of their parties and tell about Stalin's crimes or to leave everything as it was?

And the first option is dangerous.

And the second one.

If you announce that Stalin was a criminal, people will start asking different questions.

If you don't, there will be questions. And very unpleasant ones at that.

3

In Moscow, meanwhile, de-Stalinization was going on quietly at night. As the song goes: the plaster statue was removed quietly. The same thing was expressed by Alexander Galich. Situation: the prisoners were raised at night. They thought it was the end. But they were not woken up for the sake of shooting:

Cum finished his cucumber

*And finished with flour:
"Turned out to be our Father
Not a father, but a bitch..."*

*Full on, brothers, atatouille!
A memorial service with dancing!
And the statues are ordered
Get off the station overnight.*

If the younger generation is not aware, a kum is an OGPU-NKVD-MVD operative in the camp, the "daddy" of all snitches.

Our people are accustomed to this. Since 1917 we have been ruled by two great geniuses, Lenin and Stalin, and hordes of enemies - Trotsky and Radek, Bukharin and Zinoviev, Kamenev and Tukhachevsky, Rykov, Tomsky, Postyshev, Eikhe, Yagoda, Blucher, Yezhov, Voznesensky, Beria and whole herds of other leaders of various ranks. Yesterday they were great men, yesterday the people carried their portraits at demonstrations and named cities, factories and steamships after them, and suddenly one by one they turned out to be vile dogs. And the people were just as unanimous in demanding stern proletarian retribution: death to dogs!

We are not surprised by such transformations. We were prepared for it. And when it came to Comrade Stalin, our people did not tremble. Our people accepted the debunking with understanding. We only rallied even more closely around our native Communist Party and its Leninist Central Committee, which led us to new victories.

What should Polish, Czech, Romanian leaders do? Stalin's books can be removed from the shelves. Discreetly. You can take down portraits. You can tear pages out of textbooks. But here, for example, in the

Budapest is a huge monument. Comrade Stalin full-length. In boots. In Stalin Square.

If you start dismantling it, even at night, people will come. The Hungarian people have not yet been told that Comrade Stalin was a villain. Only rumors about Comrade Khrushchev's secret speech are circulating in Budapest.

And the Hungarian leaders could not find the right moment to overthrow the cast-iron Stalin. And so Comrade Stalin stood in the middle of Budapest. And the people of Hungary were given an example by the people of brotherly

Poland: it's time to take to the streets. And the people of Hungary took to the streets. Students were the first. They decided to remind their leaders what should be done with monuments to ferocious tyrants. The students went to the monument, tied ropes around it and pulled it down. Only their boots were left on the pedestal.

And so it went. On the same day, the leader of the Hungarian Communists, Comrade Ernő Görö (formerly Minister of State Security), spoke on the radio to condemn the demonstration, calling it a nationalist demonstration. The students then marched to the Radio House to object.

4

We will not understand the demands of the student demonstration of October 23, 1956, unless we remember the Paris Peace Treaty with Hungary, signed on February 10, 1947.

Because the war against Germany and its allies was a coalition war, peace treaties with each of the defeated states were negotiated by a coalition of the following states:

- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
- United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
- United States of America,
- Australia,
- New Zealand,
- Canada,
- Czechoslovakia,
- Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.
- Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic,
- Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic^[3],
- Union of South Africa,
- India.

Article 2 of the treaty obliged the Hungarian government to "*take all measures necessary to ensure that all persons under Hungarian jurisdiction, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, enjoy human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of speech, of the press and publication, of religious worship, of political opinion and of public assembly.*"

Article 22 gave the Soviet Union the right "*to keep on the territory of Hungary such armed forces as it shall require to maintain the lines of communication of the Soviet Army with the Soviet zone of occupation in*

Austria."

Taking advantage of Article 22, Comrade Stalin introduced into Hungary not only those troops that were necessary to maintain communications with Austria, but also those that allowed for "radical social and economic transformations."

As a result of the "transformations" a very small party, but armed with the only true doctrine, suddenly found itself in power, which, for the sake of disguise, was not called a communist party. Its name was the Hungarian Workers' Party, VPT.

As a result of various manipulations, pressure and intimidation, the members of the ERT won 70 seats out of 409 in the parliament during the voting. This was enough for the party to be recognized as the main winner.

All other parties had to be banned. That's right. They didn't have the one true doctrine. Who would want them like that?

The activists of all the wrong parties had to be imprisoned. And the USPT itself had to be constantly and thoroughly purged. Purging means not only expulsion from the party ranks, but often a sentence, including a life sentence, or even a tie around the neck made of soapy rope.

At the head of the only correct party was established the only correct leader Comrade Rakosi, guarded by hot-hearted boys from the AUN secret police, whose level of brutality was admired even by their Soviet teachers from the MGB.

Comrade Rakosi, who ruled Hungary indiscriminately, was officially considered "Comrade Stalin's best disciple."

No one in Hungary remembered the second article of the peace treaty, which was supposed to guarantee freedom of speech, press, assembly, religious worship and political opinion - to be alive ...

5

But then Comrade Stalin passed away, and new times came. Comrade Rakosi was suspended, then returned, then, having returned, he was slightly displaced, and his sidekick, Comrade Geryo, former Minister of State Security, was put in his place.

At this time, the Soviet Special Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General P. N. Lashchenko, was in Hungary. As part of the Special Corps:

- 2nd Guards Mechanized Division,
- 17th Guards Mechanized Division,
- 177th Guards Bomber Aviation Division,

- 195th Guards Fighter Aviation Division,
- 20th Pontoon Bridge Regiment.

These forces were, to put it mildly, too many for the provision of the routes to Austria. Each mechanized division had eight regiments (a heavy self-propelled tank, a tank regiment, three mechanized regiments with their own tanks, two artillery regiments, and an anti-aircraft artillery regiment), not counting individual battalions.

The presence of a fighter aviation division can be justified if desired. But what was the bomber aviation division doing there? What routes to Austria was it guarding?

6

The political crisis in Hungary arose not least because Comrades Khrushchev and Zhukov faced the key task of liberating Europe from the shackles of capitalism. From the point of view of military geography, it was advantageous for Khrushchev and Zhukov to split the united front of Western European states from east to west by the barrier of two neutral states.

That is why Soviet diplomacy pushed through the idea of turning Austria into a neutral state. The Soviet comrades achieved their goal. On May 15, 1955, in Vienna, representatives of

The Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and France signed a State Treaty with Austria. Austria became a neutral state which, together with Switzerland, divided the common front of Western Europe into two parts.

If the Soviet Army ^[4]and all the Armed Forces of the USSR will act against West Germany, the transfer of even a hundred fighters from Italy, Greece, Turkey or from aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean Sea will be a problem. If the Armed Forces of the USSR will act in the Mediterranean basin, it will be difficult for the bourgeoisie to transfer reserves from West Germany, Belgium, Holland. Therefore, it was very profitable for Khrushchev and Zhukov to make Austria neutral.

But then, like a nail in the shoe, there was some inconvenience arising from Article 22 of the peace treaty with Hungary, signed only eight years earlier, also by the Soviet Union. According to this article, Soviet Army troops were in Hungary only to provide routes to Austria. Since Austria was becoming a neutral country, all foreign troops were withdrawn from it, and the Soviet Army no longer had any need to secure communications with Austria. Consequently, the Soviet Army had nothing more to do in Hungary.

What is to be done? How to leave Soviet troops in Hungary in defiance of the peace treaty signed, among other things, by the government of Comrade Stalin?

A way out has been found. We can do it. When they want to.

The treaty with Austria was signed on May 15, 1955. And a day earlier, on May 14, 1955, the Warsaw Pact was signed between the Soviet Union and the subject countries of Central Europe. And the United Armed Forces headed by Marshal Konev of the Soviet Union were established.

That's it. It's sleight of hand.

Until May 14, 1955, Soviet Army troops were in Hungary on the basis of the Paris Peace Treaty to ensure communications with Austria. From May 14, 1955, the same Soviet Army troops were in Hungary on the basis of the Warsaw Pact to protect Hungary from enemy attack.

The inclusion of Hungary in the Warsaw Pact and the stationing of Soviet Army troops on Hungarian territory in accordance with that treaty was nothing less than a violation of the Treaty of Paris.

From whom did the leaders of Hungary, a signatory of the Warsaw Pact, decide to defend themselves? Hungary had no common borders with any of the NATO states. Hungary has only a small piece of border with neutral Austria. In the recent past, Austria and Hungary were parts of a single monarchy. There is no reason for them to go to war.

There was a common border with Yugoslavia. But Yugoslavia had no reason to attack Hungary either. And then there are the borders with Czechoslovakia, Romania and the Soviet Union. I think that the Hungarian leaders were not very afraid of the Czechs and Romanians invading. So Hungary had no one to fear.

Except for the Soviet Union.

7

Let's look now at the situation from Stalin Square in Budapest.

Austria was part of the Third Reich. Hitler himself came from Austria. And so Austria gained state independence, became neutral, and all foreign troops were withdrawn from its territory.

Hungary was not part of the Third Reich, it was just an ally of Germany in World War II. But for some reason foreign troops are not being withdrawn from its territory. And no one is going to make Hungary neutral.

Any normal person would ask: why? Why not make Hungary neutral, like Austria?

With this question, students marched to the Radio House.

The Radio House was guarded by units of the AVH secret police. The fight of armed guards against the unarmed crowd began. In order to obtain weapons, the demonstrators stormed the barracks of the construction barracks. After that the battle was on an equal footing.

Key point

In the Soviet Union we were shown pictures of the savage massacres of the Hungarian people against the Chekists. They were hung by their feet from trees and hammered with steel bars, they were poured with acid, they were nailed to a

nails on the floor, they were doused with gasoline and set on fire. People everywhere destroyed monuments to Lenin, burned portraits of the leaders and Marxist literature.

Looking at these horrific pictures, our fists clenched and our hearts overflowed with anger.

But no one explained to us why the people of Hungary disliked the Chekists so much. Instead, a simple idea was hammered into our heads: history has no subjunctive mood. You can't take back what has happened. Therefore, there is nothing to rake up the past.

The first part of the statement is undeniable: the past cannot be undone. But why don't we turn it around, learning lessons for the future?

After a chess game, hundreds and thousands of experts and amateurs analyze the mistakes of grandmasters. After the teacher has checked the dictation, scribbled red ink on the notebooks and assigned grades, the students do error work. After the flying day is over, the commander of the aviation regiment conducts a flight debriefing.

After the Tu-4 bomber threw a nuclear bomb at the Totsk range and the troops through the epicenter broke out into the operational space, Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov gathered the generals and conducted a review of the exercise: you acted correctly, but next time you should take into account these blunders.

Our country is flying into the abyss. Who is preventing us from analyzing our flights? Did we, unlike the peoples of other countries, miss our historical chance when we forgave the executioners their crimes and left them to sit in cozy offices?

The past cannot be brought back. But it would be interesting to know what

path our history would have taken if our people had acted more decisively at the appropriate moment?

CHAPTER 3

1

The Soviet comrades knew that the situation in Hungary was tense. The Soviet ambassador, Comrade Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, reported this to Moscow.

And he was not the only one. Comrades from the KGB and GRU worked in Hungary, saw everything with their own eyes, and wrote reports to Moscow. The reports were becoming more and more alarming, especially against the background of the fact that it could explode in Poland at any moment.

Lieutenant General Lashchenko, commander of the Special Corps, received Zhukov's order as early as June 1956 to develop a plan to provide international assistance to the brotherly people of Hungary and, if necessary, to restore order in someone else's home. The plan of pacification received the conventional name "Wave". On July 20, 1956, Zhukov approved the plan.

On October 23, 1956, the very day that the statue of Stalin broke along the boot line and crumbled to the sidewalk, Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Zhukov from Moscow ordered the commander of the Special Corps, Lieutenant General Lashchenko, to raise the corps on red alert and put into effect the "Wave" plan.

The 17th Guards Mechanized Division was on the border with Austria. Its task was to cover the border.

The 2nd Guards Mechanized Division moved on Budapest.

To reinforce the Special Corps under the "Wave" plan, one division from the Soviet forces in Romania, the 33rd Guards Mechanized Division, and two divisions from the Precarpathian Military District, the 11th Guards Mechanized Division and the 128th Guards Rifle Division, were brought into Hungary. The commanders of these three divisions had orders to break through the border with combat if necessary, using whatever means they had at their disposal.

On October 24 at 2 a.m., the first tanks of the 2nd Guards Mechanized Division entered the streets of Budapest.

At 2:15 a.m., the advanced detachments of the 11th Guards Mechanized Division, breaking the border barriers, crossed the Soviet-Hungarian border.

At 6 a.m. the units of the 33rd Guards Mechanized Division entered the territory of Hungary with the main forces.

That same night, the 108th Guards Airborne Parachute Regiment of the 7th Guards Airborne Division from the Baltic Military District landed at the Tököl airfield. Soon two more parachute regiments of the 31st Guards Airborne Division from the Kiev Military District were also airlifted here.

The airfield was placed under heavy guard. The command center of the Special Corps and the Soviet Embassy were moved here. Tököl became something like Versailles during the suppression of the Paris Commune.

By dawn the forces of the 2nd Guards Mechanized Division of the Special Corps captured and took under guard the building of the Parliament and the Central Leadership of the Hungarian Workers' Party, the State Bank, the post office, the telegraph, the editorial office of the party newspaper and other particularly important objects.

Marshal Konev of the Soviet Union, Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact countries, was in overall charge of the pacification. His command center was first deployed on Soviet territory in Beregovo, but soon moved to Hungary, to the town of Solnok. The overall leadership of the punitive operation was exercised by the Minister of Defense of the USSR, three times Hero of the Soviet Union Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov.

In total, the Special Corps, which was already in Hungary, had two mechanized and one rifle division, introduced into Hungary from the Soviet Union and Romania:

- 1,130 tanks and SAUs, including IS-3, ISU-152, T-34-85, T-44, T-54, SU-100, and PT-76;
- 380 armored personnel carriers BTR-40, BTR-50P, BTR-152;
- 615 guns and mortars;
- 185 anti-aircraft guns;
- 159 MiG-15 and MiG-17 fighters;
- 122 Il-28 bombers;
- 3,830 automobiles.

The appearance of the Soviet comrades, who had not (yet) been asked to interfere in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, was met with fire. The arriving Soviet troops were immediately engaged in combat.

A tank in the city, like a wolf in a cage, is extremely vulnerable. A tank is not made for fighting in the city. A tank needs space. Zhukov burned two tank

armies in Berlin in 1945 to no avail. The lessons of war didn't serve the great commander well. According to his plans, tanks again broke into a huge city. They burned in Budapest with the same bright flames as in Berlin.

As soon as the fire reaches the shells, a terrifying explosion blows the turret off. The turret of a T-54 weighs eight and a half tons. The turret of the IS-3 weighs almost twelve tons. When the ammunition pack explodes, the turret flies away like a hot frying pan thrown by a fierce woman across the kitchen.

2

24 October, Comrades Mikoyan, Suslov and Serov arrived at the Tököl airfield in three different airplanes under the protection of fighter planes.

Mikoyan - member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

Suslov - member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

Serov - Hero of the Soviet Union, General of the Army, Chairman of the KGB.

On the same day, Imre Nagy was elected Chairman of the Hungarian Council of Ministers.

25 October, Soviet troops clashed with demonstrators in the square in front of the parliament, in which dozens were killed and hundreds wounded.

On the same day, Comrades Mikoyan and Suslov reported to the CPSU Central Committee:

In front of the building of the Central Committee of the UPT, a firefight broke out between our tankers and a Hungarian company that had arrived to reinforce the security of the Central Committee building. The tankers suspected in the arrived insurgents. In the exchange of fire 10 men from the Hungarian company were killed and 1

was seriously wounded. It happened when we were meeting with Hungarian comrades in the Central Committee, and a machine gunner from our tank fired a large-caliber machine gun at the windows of the meeting room. Plaster was sprinkled, which caused panic among the Hungarian leading workers.

Only the Hungarian comrades were frightened, if the report is to be

believed, and Comrades Mikoyan and Suslov did not waver.

26 October fighting continued in Budapest and throughout the country.

On October 27, Comrade Geryo was replaced as First Secretary of the CC of the EPT by Comrade Janos Kadar.

Kádár was a supporter of the Soviet withdrawal from Hungary.

3

On October 28, Prime Minister Imre Nagy signed a decree dissolving the AVH secret police. A cease-fire was declared. Marshal of the Soviet Union Konev ordered Soviet troops to leave Budapest and other cities.

The revolution has won!

On October 29, 1956, troops of the Special Corps withdrew from Budapest.

On October 29, 1956, the Suez crisis broke out. The Suez Canal was closed. War broke out in the Suez Canal area. The Suez Canal is oil for Europe. Oil prices skyrocketed. Europe shook.

And Comrades Khrushchev and Zhukov were indescribably delighted. All the attention of Europe, all the attention of the world turned to the war in the area of the Suez Canal. Who will remember Hungary now?

On October 30, Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy announced the restoration of the multi-party system and the scheduling of elections.

On November 1, Imre Nagy announced Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact.

At this time, the Ambassador of the Soviet Union to Hungary, Comrade Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, invited the First Secretary of the Hungarian Workers' Party, Comrade Kadar, to the Tököl airfield for talks on the future of the communist movement in Hungary. Comrade Kádár arrived for the talks. He was politely pushed into the

and took him to the Soviet Union. Comrade Khrushchev met him and promised fraternal international aid to the people of Hungary. Only Comrade Kádár had to ask for this help.

Comrade Kadar was stalling, and the Soviet comrades asked that he ask. We know how to persuade.

They did. And so the Soviet Union formed a legitimate Hungarian government of two men: Janos Kadar and Ferenc Munnich. And the legitimate government of Hungary asked the government of the Soviet Union for help.

Having been asked for help, the Soviet comrades promised to think about it. On November 3, Lieutenant General Pal Maleter, Hungarian Minister of Defense, and his closest aides were invited to the Tököl airfield to resolve the question of the withdrawal of Soviet Army troops. During the negotiations, an agreement was reached on the corridors by which the Soviet troops would leave the country. The Hungarian Minister of Defense picked up the telephone and instructed his subordinates in the Ministry not to fire on the Soviet troops who would be moving along the agreed upon routes.

Afterwards, a small friendly dinner was arranged. We made toasts to the fact that even though we were parting, we would remain friends. We drank, snacked, poured more, a second toast was about to be made, but at that moment the Hero of the Soviet Union, the chairman of the KGB, General of the Army Serov, entered the hall with a group of seizures. The entire leadership of the Hungarian Ministry of Defense was arrested.

Actually, it is customary to let a negotiating parliamentarian go in peace. Even the cannibals of New Guinea do not devour the same cannibals from another tribe who have come to negotiate. But we have to take into account the complexity of the international situation. We must realize that we were talking about a brotherly people who needed help. Did Comrades Khrushchev and Zhukov have the right to let the vicious counter-revolutionaries, enemies of the Hungarian people and of the entire world proletariat out of their hands like that? That's right!

They didn't.

And don't bring up some cannibals from New Guinea when it comes to the happiness of all progressive humanity.

4

On November 3, 1956 at 23:00 Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov transmitted the signal "Grom444" to the commander of the Pre-Carpathian Military District, Army General Batov, and the commander of the Special Corps, Lieutenant General Lashchenko.

In accordance with the signal received on November 4 at 4:15 a.m. Operation "Whirlwind" was launched to defeat the counterrevolution.

There were already in Hungary four Soviet mechanized, one rifle, two aviation divisions and four parachute regiments of the 7th and 31st Guards Airborne Divisions. All of them, in accordance with the agreement reached, were to leave along corridors that had been agreed upon with the Hungarian Minister of Defense. In these corridors the Soviet troops were ordered not to

fire on them.

The Soviet divisions did not go anywhere. Instead, two armies - the 8th Mechanized Army of Lieutenant General Babajanyan of the Tank Forces and the 38th Army of Lieutenant General Mamsurov - were being brought into Hungary from the Pre-Carpathian Military District. They marched along corridors in which no one fired on them.

The Danube divides Hungary into two parts.

The 38th Army was taking control of the borders with Austria and Yugoslavia and all of western Hungary on the right bank of the Danube.

The 8th Mechanized Army was restoring order in eastern Hungary on the left bank of the Danube.

The task of the Special Corps was drastically reduced - only Budapest. The structure of the Special Corps was radically changed.

The 17th Guards Mechanized Division was on the border with Austria. It was excluded from the Special Corps and transferred to the 38th Army.

Two aviation divisions were also withdrawn from the Special Corps. In this case, he did not need them. Pontoon-most regiment - even more so. All of them were transferred to the direct subordination of Marshal Konev.

At the same time, the Special Corps in addition to the 2nd Guards Mechanized Division received in its composition:

- 7th Guards Airborne Division,
- 33rd Guards Mechanized Division, which arrived from Romania,
- 128th Guards Rifle Division from the Pre-Carpathian Military District, and some regiments:
 - 100th Armored Regiment from the 31st Armored Division,
 - 97th Mechanized Regiment from the 27th Mechanized Division,
 - 128th Guards Armored Tank Regiment, 135th Guards Artillery Regiment, and 145th Guards Rifle Regiment from the 66th Guards Rifle Division.

All of them at Zhukov's command entered the battle.

The storming of Budapest was ferocious. The four days of fighting were quite reminiscent of the storming of Berlin in 1945. The similarity was also in the fact that Berlin was stormed by Zhukov's and Konev's troops. Soviet artillery nailed mercilessly. Only after its percussive work did tanks and self-propelled vehicles, covered by infantry and armored personnel carriers with anti-aircraft machine guns, come into the attack.

At the last moment, before a dozen 152 mm shells flew into the News

Agency building, the agency's director, assuming the role of an announcer, delivered a message to the world that ended with the words "we die for Hungary and for Europe."

5

Imre Nagy, the head of the Hungarian government, has taken refuge in the Yugoslav embassy. What should we do with him? He is too popular with the people.

Get out of the country! That's what. That's what they told him: Get out of here to Yugoslavia! We don't want you here. Don't worry, no one will hurt you.

- On November 2, after much coordination and security guarantees, Imre Nagy walked out of the embassy.

And was captured.

He was kept on death row for almost two years. His trial was closed and did not start immediately, but when things had settled down. No one knew there was such a trial going on anywhere.

Head of Government Imre Nagy, Defense Minister Lieutenant General Pal Maleter and other leaders of the revolution were hanged.

They were not hung the way they were hung in other European countries, not on crossbars. The technology here was more advanced. All you need is a vertical pole and a stool. A noose is thrown over the top of the pole. The suicide bomber is placed on the stool or something to replace it. Now the rope on the other side of the pole is picked out, tightening the noose. And the stool is kicked out.

The advantage is that the body doesn't sag or dangle.

* * *

I have always been surprised by the gullibility of the leaders of the Hungarian Revolution.

The General Secretary of the Party went to negotiate with Comrade Andropov. The Minister of Defense went to negotiate with Army General Malinin.

The head of the government believed the immunity guarantees.

You've found someone to trust.

We're not cannibals from New Guinea.

Key point

The Suez Canal is the shortest route from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea. The alternative route around Africa is 8 thousand kilometers longer. The canal is 20 meters deep, up to 169 meters wide in some places, and 163 kilometers long. The canal was built by French engineers on the initiative of the French, according to their designs, with French money, and opened for navigation in 1869.

The Egyptian government received 44% of all shares, but, mired in debt, sold its share to Great Britain. The canal essentially became a Franco-British canal.

During the period in question, Europe's oil supply went mainly through the Suez Canal.

Khrushchev and Zhukov decided to take Europe by the throat by shutting off that faucet.

The great leader of Egypt was Gamal Abdel Nasser, the future Hero of the Soviet Union. Later, on the assignment of Nasser (in 1964)

The Soviet people responded to the USSR's highest degree of distinction with couplets and ditties:

*Lying in the sands, warming his belly.
Hero of the Soviet Union,
Half-fascist, half-asser
Gamal Abdel-Nasser.*

Khrushchev and Zhukov were pushing him to take over the canal. You, they said, sold your vegetable garden, squandered the money, now demand back what you sold, we will support you, we will give you as much arms as you want, we will dam the Nile for free or almost free.

Gamal did as he was taught and took over the canal. In response, what Soviet propaganda called the Anglo-French-Israeli intervention against freedom-loving Egypt ensued.

By diabolical coincidence, the Israeli, British and French war against Egypt began on the very day that Soviet troops withdrew from Budapest and other Hungarian cities and were about to go home for good.

CHAPTER 4

1

For the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution a waterfall of awards and encouragements fell on Soviet generals. On November 26, 1956, for the exemplary work of military intelligence during operations "Wave" and "Whirlwind" the chief of the GRU Lieutenant General Shtemenko was awarded the rank of Colonel-General for the second time.

The Order of Kutuzov of the 1st degree - and this is the third in importance and value, after the Order of Victory and the Order of Suvorov of the 1st degree, a military decoration - was awarded to seven generals, including the chairman of the KGB Hero of the Soviet Union, Army General Serov, the commander of the 38th Army Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General Mamsurov, the commander of the 8th Mechanized Army (since 1957 - the 8th Tank Army) Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General of Tank Troops Babajanyan.

The Order of Bogdan Khmel'nitsky 1st degree (the fourth in importance and value of the military commander's award) was awarded to eight generals, including the commander of the troops of the Precarpathian Military District, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Army General Batov and Lieutenant General Kitaev, General for special assignments under the Minister of Defense of the USSR.

Two times Hero of the Soviet Union Marshal of the Soviet Union Konev, who supervised the punitive operation, and the commander of the Special Corps Lieutenant General Lashchenko received the Order of Lenin.

But the most generous award went to the member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Defense, three times Hero of the Soviet Union Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov: he became the first in our history four times Hero of the Soviet Union. After him, only one more outstanding military leader - Marshal of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev - would reach such heights. All four "Gold Stars" Brezhnev will receive in peacetime for feats performed in the office.

It so happened that his first Soviet order Zhukov received for participation in punitive operations against the Russian people in Tambov province, and the last order of service (not counting pension) - also for a punitive operation, but already against the people of Hungary.

The awarding of the fourth "Gold Star" to Zhukov was out of the question. No laws and decrees do not provide for such an award. Three times Hero is a peak, fixed by decrees. Although this is a great folly.

I understand what a hero is. But how can you be a hero twice? Or three times? It's kind of like being twice a genius or thrice a saint.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Konev directly supervised the punitive operation while in Hungary. He was not given the Gold Star. And Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov exercised general leadership. From Moscow. In Hungary, he did not appear for a day, not for an hour, not for a minute. So what was his heroism?

Zhukov's awarding, so that the fame of the punisher did not stick to him, was disguised as a birthday. December 1, 1956 Zhukov was 60 years old. That day he was given the "Gold Star" and the Order of Lenin. As if on his birthday. But then it's quite funny. What's the heroism? That he didn't drink himself to death before he was 60?

Speaking of the Order of Lenin. When the title of Hero was awarded for the first time, then gave the "Gold Star" and the Order of Lenin (Zhukov's first "Gold Star" at number 435, and the Order of Lenin to it at number 6071). But when the title of Hero was awarded again, they gave only the "Gold Star", but the Order of Lenin to it did not rely. This is the established order. It has always been so, including when Zhukov received the second and third "Gold Star".

And then suddenly, when he received his fourth "Gold Star" he was also given the Order of Lenin, contrary to the law. Who allowed all this outrage?

Let's see.

Power in our country belonged to a body called the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. In the described historical period, the Politburo was called the Presidium of the Central Committee.

Who's in the Presidium?

That's right. After the XX Congress of the CPSU in the Presidium ruled two: Khrushchev and Zhukov. And Zhukov stubbornly pulled the blanket of power on himself. So he rewarded himself.

2

Troop exercises at the Totsk range in September 1954 revealed a weak link in the entire military doctrine of the Soviet Union. To liberate the working class of Europe, it would be necessary to break through the enemy front. But it will not be possible to break through the front as it was broken through in World War II. If several days in a row to collect on the breakthrough areas of

three hundred guns per kilometer with the appropriate amount of ammunition, the enemy, do not be a fool, will strike a nuclear strike on this cluster. Therefore, his defense was to crack without concentrating such masses of artillery. That is - only with a nuclear strike.

However, the slow-moving Tu-4 piston bomber as a carrier of a nuclear charge for such work was clearly not suitable. And the newest bombers of Tupolev, Myasishchev, Ilyushin and Yakovlev were not suitable for such work either. They had the opposite problem - too high a speed. Delivering nuclear strikes deep inside enemy territory was not a problem for them. But how to carry out such strikes on the front line, with their own troops nearby?

If the bomber is traveling at high altitude, bombing accuracy is low. In addition, such an aircraft is easy to detect and shoot down. If the bomber approaches the target at low or ultra-low altitude, the enemy has very little time to react to its appearance. But the aircraft also has little time to distinguish where the front line is, where the end of their own and the beginning of others.

And one more thing: what happens if thousands of tanks and guns, tens of thousands of vehicles and hundreds of thousands of fighters have prepared for an offensive, if the operation is calculated by minutes, but on the approach to the target the bomb carrier is shot down? What should we do in this case? Cancel the offensive in this area, when the neighbors rushed forward?

The experience of troop exercises at the Totsk test site unequivocally indicated that a nuclear strike on the front edge of the

the enemy's airborne means of delivery were inadequate. It was necessary to look for another solution.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov, upon assuming the post of Soviet Defense Minister in February 1955, ordered proposals for the development of delivery vehicles for tactical nuclear weapons with which troops could launch nuclear strikes in close proximity to their location.

Several proposals were put forward. Zhukov selected three, which, in his opinion, promised real results. On November 18, 1955, at Zhukov's suggestion, the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a resolution to begin work simultaneously in three areas.

The first direction: creation of a self-propelled gun of 406 mm caliber and a nuclear projectile for it. There was experience in creating such cannons for ships, there was a technological, production and personnel base. In 1938, the "Soviet Union" battleship was laid down, which became the lead ship in the

series. Each battleship of this type was to carry three three-gun main caliber turrets.

The thickness of the frontal armor of such a turret is almost half a meter. 495 millimeters to be exact. Each turret weighed 2,364 tons. All processes of loading and gun guidance were extremely mechanized. The crew of each gun turret consisted of "only" 105 officers and sailors!

Each barrel and breech weighed 136.7 tons. These guns hurled shells weighing 1,108 kilograms at 45 kilometers. The weight of the charge was 310 kilograms. Barrel life was 300 rounds.

Before the German attack, not a single battleship of the "Soviet Union" type had been launched. Hitler's attack disrupted their construction. After the war, the unfinished hulls were dismantled for metal.

It was decided to use 406mm guns for ground forces. The T-10M tank was used as the base for the self-propelled carriage. It is clear that no carriage can lift a barrel weighing almost 137 tons, so the barrel was shortened, the weight of the projectile was halved, the charge was reduced by a factor of five, and the barrel survivability was reduced by a factor of eight. This allowed to drastically reduce the weight of the breech block, breech block and the barrel itself. The machine turned out to be elegant and light - only 64 tons. It was given index 2A3. This gun could hurl projectiles weighing 570 kilograms at 25 kilometers.

3

Simultaneously with the work on the development of the 406-mm self-propelled gun 2A3, work was underway on the second direction: the development of a self-propelled mortar 2B1 with a caliber of 420 mm on the same base. This mortar could throw mines weighing 670 kilograms at 25 kilometers and active-reactive mines at 50 kilometers.

The mortar had undeniable advantages over the cannon. The combat weight was 55 tons. The Soviet Army had a weight standard of 60 tons. This is the carrying capacity of a four-axle railcar. It was desirable to keep the weight of heavy tanks and any other combat equipment within this limit. Army ferries and other combat vehicles were developed based on the 60-ton weight limit. The 406-mm self-propelled gun jumped this weight limit, but the mortar fit into the weight standards.

The smooth-bore mortar was incomparably easier to produce and had immeasurably greater survivability. The larger caliber and weight of the

ammunition, lower dynamic and thermal loads in the barrel channel at the moment of firing made the task of creating a nuclear charge for such a gun much easier, although the mortar was less accurate.

Both guns had congenital defects. First of all - dimensions: length more than 20 meters, height - 5.7 meters. How could they walk through the streets of cities without cutting electrical wires? How can they squeeze under a bridge overhanging the road, how can they walk across another bridge without falling through?

The third direction was the development of a recoilless gun. The creators of the 452 mm caliber recoilless gun faced other problems that could not be solved.

The testing and fine-tuning of the monsters was still going on when a great date appeared on the horizon - the 40th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Zhukov ordered four self-propelled guns and four mortars to be produced for the great date.

Why four? To show at the parade on November 7, 1957. It gave the impression that these were mass-produced guns, not one-offs.

prototypes that we have something to break through the enemy's front.
Tremble, bourgeois!

4

But there were other problems. We would, let's say, break through the front, but the path of our liberators was blocked not only by the troops of the oppressors of the working people, but also by natural obstacles. First of all, rivers. Among them, the Rhine.

Reconnaissance companies of motorized rifle and tank regiments, reconnaissance battalions of motorized rifle and tank divisions had PT-76 floating tanks and BTR-40 light armored personnel carriers.

The PT-76 met the requirements of the forthcoming liberation campaign in Europe. The armor partially saved the tank from radiation, the tracks allowed it to ignore trenches and trenches, and the tank could not cope with water obstacles. But the BTR-40 could not swim, could not cross a trench without help and was open from above.

The BRDM was developed to replace the BTR-40 ^[5]. The BRDM differed from the BTR-40 in that it had an armored roof, which, as the experience of Hungary showed, was not an unnecessary pampering. In addition to four large-diameter wheels, the BRDM had four small wheels under the belly,

which could be retracted inside. Having released them, the BRDM could walk freely through trenches on the battlefield, and it could also swim.

The motorized rifle units of the tank divisions had the BTR-50P floating tracked armored personnel carrier based on the PT-76 tank. These vehicles were not afraid of the Rhine either. The BTR-60P four-axle floating wheeled armored personnel carrier was being developed to replace the BTR-152 for motorized rifle divisions.

But what about tanks? Pontoon bridges are extremely vulnerable, especially in a nuclear war. A scout tank can be made floating, its armor is not too heavy. But a main battle tank can be turned into a floating tank only by putting huge pontoons on all sides and putting a propeller-driven engine on it. All this is acceptable if we're talking about a hundred tanks. And we don't have a hundred. And we don't have a thousand. The Soviet Union has eight tank armies and

a lot of armies of general armies, equally abundant in tanks. And all of them had to ford water obstacles in the future. That is why mounted pontoons were not suitable, and tanks could cross water obstacles only on the bottom.

It was decided to develop special equipment for the T-54 tanks that would allow them to overcome water obstacles under water.

5

But the main threat to the Soviet Union did not come from malicious enemies. It came from our own aspiration to make the whole world happy, to liberate the workers from capitalist oppression.

I explain. If you have a chance, take the deployed parachute in your hands, look carefully at the seams, touch the slings, the satchel, the dome. After all, it's a real miracle! This miracle was created by master girls. I don't know how it is now, but in those years it was all handmade by top-class specialists from the highest quality materials. At each factory sat a representative of the Ministry of Defense, military representative, in lieutenant colonel's epaulettes with his team. He checked every seam personally, because he was responsible for the quality of the products he received.

The girls were paid good money. And the foreman. And the foreman. And the director. And the military chief. And everyone who made slings, material for the domes, heavy-duty threads and everything else.

In those glorious years, the Soviet Union had twice as many airborne divisions as all the countries of the world combined. Those divisions were

manned (for three years each) by selected soldiers who did not produce anything themselves. Who were torn away from machines and threshing machines. They had to be clothed, footwear, abundantly fed, armed, provided, including parachutes. In addition to everything else, Airborne Troops officers had to be paid a lot of money.

Tremendous funds were spent on the maintenance of airborne troops, which were not necessary for the defense of the country at all. All those who provided the Airborne Troops with weapons, ammunition, fuel, uniforms, combat equipment and everything else had to be fed and paid money.

But there was no end in sight for the airborne troops. Outstanding designers sat somewhere and created a 406-mm self-propelled gun, which is only needed to break through the enemy's front, and is not good for anything else. And those comrades got a lot of money. And other comrades created a nuclear munition for the gun. And they also got money.

The factory received an order for a small series, broke down the established production, and produced piece samples. And there was a military representative sitting at the factory. He was also tasting the products. He got money too.

And steelworkers welded armor steel for our tanks. There were only eight tank armies in the whole world. All eight were ours! The steelworkers got paid. And many, many different people drilled gun barrels, invented lowering wheels under the belly of BRDMs, tested missiles and produced plutonium for the next nuclear bomb.

There were 200 million people in the country. For the normal development of the country, the maximum number of the army in peacetime, together with internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, border troops of the KGB and all others, could not exceed two million. Under Khrushchev and Zhukov, and under other comrades, its number was 2-2.5 times more, not even counting internal and border troops.

Besides, we've armed half the world with our weapons.

The country worked to produce weapons. The miners were exceeding their plans to give the country more coal. The coal went to make coke. Coke went to make steel. Steel to make tanks.

Enthusiasts built giant dams across the great rivers to generate electricity. The electricity was used to make aluminum. Aluminum makes warplanes, rockets, tank engines.

The main end product in any production chain was weapons. Goods for

the people were only by-products of military factories.

But for their labor, everyone involved in the process of producing weapons was paid. And there was nothing to buy in the stores - you had to the economy does not need a 420-mm self-propelled mortar and nuclear warheads for it.

The rulers of the Soviet Union printed money and paid the workers, engineers, designers, military chiefs, directors, ministers, party secretaries, and vertukhai who guarded the war factories and the convicts who did the hardest, dirtiest, and most dangerous work. There was little money paid, but there were even less goods in the stores. Every year there was more and more money in circulation, but no more goods.

A sharp excess of the money supply over the commodity supply has never led any rulers to good. Therefore, the rulers had to somehow shovel back the money given to the people.

6

The solutions were found simple and reliable. First of all, sell more vodka to the people. The production of vodka costs pennies, but it is sold for rubles. And it was necessary to keep the vodka monopoly firmly in place. Only the state (i.e. its leaders) had the right to run this very profitable business. If anyone tried to make moonshine himself, he should be imprisoned.

The second solution was called inflation. Let us ask: why was this foreign term used? Why not call this process a simple Russian word? Because the literal translation sounds too frank: inflation is cheating. In the truest sense. It's cheating the people. For example, you, for example, dug my vegetable garden, and should by mutual agreement to get a bubble of vodka, and I diluted this vodka with water. That's inflation. That's cheating. A bottle is a bottle. It looks the same as all the others. Only the strength of the drink is wrong.

So it is with money. The people's leaders are paid in the same rubles. Only their "fortress" is not the same as it was last year.

The third trick is borrowing. The leaders pay the people who forge weapons, and then ask the people for a loan. State loan bonds were issued every year. They were distributed under Comrade Stalin in a compulsory order, under Khrushchev - in a milder voluntary-coercive order.

So, the state issued bonds, then by persuasion and threats distributed them to the people and received money in return. A three percent loan. This

theoretically meant that having borrowed one hundred rubles from a citizen, the state was obliged to return one hundred and three rubles to him in a year.

But that's the way the bourgeois have it. But in our country, the repayment of the national debt followed the rules of the lottery. Once or several times a year, thousands of numbers were published in newspapers on a full spread: bonds with these numbers were declared redeemed. If you were the owner of a bond with such a number, you went to the savings bank, presented a bond for, say, one hundred rubles, and you were given a cash refund of its face value - one hundred rubles.

When each particular bond will be redeemed, no one knows. How it will fall out. One might be in a year, another in ten years, another in twenty years. The trick was that the worker paid a hundred rubles and if the bond is redeemed in a year, he will get his hundred rubles back. But it would be money already somewhat weakened by inflation. If the bond is redeemed in 20 years, the purchasing power of the same hundred rubles will be deplorable.

What about the three percent markup? Where is it? Oh! There's a provision for that, too. The three percent annual interest was not paid to everyone individually, but to the lucky ones. Part of the bonds were redeemed every year, and a very small part became a winner according to the lottery principle. One could win a thousand rubles or ten thousand rubles on a hundred-ruble bond.

But don't worry: the native state did not offend itself and did not spoil its citizens with winnings. It was reported that those three percent went to pay for the winning numbers. Those who wanted to believe it, believed it. Those who did not want to believe it, had no opportunity to check it.

So the state borrowed and borrowed money from citizens, and finally got into debt quite seriously. By the beginning of 1957, the internal debt of the state amounted to 259.6 billion rubles, and there was nothing to pay with. And the country's leaders realized: let the citizens themselves ask the state not to repay their debt!

And then, as if by order, letters from workers and resolutions of meetings of labor collectives with appeals to the Kremlin were sent to the busy by the state not to return the money to the people - at least not at the moment.

Since the people were asking for it, the Communist Party could not refuse. They decided to freeze debt payments for 25 years, i.e. until 1982, and from 1982 to start paying 13 billion a year, and in 20 years, i.e. by 2002, to pay off the people in full - without, of course, paying any interest.

For people who were 30 years old in 1957, Khrushchev promised to repay the last debts when they were 75 years old. Khrushchev himself would be 108 years old by the time the payments were completed.

And few people paid attention to some inconsistency in the promises. The Program of the CPSU, adopted by the XXII Congress of the CPSU, ended with the words:

The Party solemnly proclaims: the present generation of Soviet people will live under communism.

Communism the Communist Party promised to build in two stages.

The first: creating the material and technical basis for communism by 1970.

Second stage: full communism by 1980.

That is, by that date the country was to start living in accordance with the great principle: *from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs*. Simply put, after 1980, everyone would take as much as they needed. Money would lose its meaning. There would be no money.

So, on the one hand, the leaders of the country declared that by 1980 money would be out of use in the Soviet Union. On the other hand, they decided that starting in 1982, the Communist Party would start returning your money to you, the citizens. Of course, without accumulated interest. And after the year 2000, that is, in the deep and

in a fully developed communism, when there will be no money at all, we will pay off all our debts.

CHAPTER 5

1

On May 15, 1957, at 19:01 Moscow time, the world's first intercontinental ballistic missile 8K71 was launched at the Tyura-Tam state test site. The missile flight was successful for the first 60 seconds. At the 61st second, a flame was seen on one of the side blocks. At the 98th second, one side block fell off, the missile lost stability and was detonated at the 104th second.

It was a victory.

It was clear that this rocket would fly.

2

Zhukov was preparing the Soviet Army for a new war. On May 21, 1957, he sent to the CPSU Central Committee a report on the results of a top secret scientific conference held under his leadership:

The conference addressed such issues as the struggle for air supremacy on a strategic and operational scale, the conduct of offensive operations at great depth in the conditions of mass use of atomic weapons, the organization of the country's air defense system in modern conditions, the conduct of naval operations on remote enemy communications and the destruction of his coastal facilities (Georgy Zhukov. Transcript of the October (1957) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. Moscow: International Foundation "Democracy", 2001. C. 115).

According to Zhukov's report, this was the first time a scientific conference of this magnitude had been held in the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. One of the four main issues addressed during the conference was the strengthening and development of the air defense system. After reading this phrase, people far removed from the army may get the impression that our strategists are not only

offensive operations were prepared, but sometimes a little thought was given to defense.

However, the improvement and development of the air defense system is not at all proof of the defensive orientation of military construction and does

not contradict the preparation of a liberation campaign in Western Europe. The development and improvement of the air defense system is equally important whether we are preparing for offensive or defensive operations. If we attack, the enemy will fight back, so we must cover our cities, factories, power plants, railroad hubs and bridges, ports and airfields, and, of course, the command posts, communications centers, and groupings of the advancing troops during the great scattering strikes.

This was the scenario discussed by the strategists under Zhukov's command. The central issue of the conference: *conducting offensive operations in great depth under conditions of mass use of atomic weapons*. Let us ask: against whom?

Not against Japan, Great Britain and the USA - in that case we would be talking about sea landing operations, and here we are talking about some adversaries on the continent.

Zhukov was not preparing these operations against China. In those years, at Zhukov's request, the Soviet Union spared no expense in persistently arming the Chinese army with the most advanced Soviet combat equipment and Chinese industry with the most advanced Soviet weapons technology.

Zhukov was not preparing these operations against Afghanistan, Iran or Turkey. It is possible to conduct offensive operations against these countries to a greater depth and without the mass use of atomic weapons.

It was possible to conduct offensive operations in great depth under conditions of mass use of atomic weapons only against West Germany and its allies on the continent - Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, France and the U.S. troops stationed here. The mass use of atomic weapons in Western Europe was necessary to destroy command posts and strategic communication hubs, to suppress air defense and aviation at airfields, to break through a powerful defense front and defeat the main enemy groups.

Another important issue addressed at the conference was the struggle for air supremacy on a strategic and operational scale. Air supremacy is a prerequisite for conducting grand offensive operations. Without air supremacy, or at least solid air superiority, it is impossible to attack.

That is why in World War II, from the first moments of the war against any enemy, Germany's first priority was to seize air supremacy. This was the case when attacking Poland, Denmark, Norway, France, Belgium, Holland and Yugoslavia. But the attempt to seize dominance over the British Isles failed, so the invasion of Great Britain did not take place.

Next in line was the Soviet Union. The German offensive in the first months of the war was so successful not least because Hitler's generals had managed to seize and maintain air supremacy for a long time. In 1941, Stalin and Zhukov themselves were preparing something similar, but Hitler was ahead of them. And now, a decade and a half later, Zhukov, having gained power, was again preparing to do what Hitler did not allow Stalin and Zhukov to do in the summer of 1941.

The fleet's tasks in 1957, as before the German attack in 1941, were not in the defense of naval bases and communications, not in the defense of Liepaja, Tallinn, Sevastopol, Odessa, Leningrad, Murmansk, but in conducting naval operations on remote enemy communications and in the destruction of his coastal facilities.

A decade and a half has passed since the moment when, through the fault of Stalin and Zhukov, the country was completely unprepared to wage a defensive war, because the Red Army was focused on conducting only offensive operations. And here Zhukov, starting with the XX Congress of the CPSU and until the end of his days, not only blamed for the unpreparedness of the country and the Red Army for the defense of Stalin, not only did not admit any of his guilt, but continued to prepare the country and the Soviet Army only to conduct offensive operations. Neither under Stalin, nor after him Zhukov and similar strategists did not consider the issues of repulsion of enemy invasion, even in purely theoretical terms.

Stalin's main goal was to establish a communist dictatorship across the planet, primarily in Europe.

Question: if Khrushchev and Zhukov really abandoned Stalin's legacy, the idea of world revolution, why would they conduct offensive operations at great depth in conditions of mass use of atomic weapons? Why conduct operations on the remote communications of the enemy and destroy his coastal facilities? If the insidious enemies tried to invade our country, it would be possible to launch nuclear strikes on a dozen enemy cities and thus discourage the enemy from continuing the war. Why should the Soviet Army conduct offensive operations when the enemy could be easily subdued without them?

In the plan of future war Zhukov ordered to write a provision that the Soviet Union is the first to start the war (ibid. P. 300).

In 1939, the plan to attack Germany was masked, like a fig leaf, by a statement in the new field regulations of the Red Army (PU-39): *if the enemy*

imposes war on us, the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army will be the most attacking of all the armies that have ever attacked.

Eighteen years later, Soviet Defense Minister Zhukov demanded that the new plans for the defeat of Europe should be written down directly, without blandishments: we attack first!

3

On June 11, 1957, after three unsuccessful launch attempts, the fuel was drained from the second 8K71 rocket, it was removed from the launcher and returned to the technical position. This event was of great significance in the power struggle between the Kremlin elites, and here is why.

In the 1950s, the development of strategic weapons in the Soviet Union was like chasing two birds with one stone. Nuclear weapons were developed, which could be delivered to the target by missiles or strategic bombers. Both missiles and bombers had their advantages and disadvantages.

The threat of nuclear weapons was a deterrent. Strategic bombers looked spectacular, they could be driven across the ocean and the roaring armada could be shown to enemies and allies alike, both those confident in the power of a given power and those doubting it. The threat of nuclear weapons with the help of bombers could be aggravated to the most extreme degree: to send airplanes to the enemy's borders, but at the very last moment to return back, scaring the enemy, but not allowing a worldwide catastrophe.

Rockets did not make such a spectacular impression. A few of them could be carried around the central square of the capital, but who would see them in person outside the country? Rockets could be used to scare the enemy, but once they had flown, they could not be returned (they could be destroyed in flight, but scaring the enemy in this way was too expensive and too risky).

At least missiles did not have to break through air defense systems, and in those days only fantasists dreamed of missile defense.

The Soviet Union was unable to successfully develop both missiles and strategic bombers at the same time: the weak socialist economy did not allow it. It was necessary to make a decision: either to concentrate the main efforts on the development and production of missiles, and give a secondary role to bombers, or vice versa.

Both missiles and bombers had their supporters and their opponents. They were in the General Staff, in the ministries in charge of weapons production, in the State Planning Committee, in the Central Committee of the Communist

Party, and even among the top officials of the state. Khrushchev, for example, was a fierce opponent of bombers and an equally staunch supporter of missiles. Zhukov favored strategic bombers. During exercises at the Totsk test site, a nuclear strike could have been carried out with the 8Zh38 (R-2) missile in service with the Soviet Army, but Zhukov ordered that an obsolete Tu-4 bomber be used as a carrier.

In the summer of 1957, Khrushchev urgently needed to demonstrate to his fellow party members his success in rocket science. Another failure to launch the 8K71 was a blow to rocket supporters, and first of all to Khrushchev [\[6\]](#).

To conduct offensive operations in great depth requires a unified will. You need a real leader who could concentrate in his hands the entirety of power and dispose of it in accordance with the development of the strategic situation. Zhukov was preparing himself for this role. He single-handedly abolished the nomenclature positions of the Central Committee ^[7].

The Soviet Union was ruled by the Communist Party. It ruled indiscriminately. Anyone who encroached on its power, the Communists exterminated immediately and mercilessly.

This power was exercised through the appointment and removal of chiefs of all and sundry ranks. Appointments and removals took place in accordance with the system, the essence of which was expressed by one term: nomenclature.

The nomenclature had four levels: district, regional (krai), republican, and central.

The central level in turn consisted of three sub-levels:

1. nomenclature of the CPSU Central Committee;
2. nomenclature of the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee;
3. nomenclature of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee (from 1952 to 1966 - the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee).

At every level, from the district party committee to the Politburo, there was a list of positions that could only be filled by decision of that party committee. And it did not matter in the slightest whether the structures in question were an Orthodox church or a trade union organization, a voluntary sports society or a scientific institution, a tank division or the editorial office of the Yunost magazine. Everyone who had anything to do with running the country was a member of the nomenklatura at some level, often without even knowing it.

By eliminating the positions of party supervisors, although not of the highest rank, but were, however, part of the nomenclature of the Central Committee, Zhukov encroached on the undivided power of the Communist Party and attempted to get out from under its control.

Stalin used to do this a lot. But he was the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. It was his duty and his right to create positions or their

to abolish, appoint or remove someone to a nomenclature position. Zhukov had no such right, because he was not the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. This position was held by Khrushchev.

By single-handedly abolishing the positions of the Central Committee

nomenclature, Zhukov was thereby tearing power from the hands of Khrushchev and the Communist Party led by him. Having arrogated to himself the right to abolish the positions of the CPSU Central Committee nomenclature, Zhukov thus overstepped the boundaries of his authority. And decisively moved on.

At the level of armies, flotillas, military districts, groups of troops and fleets, the authority of commanders was under the control of military councils. Such a council consisted of the commander himself and one or two members of the military council, who always stood behind his back - without their consent the commander had no right to make any principal decisions. The military councils were the collar of the Communist Party around the neck of the Soviet Army.

Zhukov demanded that the Military Councils be transformed from controlling bodies into advisory ones, and that their composition be approved not by decisions of the CPSU Central Committee, but by orders of the Minister of Defense (ibid. P. 445). In other words, Zhukov demanded that the Communist Party should not appoint controllers over commanders and commanders, that there should be no controllers over commanders and commanders. Let there be just counselors. And let these advisors be appointed not by the Communist Party, but by the Minister of Defense, that is, Zhukov.

Simply put, Zhukov was pushing the line that the Soviet Army should be subordinate not to the Communist Party, but to him personally. And that the KGB and MVD troops be transferred to the Soviet Army - that is, under Zhukov's control.

But even this was not enough for him. In October 1952, the XIX Congress of the CPSU adopted a new Party Charter, according to which every communist had the right to appeal to any party instances, up to the Central Committee. Many officers were communists (otherwise they could not go to the top); generals were communists almost all of them.

Zhukov imposed his own orders in the Soviet Army. Contrary to the CPSU Statute, he forbade army and navy communists from applying to the CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU. From that moment on, the rights guaranteed by the CPSU Charter did not apply to army and navy communists (ibid. P. 446).

But even at that Zhukov was not satisfied. He forbade the head of the Main Political Department of the Soviet Army, Colonel-General A. S. Zheltov to inform the Central Committee about everything that was happening in the Armed Forces (ibid. P. 244). S. Zheltov to inform the Central

Committee about everything that was happening in the Armed Forces (ibid. P. 244).

Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army^[8] was the supreme political supervisor. The Main Political Department was at the same time one of the departments of the Central Committee.

Thus, what happened was this: Zhukov forbade one of the departments of the Central Committee from performing its supervisory functions. By doing so, Zhukov took one of the departments of the Central Committee out of the subordination of Comrade Khrushchev, First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The allocation of cadres is the only lever of power that has been in the hands of the Communist Party. Take away from the Communist Party the right to allocate positions of authority, and there will be no other power left in its hands.

That's exactly what Zhukov was doing. He was tearing power out of Khrushchev's hands, pushing him and all the other leaders away from power.

5

But Khrushchev was also carried away. On May 13 and 19, 1957, at a meeting with cultural figures, Khrushchev, lapsing into vernacular, almost profane speech, taught the engineers of human souls how to properly compose poems and books, how to write pictures, how to make films. A year ago, at the XX Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev exposed the cult of personality of Stalin. The entire ideological apparatus of the country was instructed to work in the spirit of Comrade Khrushchev's report. The writers did their best.

Khrushchev wanted them to curse Stalin personally, but not to touch our entire native economic and political system built by Stalin. But this was impossible. By following Khrushchev's instructions, by crushing the cult of Stalin, the fighters of the ideological front, without wishing to do so, undermined the deep fundamental bases of ideology.

Khrushchev was angry, and he divided writers and artists into painters and detractors. The former, in his opinion, embellished reality, the latter perverted it, distorted it, showed it in a cartoon form. And it was necessary to find the golden mean.

No one could find it - because it didn't exist. There could not be a middle. The reality was cartoonish. The country, which claimed to be a superpower, was unable to feed its own people, clothe or educate them, or provide them with housing. Any word of truth was an indictment of the bureaucratic

leadership system.

Back in June 1941, the standard of socialist realism was set by Stalin's favorite director Ivan Alexandrovich Pyryev. The standard was called "The Pigmaiden and the Shepherd".

For this outstanding achievement of our most advanced cinematography, Pyriev was immediately awarded the Stalin Prize. In just ten years, he snapped up six such prizes, equaling Konstantin Simonov himself, who topped all lists of Stalinist laureates.

In Piryev's masterpiece, a pig farmer with an elegant manicure and a fashionable hairdo, singing heartfelt songs, on a sterily clean pig farm was exceeding her plans, while a Dagestani shepherd was herding sheep in the snowy mountains. The pig farmer and the shepherd were sent to an exhibition in Moscow, where they met. And sang a duet. That movie had everything - the joy of labor, friendship of peoples, early fulfillment of plans and even innovations (invention of a new feeder for pigs).

After the war, Piryev, outdoing himself, produced a new super masterpiece of socialist realism called "Kuban Cossacks". The film was in color. This alone gave it a special freshness. The same pig farmer was now the chairman of the collective farm. The collective farmers (in crimson and red silk shirts) sang and danced, between songs and dances they overfulfilled their plans, life looked like a never-ending holiday, the tables were bursting with abundant food, but none of the characters gave in either on weekdays or on holidays.

The movie became a new benchmark of socialist realism: it showed reality not as it was, but as it had been.

it had to be. A step away from this standard highlighted the ugliness of the system. Not a single Soviet movie showed a queue for sausage. Nor were queues for pots, for valenki, for kerosene.

The masters tried their best, avoided not only sharp but also blunt corners, but any deviation from the standard of "Piggery" and "Kuban Cossacks" looked in the eyes of the management as a slander on our most advanced system - no matter how hard you try, you are likely to be either a painter of reality or a malicious detractor of it. Khrushchev winged both. But this was not enough for him, and during a meeting with cultural figures, he told a stunned audience of Stalinist laureates about the details of the Kremlin leaders' underhanded battles.

It was a monstrous violation of nomenclature ethics. In your own circle, talk about everything until your tongue is ripped out of your head. But don't

you dare take it out of the house!

Khrushchev bulldozed the rubbish out of the Kremlin's hut and took it out by dump trucks: I think like this, but there are some among our leaders who think differently!

On May 22, 1957, speaking to agricultural leaders, Khrushchev announced the main task of the Soviet Union's economy: in the next 2-3 years to catch up and overtake America in the production of meat, milk and butter per capita.

Khrushchev's words were immediately picked up by the entire Soviet propaganda and repeated thousands of times all over the world. The people responded with an avalanche of jokes and foul language ditties.

It's easy to set a goal: to catch up and overtake. But how? Lenin set this task back in September 1917, before the Bolsheviks seized power. After that, we were always trying to catch up and overtake someone.

Khrushchev set the task of catching up with America by 1960 without consulting anyone, without informing his colleagues in the leadership of the state and the party. This was the last straw. The failed project of virgin land development, undermining the authority of the Communist Party and punitive bodies at the XX Congress of the CPSU, the collapse of socialism in Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and the GDR, insane, ungrounded projects to overtake America, the removal of the Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

of Kremlin squabbles to the public eye and discussion - all this nonsense, like powder kegs, rolled into one cellar.

The only thing missing was a spark, so that the whole pile of powder kegs would rumble under Khrushchev at once.

Key point

In order for you and me not to be confused by the communist hierarchy, I will allow myself once again to briefly outline the power structure in the country at that time.

In the period described, the Soviet Union consisted of 15 republics. The largest of them, Russian, had 16 autonomous republics, 6 krais and 52 oblasts. Autonomous republics, krais and oblasts were divided into districts.

The second largest Ukrainian republic had 26 oblasts.

Kazakh - 16.

Uzbek - 9.

Belorusskaya - 7.

Kyrgyz - 5.

Turkmen - 4.

Smaller republics - Georgian, Tajik, Azerbaijani, Lithuanian, Moldavian, Latvian, Armenian, Estonian - did not have oblasts in their composition, they were divided immediately into districts.

Party secretaries ran the country at all levels.

The districts were governed by district party committees. The district committee had several departments that managed ideology, industry, transportation, agriculture, and so on. There were 3-4 secretaries at the head of the district committee. Each of them managed one or more departments. The first secretary of the district committee was the boss over all of them.

The same was true in the oblasts. The oblast was governed by a regional party committee. It consisted of departments. One or more departments were headed by a secretary. The first secretary of the regional committee was placed over all of them.

In the provinces, provincial committees with secretaries.

In republics, it's republican.

And above them - the Central Committee. The Central Committee in different periods included from 6 to 27 departments. The departments merged and separated in different periods, and their names changed. Let us pay attention not to the names, but to the essence.

At all times, the main departments were:

- Military Department (i.e., the Main Political Department of the Soviet Army and Navy);

- personnel accounting and distribution department, which appointed and removed all the top leaders in the country: generals, admirals, marshals, ambassadors, ministers and their deputies, secretaries of district committees, regional committees, krai committees, union republics, university rectors, church hierarchs, and so on;

- international department, which managed the foreign policy of the state;

- the ideological department, which worked out the "only true" party line;

- Agitation and Propaganda Department (Agitprop);

- other departments that administered virtually every aspect of the country's life.

The departments of the Central Committee employed hundreds of high-ranking officials who were recruited from among financiers, engineers,

military officers, journalists, Chekists, diplomats, and so on - in other words, from among people with some specific knowledge to lead certain spheres of activity.

The departments were headed by heads of departments. The head of a department had enormous power in his hands. Their actions were coordinated by the Central Committee secretaries, each of whom had one or more departments under his command. Above all the secretaries stood the General Secretary, who from 1953 to 1966 was called the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Simple, isn't it?

Besides this there were party titles - something like the titles of baron, count, duke. There were five titles. Let us list them in ascending order of their importance in the hierarchy of power:

- member of the Central Audit Commission,
- candidate for the Central Committee,
- member of the Central Committee,
- candidate to the Politburo (Presidium) of the Central Committee,
- member of the Politburo (Presidium) of the Central Committee.

Titles were not hereditary or for life. They were temporary. The last two titles were given only to those who held the title of member of the Central Committee.

Titles were conferred in the following way. A big boss (for example, the first secretary of a very important and successful regional committee, commander of troops of a military district, a high-ranking diplomat, head of a department of the Central Committee) suddenly received the title of a member of the Central Committee for his merits. For example, Zoya Vasilyevna Mironova, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the USSR, Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union to the European branch of the United Nations, once became a member of the Central Committee. The CRK was a party court. The big bosses could not be tried by an ordinary court, so as not to take the dust out of the Kremlin's hut. Their cases were secretly tried in the CDC, without telling anyone about it.

The next most important rank was candidate member of the Central Committee. If a comrade headed some important *krakom* or *oblkom* (for example, Kuibyshev) or a military district (for example, the Far East), proved by deeds that he could cope with the work, then he could be given this rank. In party jargon, this was called "selecting".

Even higher - a member of the Central Committee. This title was given to the first secretaries of the Union republics, some *krais* and *oblasts*, some

ministers, the biggest Chekists, the most prominent ideologists and military men of very high rank.

According to the Party Statute, at least once every three months, a plenum of the Central Committee met in Moscow, bringing together members of the Central Committee, candidates to the Central Committee and members of the Central Committee. The Plenum resolved the most important issues of leadership of the country and the world communist movement.

In 1957, there were 126 members, 117 candidates and 62 members of the CPSU Central Committee.

From among the members of the CPSU Central Committee, the plenum selected the Politburo, which in the period under consideration was called the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee; in 1957 it consisted of 11 members and 7 candidates. The Politburo (Presidium) met once a week on a scheduled basis. In case of necessity - at any time.

CHAPTER 6

1

June 18, 1957. The Kremlin canteen, a special hall for members of the Politburo. In 1952, the Politburo was renamed the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, but the name of the hall stuck to it.

The cleanliness is dazzling. Even cleaner than the pig farm in Ivan Piryev's truthful movie about happy collective farm life.

The dinner was coming to an end. There were 7 out of 11 members of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee - Comrades Bulganin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Molotov, Saburov, Pervukhin, and three out of 7 candidate members of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee - Comrades Brezhnev, Furtseva and Shepilov.

There was a conversation. About Khrushchev.

Word by word, it was immediately decided: what's the point in dragging it out? Let's call Khrushch and shoot it. Is everyone here? Not everyone. But most of them.

How to call, so as not to scare them away? Simple: the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee were about to visit Leningrad. On May 16, 1953, Leningrad was 250 years old. No one remembered about it. They came to their senses too late. That's why they decided to celebrate four years after the anniversary - June 21, 1957.

Does it make much difference whether to celebrate in May or June, the

same year, or four years later? The leaders decided that there was no difference. It was only necessary to discuss which of the Kremlin chiefs would speak in front of which audiences and what they would talk about.

They called Khrushchev: Nikita Sergeyich, come in for a moment, we need to decide about Leningrad.

While we were waiting for Khrushchev, Malenkov proposed: Khrushchev should be removed and made Minister of Agriculture, Molotov should be made head of the Communist Party.

Molotov: and Malenkov as head of the government.

Comrade Kaganovich proposed that Marshal of the Soviet Union Bulganin be appointed chairman of the KGB, and Bulganin proposed that Comrade Kaganovich be appointed secretary of the Central Committee, responsible for the

control of the Armed Forces, military industry, and foreign policy.

It was agreed, we moved to the conference room. Here Khrushch appeared in the doorway: what were the uncertainties with Leningrad?

Comrade Malenkov explained that everything was clear about Leningrad in general terms. What was not clear was the position of First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The CPSU Charter did not provide for such a position, just like the position of General Secretary, which had existed before. Therefore, the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee decided to abolish the position of First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee as not corresponding to the Party Charter.

The past scenario was repeated. In 1922, the position of General Secretary of the Central Committee was established. This position was assumed by Stalin. But no corresponding changes were made in the Party Charter. In October 1952, a new Party Charter was adopted, which also said nothing about this position. The new Charter was adopted in order to remove Stalin from power: here, look, the Communist Party voted for a new charter, which does not provide for your position, Comrade Stalin. Get out of here!

After Stalin's death, the position of First Secretary of the Central Committee was established, which was assumed by Khrushchev on September 13, 1953. However, no changes were again made to the Statute. That is, Khrushchev held a position not provided for by the Statute. On June 18, 1957, the leaders decided: this post was abolished and thus removed Comrade Khrushchev from the leadership of the Party and the country.

Khrushchev objected: who are you? I was made First Secretary by the

plenum of the Central Committee, and only the plenum can remove me. Gather the plenum, gather all 126 members of the Central Committee, 117 candidates and 62 members of the Central Committee, let them decide.

But even to this the answer was prepared: we, the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, appointed you to the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee, Comrade Khrushchev. And the plenum, all these three hundred low-ranking leaders, merely dutifully approved our decision. We appointed you, we appointed you take it off.

At that moment Comrade Mikoyan appeared in the hall. Of the 9 members of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, seven were against Khrushchev, two were for him: Khrushchev himself and, after some hesitation, Mikoyan.

Candidates to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee had the right of deliberative, but not decisive vote. That is: everyone listens, expresses an opinion, but does not participate in the voting. At that moment only three candidates were present in the hall. Their opinions were divided.

Shepilov - against Khrushchev. Brezhnev and Furtseva are Khrushchev's nominees. If Khrushchev is removed, they'll be chased out too. They are, of course, for Khrushchev.

Zhukov was also from Khrushchev's team, but he was absent. Zhukov was in Solnechnogorsk, where a group of generals was working on documents for another military exercise using nuclear weapons.

Zhukov's presence at the meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee was not required. Zhukov was only a candidate member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. He had the right to express his opinion, but he did not have a casting vote.

2

Meanwhile, Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich were setting the tone, lashing Khrushchev with the last words, reminding him of all the stupid things he had done in the last four years.

It was an unforgivable mistake.

Comrade Shepilov, a candidate to the Presidium, who did not have the right to cast a deciding vote, was shouting, shouting: so vote, vote, motherfucker!

It was necessary to vote immediately, to decide on Khrushchev's removal, to stop talking and move to decisive action.

One: lock Khrushchev in a room with no phones. At least for 24 hours.

Second: Mikoyan, Brezhnev and Furtseva, who supported Khrushchev, - there too.

Third: under any pretext, summon KGB Chairman General Serov to the Kremlin and lock him up as well. At least for a few hours.

Immediately the new KGB chief, Marshal of the Soviet Union Bulganin, changed the guards in the Kremlin, in the Central Committee buildings on Staraya Square, at the government communication centers, to provide communications for his men, to disconnect government communication channels in all institutions where Khrushchev had planted his nominees.

After that Khrushchev's people should be summoned to a meeting in the Kremlin. The meeting should be held on any topic, as long as for many hours and until late at night, or even better - until the first roosters. At that time, his men should be informed about appointments to new posts in the ministries and demanded to accept the cases immediately.

And most importantly, the new Secretary of the Central Committee for Defense and Foreign Policy, Comrade Kaganovich, should have whirled to the Ministry of Defense, changed the guards and ordered Zhukov, whose position in this matter is not clear, not to be allowed into the Ministry.

After that it was possible to convene a plenum of the Central Committee and announce to its members that comrade Khrushchev had failed to cope with the work of the First Secretary, the CPSU Charter did not provide for such a position, it was liquidated by the decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee, and comrade Khrushchev was transferred to a less responsible position of the Minister of Agriculture.

Who would object?

It was there, at the plenum, that everything that had been accumulated against him should have been expressed to Khrushchev.

But Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich got carried away. They took Khrushchev down and began to recall his blunders, follies and mistakes. Voroshilov, Bulganin, Pervukhin and Saburov did not lag behind. Nikita had time to break wood - there was something to mock.

Khrushchev snarled weakly.

During the break, Ekaterina A. Furtseva, candidate member of the Presidium of the Central Committee, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, slipped out of the hall, sneaked into her office and dialed

Zhukov's office in the Ministry of Defense: where is he?

I got the answer: in Solnechnogorsk.

With the authority of the Central Committee, Furtseva demanded immediate connection. They did.

And she shouted into the phone: Zhora, Nikitka's been thrown off! Save him!

3

- You, Comrade Khrushchev, went to Finland and sat naked in a Finnish bathhouse with the Finnish president! Where did you ever see a statesman present his great country with a bare ass!

- And you, Comrade Molotov, you drank champagne with Ribbentrop and shook hands with Hitler. It's better to sit with your friends with a bare ass than to lick Hitler's ass!

The altercation continued in the same way. I am not telling further, because the chiefs mostly used abnormal language.

4

Zhukov acted the way the members of the Central Committee Presidium who decided to dump Khrushchev should have acted.

The first thing from Solnechnogorsk Zhukov called the chairman of the KGB Serov: Vanya, they'll call you to the Kremlin, don't go! Lock yourself in your room! Don't let anyone in! Don't let the Kremlin guards change! Hold tightly the nodes of government communication. Turn off the phones of all those who, according to your information, support Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich!

The second call to Marshal Konev: Vanya, take the list of Central Committee members, call everyone, summon them to Moscow! On my behalf, order the commanders of military districts and fleets to allocate the fastest airplanes for the members of the Central Committee. Land the planes at the Central airfield!

The third call to the chief of the GRU, Colonel-General Shtemenko: Sergei, go to the Central Airfield! Members of the Central Committee will be arriving, bring them up to speed!

While Zhukov was calling his three battle comrades, Lieutenant General Kitaev, a general for assignments of special importance of the USSR Minister of Defense, contacted the commander of the troops of the Moscow Military District, Marshal of the Soviet Union Moskalenko, and relayed the orders of the Minister of Defense.

First: to raise the 2nd Guards Taman Motorized Rifle Division of the Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov on alert (without leaving the military camps).

Second: all marshals, generals and admirals who are in Moscow or in the Moscow area, raise the alarm, arm, assemble at the Ministry of Defense, be in readiness for immediate execution of the orders of the Minister of Defense of the USSR.

Third: to raise the alert of students of military academies, to arm them, to set up officer sentries at the Central Airfield of Moscow, at the hotel "Moscow", where the arriving members of the Central Committee and candidates to the Central Committee will be accommodated, to block all traffic in the squares and streets adjacent to the Kremlin, to set up there armed officer patrols.

Fourth: block all traffic from Solnechnogorsk to the Borovitsky Gates of the Kremlin.

5

The way from Solnechnogorsk to the Kremlin Zhukov and Kitaev skipped sparkling meteor.

Candidates to the Presidium of the Central Committee do not have a casting vote at meetings of the Presidium of the Central Committee. But one of the candidates, surnamed Zhukov, who burst into the meeting room, still had a casting vote, albeit unofficially.

Zhukov's voice was louder than the voices of all the other members of the Presidium put together. Zhukov was Marshal of the Soviet Union, Minister of Defense of the USSR. In his hands was the Soviet Army.

Zhukov flew into the hall and announced: you, dear comrades, have decided to remove Nikita Khrushchev from power, but the Soviet Army will not support your decision. If it is necessary to bring 200 tanks here to resolve the issue, I will arrange it.

To this Zhukov added that tanks follow only his orders and no one else's.

Zhukov's statement is not understood, not appreciated even after half a century.

In fact, this declaration was nothing more than the *proclamation of a military dictatorship in the Soviet Union*.

The meaning of Zhukov's statement was as follows: here you guys are sitting here, pretending to be leaders, pretending to be the supreme power. But the Army doesn't obey you! The Army is subordinate to me! The question of who will rule the country is decided not in the Kremlin, but in the Ministry of

Defense. And it is decided not by you, dear comrades, but only by me.

6

Let's take stock of the situation. Let's call things by their proper names. Even the ancient Chinese knew that to name correctly is to understand correctly.

So what shall we call what was happening in those days in the capital of our Great Motherland?

That's right: a military coup.

Let's agree: there were no tanks in the street, no shooting and bloodshed. But everyone present had a clear understanding: resistance was useless. If necessary, there would be tanks, shooting and bloodshed.

Let's mentally transfer the situation to any other country: the central political, industrial, and financial leaders have gathered and are deciding on the issue of supreme power. And then suddenly a big army chief says to them: who are you? It's none of your business. The issue of supreme power is decided by the army - that is, by me as its supreme leader.

The arrangement in the Kremlin on June 18, 1957 was as follows: either the supreme Kremlin authority controls the army, or the army controls the supreme Kremlin authority. There could be no other options.

Zhukov openly and brazenly announced to the Kremlin leaders that the second option was being introduced in the country called the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. And the first one is canceled. Right now. By all respected comrade Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov.

7

On June 18, 1957, the meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee ended quite early - at 8 pm. Khrushchev needed to stall for time. He needed to win at least one night. Katya Furtseva suggested that the meeting be postponed until tomorrow. The leaders had been yelling at each other since lunchtime. The expenditure of nervous energy is much more tiring than the expenditure of physical energy. Tired, exhausted everyone. That's why they agreed.

This was another unforgivable mistake by Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich. They should have put the question to a vote and removed Khrushchev. Shepilov insisted on this: so vote!

They didn't listen to him. They split up, they split up.

Khrushchev immediately rushed to Old Square to the gray building of the

CPSU Central Committee, blinking to his companions: gather at my place.

There were five of them in Khrushchev's office: Nikita himself, Brezhnev, Mikoyan, Zhukov, and Furtseva.

Zhukov reported: I have everything ready! I will arrest them all! (Krasnaya Zvezda, October 26, 2002).

Mikoyan agreed, but added that this weapon should be used only as a last resort. There is hope to do everything with decorum. It is necessary to split the conspiracy. It is necessary from the most ardent to repel those who hesitate. The most ardent opponents should be declared the instigators and nailed. The rest should be considered deceived and misguided. They should not be driven into a corner, but given the opportunity to retreat. In addition, all those who rebelled against Khrushchev would be under personal control and surveillance.

We called the master of the KGB, Army General Serov. He reported that everything was under control, all the rebels were bugged. But the controlled comrades don't talk on the phones. They're having meetings at Molotov's dacha. On the paths of the park.

At that moment, the first large drops of rain fell on the windows of Khrushchev's office. And a thunderstorm broke out, which was followed by heavy rain for the whole night.

Key point

By threatening to use military force, Zhukov, a candidate for the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, overthrew the majority of the country's political leadership. This is exactly how Bonaparte dispersed the authorities he did not want with the butts of his guardsmen or with the mere threat of summoning them to the assembly hall to decide a matter.

In any country but ours, Zhukov's actions would be labeled a military coup. Wouldn't they? A candidate for leader threw most of the leaders out of power. What else would you call such actions?

We don't call it a coup. We have found a wise term. It turns out that it was not the majority of the country's leadership that opposed Khrushchev, but only an "arithmetical majority". Therefore, Zhukov overthrew not the majority of the leadership, but only an arithmetical majority of the leadership.

Since then, the term has been floating around the world. And published in scientific journals scientific comrades articles in defense of Zhukov. And in those articles flashes this strange term. Example: Naumov VP "Case" Marshal Zhukov. Novaya i novaya istoriya [\[9\]](#). Moscow: Nauka. 2000. №6. C. 79.

Let us puzzle serious historians with a question: fellow scientists, is there any other kind of majority besides the arithmetic majority? Geometric? Or trigonometric?

Actors

FURTSEVA EKATERINA ALEKSEEVNA. A.K.A. Catherine the Third. She is also (popularly) Katyusha the Insatiable.

Born December 7, 1910. Proletarian origin. Labor activity, as many millions in our country in those times, - from early youth at the factory. At the age of 14 she joined the Komsomol - the Communist Youth Union.

Since 1930 he has been in the Komsomol. In the same year she joined the Communist Party. Graduated from the Institute. Chemical engineer. Was party secretary of the institute. After graduation from the institute - on party work.

In 1942, she was appointed (in party circles it was customary to politely say "elected") as the second and then first secretary of the party committee of one of the most prestigious districts of Moscow - Frunzensky. In the same year, she met Khrushchev and forever remained on his team, although in 1942 Khrushchev was not the master of Moscow.

In 1950, Furtseva was the second secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee. In October 1952, at the anti-Stalinist XIX Congress of the CPSU joined the Central Committee of the CPSU. Since March 26, 1954 - First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU. At the next, already openly anti-Stalinist XX Congress of the CPSU - candidate member of the Presidium and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

Back during World War II, she met Nikolai Firyubin, who also served as one of the secretaries of the Moscow City Party Committee. In 1953, Nikolai Pavlovich Firyubin received a diplomatic appointment. In 1954-1955, Firyubin was Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary USSR in Czechoslovakia, from 1955 - Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Yugoslavia.

Firyubin and Furtseva married in 1956. It was the second marriage for each of them.

CHAPTER 7

1

On June 19, 1957, the Presidium of the Central Committee was in full session. The members of the Presidium, Comrades Suslov and Kirichenko, who had been absent on the first day of the meetings, realized on which side the power was on and took Khrushchev's side without hesitation. All the candidates to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, Kozlov, Mukhitdinov and Shvernik, who were absent on the first day of the meetings, did the same.

While the Presidium of the Central Committee, shouting and screaming, was deciding whether or not Khrushchev should be the chief of the Soviet Union, the entire Central Committee was urgently gathered in Moscow.

Some of the Central Committee members lived and worked in or near Moscow. The meeting place for them was in the Kremlin. Here they were met and "feted" by the Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Lieutenant General Leonid Brezhnev. Comrade Brezhnev informed the members of the Central Committee that a group of factionists had opposed our dear Nikita Sergeyevich. There is a rift at the very top. Everything will depend on your decision, dear comrades. Decide as your Communist conscience tells you. But Comrade Zhukov asked me to tell you that the Soviet Army is on the side of Comrade Khrushchev, and the army will not tolerate or accept any other decisions. By the way, Comrade Serov, Chairman of the KGB, asked me to tell you the same thing.

Members and candidates to the Central Committee who lived and worked far away from Moscow were urgently taken by military aircraft to the capital's central airfield, Khodynka. Those of them who did not work too far away flew in comfort on personal airplanes of the commanders of troops of military districts and fleets - at that time they were Il-14 passenger airplanes in the government version. Those who ruled the distant provinces flew on Il-28 jet bombers, without comfort.

At Khodynka they were met by Colonel-General Shtemenko, the head of the GRU, and each of them personally explained the situation: to vote as the conscience of a Communist dictated. But Comrade Zhukov asked

to pass on... From the Central Airfield, the leaders were taken to the Kremlin, where they were met by Comrade Brezhnev, who repeated: vote as the

conscience of a Communist dictates!

The members and candidates to the Central Committee correctly understood the admonition of the Chief of the GRU, Colonel General Shtemenko, repeated once again for complete clarity by Lieutenant General Brezhnev. And even without these admonitions everything was clear to them. If a member of the Central Committee in distant Vladivostok or Khabarovsk is awakened in the middle of the night and, without explaining or asking anything, is taken to a military airfield, packed in furs, put a parachute under his ass, and put in the cockpit of the aft gunner of an IL-28 bomber (because there are no other places for passengers in the bomber), it means that this trip does not contradict the interests of the Armed Forces.

The IL-28 is a front-line bomber, that is, not a strategic bomber. One-way range - just over two thousand kilometers. Therefore, rushing to Moscow members and candidates for membership of the Central Committee at military airfields passed like a baton. They sat down at one airfield and there was a new bomber with a fresh crew waiting. It took two or three or even four transfers to Moscow. It was felt that some big boss growled at the aviation commanders, threatened with terrible punishments in case of failure to deliver the necessary people to Moscow. That's why everything worked with the precision of a Pavel Bure watch on the hand of the Minister of Defense.

And whom does our glorious Soviet Army (that is, Comrade Zhukov) support? That's right: Comrade Zhukov supports Comrade Khrushchev. And security for the members of the Central Committee was allocated from the army. The time is hot, and the life of each member of the Central Committee is precious. They are servants of the people! Anything can happen! That's why they must be protected. That's why each of them should have a personal guard!

But the guards assigned by the Armed Forces could turn into convoys at any time. You don't need to explain that to anyone. They guessed it themselves. That's why the instructions of Colonel-General Shtemenko, head of the GRU, and Lieutenant-General Brezhnev, secretary of the Central Committee, were listened to by members and candidates to the Central Committee with increased attention, taken into account with deep understanding and even with gratitude: thank you, dear ones, I brought you up to date.

2

The meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee continued on June 19, 20, and 21. 11 members and 7 candidates to the Presidium of the Central Committee were yelling at each other, exposing and incriminating.

Each of them had a full four-axle carload of kompromat and a small cart. And the leaders were desperately beating each other with those teeth-grinding revelations.

And in the corridors crowded two hundred leaders of slightly lower rank who had flown in from all parts of our great motherland. These were members of the Central Committee, candidates for membership in the Central Committee, and members of the Central Revision Commission. Having been put on the path of truth by the lucid instruction of Generals Shtemenko and Brezhnev, they demanded to be admitted to the meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee.

Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Shepilov, who joined them, did not understand it. How is it? The central leaders are sitting in the hall, and some figures of lesser rank demand something! Under Comrade Stalin, such an outrage never happened!

A delegation was selected from the members of the Central Committee, whose number in the corridors of power was increasing. It included Marshal Konev, Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact, First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Patolichev, and Kapitonov, First Secretary of the Moscow Committee of the CPSU. The delegation demanded that the chiefs end the dispute and bring their differences before the Central Committee.

The scales were slowly but steadily tipping in Khrushchev's favor. Marshal of the Soviet Union Voroshilov was the first to run to his side, followed by Marshal of the Soviet Union Bulganin. They were followed by Comrades Pervukhin and Saburov. Thus Khrushchev obtained a majority in the Presidium of the Central Committee; this enabled him to write the following document:

No. P99/25 June 21, 1957.

Top secret.

Members of the CPSU Central Committee, candidates to the CPSU Central Committee, members of the Central Audit Commission.

To convene a plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on June 22 this year at 2 o'clock in the afternoon on the intra-party issue.

Secretary of the Central Committee ^[10] (Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich. 1957. Transcript of the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and

other documents. C. 23).

3

The Plenum of the Central Committee lasted from June 22 to June 29, 1957 inclusive. It turned into a rout of those who dared to oppose Khrushchev. It was the longest plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in its history.

Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Shepilov, who joined them, were labeled an anti-party group.

The tone was set by Zhukov. He was the first to make a big speech. Its main motive was as follows:

At the 20th Party Congress, as is known, on the instructions of the Presidium of the Central Committee, Comrade Khrushchev reported on the mass illegal repressions and shootings which were the consequence of Stalin's abuse of power. But then, comrades, for well-known reasons, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Molotov were not named as the main perpetrators of arrests and shootings of Party and Soviet cadres (Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich. 1957. Transcript of the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. Moscow: International Foundation "Democracy", 1998. C. 37).

The transcript of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, which opened on June 22, 1957, has been published. It is 843 pages of text, typed in small print. If we read the tone-setting speech of Comrade Zhukov, and then the many speeches of other comrades, we will whistle in amazement.

At first glance, everything seems to be correct: Zhukov spoke first, he stigmatized and exposed the anti-party group. And all

the other participants spent a week stigmatizing and denouncing the anti-party group.

That's the similarity.

And here is the difference: Zhukov made the main expositional emphasis on the fact that Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich are bloody executioners. All the other participants of the plenum branded Molotov, Malenkov,

Kaganovich and Shepilov, who joined them, with their last words, recalled many miscalculations and mistakes, but when discussing mass shootings they showed seemingly inexplicable restraint and tolerance.

Why?

Because Comrade Stalin was anything but a fool. Stalin didn't create terror by himself. He tied the entire Communist Party in a bloody circular bond. In every district, in every region, in every krai and in every republic were created so-called "troika". The "troika" consisted of the party secretary of a district, region, krai or republic, the head of a local department or office of the NKVD and a prosecutor. The "troikas" received orders: so many enemies were to be shot, so many were to be imprisoned.

"Troikas" ruled on a firing squad or a full camp term, without summoning for questioning, without delving into the essence of the case. It was a list. Party secretaries liked this life terribly, and they all asked Comrade Stalin to increase the norms. Comrade Stalin was not stingy, he added norms.

And so in June 1957, two and a half hundred of these very secretaries gathered in one hall for a meeting of the plenum of the Central Committee of the Party. Many years ago they had been petty secretaries of districts and regions. Now they had risen to commanding heights. Rise because they faithfully served the great cause of Stalin. All of them were raised and inspired by Comrade Stalin. All of them received instructions from the General Secretary of the Central Committee, all of them became members of the Central Committee themselves over time.

In the meeting room sat not only the most zealous executors of Stalin's orders, but also the most cunning. The simpler ones had long ago fallen under the proletarian scythe. But these survived. And somehow they were not very eager to incriminate their brothers-in-craft, comrades Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich in excessive zeal in carrying out the instructions of the Central Committee.

4

The second most bloodthirsty of all regional leaders in 1937 was a former shepherd and stoker with a two-grade education, Comrade Eikhe Robert Indrikovich, a candidate member of the Politburo, the master of Siberia. He showed simply incredible enthusiasm in matters of extermination of enemies. He constantly and insistentlly begged Stalin to increase the limits on extermination. Everything was not enough for him. He tearfully demanded more.

Robert Indrikovich was of a simpler temperament, so he soon fell under the tramway of history. On April 29, 1938 he was arrested, almost two years was under torture investigation, on February 2, 1940 was sentenced to capital punishment and on the same day received a long and honestly earned bullet in the back of the head.

In February 1956, at the XX Congress of the CPSU, Comrade Khrushchev declared Robert Indrikovich a loyal Leninist and an innocent victim of Stalin's bloody arbitrary rule.

Nikita himself surpassed Robert Indrikovich in bloodthirstiness. Of all the regional chiefs, he was number one in executing plans to uproot enemies. But he was cunning.

5

In February 1956, at the XX Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev accused Stalin of mass repression. The move was risky and, as further history has shown, suicidal for the entire socialist system.

Khrushchev's logic was as follows: Stalin is a villain, and all of us, leaders of a lower rank, are clean, we are loyal Leninists, we knew nothing!

In June 1957, Khrushchev accused Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich of many sins, but did not insist on mass shootings, because he himself has a snout in a cannon. And Zhukov suddenly remembered that not only Stalin was guilty of terror, but also Molotov, and Malenkov, and Kaganovich.

It was impossible to think of anything worse than that. Every party leader could not help but ask himself the question: what will Zhukov do tomorrow? He had the real military power in his hands. Today Zhukov remembered that Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich were to blame for the mass shootings. And who will he name tomorrow?

But all those present at the plenum of the Central Committee in June 1957 were Stalin's fledglings, each personally chosen by Comrade Stalin. Each of them had merits before Stalin. Each is stained with blood.

With his chatter, Zhukov made ALL members of the Central Committee and ALL candidates his enemies in an instant. Everyone was trembling for his fate: he might remember me too.

From Zhukov's speech, Khrushchev could draw a simple and logical conclusion: a year ago, Stalin's associates Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov were not called criminals, but now Zhukov reminded them of everything. Today Zhukov does not call Khrushchev a criminal, although Khrushchev is as much an associate of Stalin as others in the entourage of the

leader, but what if tomorrow Zhukov will change his opinion?

But Zhukov wouldn't stop:

Comrade Khrushchev, like all of us, has shortcomings and some mistakes in his work, about which Khrushchev, with all his inherent candor and sincerity, told the Presidium. But, comrades, Khrushchev's mistakes, I would say, did not give any ground for accusing him of even the slightest deviation from the Party line.

Zhukov was smart enough to kick even Khrushchev, his only ally in the struggle for power. It turned out that everyone is in the shit, and only Georgy Konstantinovich - all in white. Everyone is stained, starting with Khrushchev, but clean Zhukov generously forgives him for now.

6

The debate occasionally turned from a hysterical family quarrel into a veritable interrogation of the captives, consistent and

businesslike.

Zhukov: *Let's talk about responsibility for crimes, for shootings. This is the most important issue.*

Kaganovich: *If the members of the Presidium want me to defer other questions.*

Zhukov: *Tell me, why did you send 300 railroaders to the other world?*

Kaganovich: *The question that is posed is a matter of policy.*

And criminal.

Kaganovich: *It should be viewed not from the perspective of 1957, but from the perspective of 1937-1938.*

Zhukov: *You, brother, answer directly: members of the Central Committee were shot, are they our enemies?*

Kaganovich: *I have a political responsibility.*

And criminal.

Kaganovich turns to Khrushchev: *Didn't you sign the papers on shootings in Ukraine?*

Zhukov: *300 men of the railroad.*

(Ibid. p. 67.)

Zhukov wanted Kaganovich, who had signed the lists for the execution of 300 railroad workers, to be prosecuted. So that instead of bloody executioners Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich on the top of power sat good, kind and fair Khrushchev. Meanwhile, *"Nikita Khrushchev, a fighter against the cult of personality of Stalin, under him headed the Moscow city and regional organizations of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b), one of the first regional party secretaries appealed to the Politburo with a request to authorize mass arrests and subsequent shootings or eviction of "anti-Soviet elements" by the decision of the "troikas". Khrushchev's July (1937) lists included more than 41,000 people"* (Krasnaya Zvezda. May 17, 2003).

The cunning Khrushchev, having received the post of First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee as early as September 1953, took care to thoroughly

to wipe out the traces of his boisterous activity in the days when he was a faithful disciple and associate of the great Stalin. But even after the archives have been cleaned up, something can be discovered. Today we know for sure that in the Moscow region alone in June 1937 alone Khrushchev's victims were more than 39 thousand people [\[11\]](#). And Nikita was not a servile executor, but an enthusiastic initiator of the purges. About this Zhukov did not recall.

7

Zhukov took part in the conspiracy against Stalin - otherwise, a couple of weeks before Stalin's death, he would not have been returned from exile in the Urals to Moscow and immediately after Stalin's death would not have been put first deputy defense minister.

Zhukov took part in the plot against Beria and personally arrested him.

Zhukov in June 1957 led a conspiracy against the collective leadership of the country and the Communist Party, against the majority in the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee.

Zhukov's defenders prove that against Khrushchev Zhukov certainly did not plot anything, and could not plot.

We won't argue. We'll believe it.

But in that case Zhukov is a scoundrel. Zhukov incriminated Kaganovich for signing lists to shoot 300 railroad workers, but defended Khrushchev, who

signed lists to shoot and imprison without trial tens of thousands of people.

Key point

In his speech, which set the tone for the entire plenum of the Central Committee, Zhukov stated:

It must be said that other comrades, former members of the Politburo, are also to blame. I believe, comrades, that you know who we are talking about, but you know that these comrades, by their honest work, by their straightforwardness, have deserved to be trusted by the Central Committee of the Party, by our whole Party, and I am sure that from now on we will recognize them as leaders for their straightforwardness, pure-hearted confessions (Molotov,

Malenkov, Kaganovich. 1957. Transcript of the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. C. 41).

The Plenum responded with raucous applause. And Zhukov suggested that these "other comrades", who were not named, should repent:

Here, at the plenum, without lurking, they should say everything, and then we'll see what to do with them.

This is what Robespierre used to break his neck. He drove his associates to the guillotine one by one and in gangs, and the cowardly majority of the people's elected representatives responded with shrieks of delight. Everyone was trembling for his own skin, and when it turned out that for today he had been successful, he cheered and squealed with happiness.

And then one day Robespierre announced: I have identified in our circle a few more enemies of the people, which long ago it is time to cut off the heads, tomorrow we will do so, but so far I do not name names. Naturally, everyone took this remark to his own account, and therefore all the heads that had not yet been cut off simultaneously came up with the seemingly paradoxical thought: why not cut off Robespierre's own head?

That's what we agreed.

Zhukov went the same way: these I kick out, but the rest are also guilty, I do not name names, you yourself, comrades, you know them, but so be it - for today I forgive, let them still be considered leaders, and then we'll see.

Zhukov did not realize that from that moment, all those present at the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee - and this is two and a half hundred hardened in the underworld fights - became his mortal enemies.

Their raucous applause was merely a form of herd instinct, a manifestation of fear.

But it was this fear that united them all in their desire to get rid of Zhukov.

CHAPTER 8

1

The plenum continued. Party figures were rushing to express their ardent support for the victorious Khrushchev.

A month ago, Khrushchev publicly almost swatted Soviet writers and other cultural figures. Now it is time for the writers to respond. Kochetov, a member of the Central Revision Commission and editor-in-chief of the *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, is speaking:

Comrade Khrushchev's Bolshevik, party speech was of great importance. We rejoiced at it, it was a holiday for us. Before that there was just terrible muddiness (Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich. 1957. Transcript of the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. C. 410).

Before Khrushchev, the writers were gently chided by Comrade Shepilov, a candidate for the Presidium of the Central Committee. After him, Khrushchev said the same thing, only in the vernacular. It has now turned out that Shepilov's speech was terrible mud, while Khrushchev's speech was a balm for writers' souls.

Konstantin Simonov, a member of the Central Revision Commission, a six-time Stalin Prize winner, realizing that his party rank was too low and that he would not be honored to lick the victor's feed, sent a note to Khrushchev. Khrushchev read it to the plenum of the Central Committee:

Comrade Khrushchev criticized some of us, including me, harshly, but behind this harshness there was heart and soul, love for literature, concern for it and trust in us. I and, I know, other comrades left that meeting with a desire to work, with faith in their strength and with gratitude to Comrade Khrushchev for his direct, sharp, but full of concern words (ibid. P. 67).

That is: the boss beats us, and we are grateful to him. If he beats us, it means he loves us.

2

In the course of the altercation Zhukov was accused of being an executioner himself, signing sentences himself. To which the great commander allegedly proudly replied: "Dig! You won't find my signature there!"

Zhukolubovs and Zhukovedovs too often repeated these words, they have long been included in all treatises on Zhukov as proof of his honesty and non-involvement in mass shootings.

And I was interested in a minor detail: Zhukov was thrown the accusation..... By whom?

I decided to find the prosecutor. But the prosecutor was nowhere to be found.

Then I rushed to find out who had first told the story. And suddenly found out that the primary source is Konstantin Simonov, Deputy Secretary General of the Union of Writers of the USSR, Hero of Socialist Labor, winner of the Lenin and six Stalin prizes, one of the most important apologists for Zhukov's genius. Simonov described this scene in the article "To the biography of G. K. Zhukov. K. Zhukov." Simonov's fiction is not supported by any sources.

Transcript of the plenum (Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich. 1957. Transcript of the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. C. 68-69) refutes Simonov's fictions.

And it went like this.

Zhukov could not forget about three hundred railroad workers, under the decision to execute which was signed by Kaganovich.

Kaganovich: *Why didn't you, Comrade Zhukov, being a division commander, sign it?*

Zhukov: *Not a single person was framed for execution, Comrade*

Kaganovich.

Kaganovich: *This is difficult to verify.*

Zhukov: *Check, please.*

Kaganovich: *Did you disapprove of the policy of the Central Committee, the policy of fighting the enemies?*

Zhukov: *Fighting the enemy, but not shooting.*

Zhukov's answer: he supported the policy of fighting enemies, but he did not support the practice of firing squads.

I would like to know what exactly this was expressed in? Not otherwise in June 1937, the division commander Zhukov stood up at a party meeting and with his usual candor said: I, comrades, am against the execution of enemies, the policy of our native Communist Party in this matter does not support.

So: there is no need to look for evidence that Zhukov was fighting enemies. He himself stated this to Kaganovich at the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. But unfortunately, unfortunately, Zhukov did not provide any evidence that, while fighting the enemies, he allegedly opposed shootings.

Realizing that the discussion went in the wrong direction, Khrushchev put an end to the dispute: "*We all approved*". And Zhukov remained silent. And Zhukov did not object to Khrushchev's words.

But in other cases, the great strategist was not silent. Zhukov stigmatized, accused and exposed, threw lines, interrupted speakers. Zhukov reveled in power. At times he said things that could not have been said.

Speaker Shepilov. Zhukov to him:

Maybe you can tell me where you met Kaganovich? Yesterday, during the rain, Kaganovich stood with you under an umbrella in the forest.

Zhukov addressed all the accused as if he were an NKVD investigator: you, brother, don't dodge, don't twist!

But it's not about being treated rudely. We've all been accustomed to it for a long time. With his questions Zhukov was not so much exposing the rebels against Khrushchev as exposing himself. Zhukov's aggressive interrogation with reflected light showed his knowledge in matters in which it was better not to show his knowledge to anyone.

Here is what we are talking about. A year ago at the 20th Congress, Khrushchev exposed Stalin's personality cult and announced: from now on we will no longer have the dictatorship of one man, we will have collective leadership. 11 members

The Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU was the very collective leadership. These were those who ruled the Soviet Union. These comrades lived in dachas, and those dachas were in fabulous forests, in picturesque parks, on the banks of clean rivers and clear lakes. And those forests, those parks, those lakes and rivers were protected as nothing else in this world was protected.

The first clash in the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee ended in a draw on June 18, 1957. The group that supported Khrushchev gathered late in the evening in the Central Committee building on Staraya Square. Here Khrushchev's supporters could speak openly without fear of being overheard, since the Central Committee complex was under the watchful eye of the KGB, and KGB chief Army General Serov was on Khrushchev's side.

It was only natural that the opponents should gather somewhere. It is equally natural that their conversations took place not indoors, where they could be overheard, but on the paths of the park.

That night in Moscow there was an unprecedented heavy rainfall. Khrushchev's opponents were conferring under umbrellas. Zhukov smacked them: here it is, the conspiracy! I've exposed you!

But Zhukov exposed himself. No one contradicted him, no one asked him a counter-question. Because everyone was mortally intimidated. Because everything was clear and without questions.

So, Khrushchev's opponents conferred at night on the paths of the park in the rain. But the park is heavily guarded. If Zhukov knows about such details, it means that the top leaders of the country were under surveillance.

By whom? When? For what purpose? By what forces?

The first option: Zhukov himself, through the GRU, which was fully subordinate to him, established control over members of the Soviet Union's top leadership. Marshal Zhukov's duties as Minister of Defense of the USSR were to defend the country from external enemies. Instead, as a mere candidate member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, he established surveillance of the full members of the Presidium.

If it's not a conspiracy against the top leadership of the country, what is it?

The second option: members of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee were spied on by KGB officers, the same ones who guarded the government's of the residence. That is, the guards of the country's top leadership were in fact not guards, but a Vertukhai-stuka convoy. The government guards did not so much preserve the peace of the leaders, but rather watched them and reported to their chief Serov, who passed this information to Zhukov.

On what grounds did Serov pass this information to Zhukov? The KGB was not subordinate to the army. The State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers was subordinate to the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. At that time, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bulganin.

If the chairman of the KGB, who was obliged to protect the security of the state as a whole and the security of the state leaders in particular, was instead conducting surveillance of those to whom he was officially subordinated, if, violating laws and rules, he passed the extracted information to Zhukov, i.e. to a third person to whom he was not even subordinated in his service, then how should you qualify the situation?

I won't call it the Zhukov-Serov conspiracy. Let someone else find another definition.

3

The Party chiefs unanimously expressed their deep gratitude to their savior Khrushchev. Comrade I. V. Kapitonov, member of the Central Committee, First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU, is speaking:

We have no tanks. They are in the safe and loyal hands of Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov. (Applause). And he knows how to manage these tanks (ibid. P. 223).

In other words, Kapitonov admits: it is not we, the members of the Central Committee, who govern the country and its army. It is not in our hands the power and strength. Power is in the hands of the great Georgy Konstantinich. He knows how to use that power, how to dispose of it. Long live!

4

Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov, relying on the might of the army, overthrew the majority of the political leadership of the Soviet Union, forced Marshals of the Soviet Union Voroshilov and Bulganin to submit to himself, brought to a consensus of two and a half hundred members and candidates of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

That's how Khrushchev won.

Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Shepilov were ousted from the pinnacles of power.

Bulganin, Voroshilov, Pervukhin and Saburov remained temporarily in high leadership positions, but their song had been sung. It would not be long before they would be kicked out one by one.

It would have been unseemly to expel them all at once. It would have become clear that the minority in the Presidium of the Central Committee had seized power by force, overthrowing the majority.

At the final session of the plenum on June 29, 1957, Comrade Zhukov was elected to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee.

Instead of the expelled Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and "joined them" Shepilov in the Presidium joined at once a whole horde of loyal Khrushchevites, including Brezhnev Leonid Ilyich, Furtseva Ekaterina Alekseevna and Kozlov Frol Romanovich.

5

In recent years in our country, and beyond its borders, there are a lot of scientists of a new direction in historical science - bug study. They study the life and extraordinary adventures of Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov Georgy Konstantinovich.

And these very learned comrades chorus inform us that in 1957 Zhukov allegedly did not plot and prepare any coup d'état, and certainly did not commit it. Zhukov, according to those who delve deeply into his biography, at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party just threw some words into the wind in the heat of passion, and the Kremlin fools were scared to death and accused the Marshal of Victory in Bonapartism.

Let's figure it out. Let's dot the I's and cross the T's.

So, for four days, from June 18 to June 21, 1957, an exceptionally tense meeting of top leaders took place in Moscow

countries. There were 11 persons with casting vote and 7 persons with advisory vote.

We discussed the removal of Khrushchev. Of those who had the right to

decide, on the first day ALL opposed Khrushchev!

The next day, when the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee was in full session, but when it became clear that dissenters could be shot, 7 people were against Khrushchev, 3 people were for him.

By any human concept, Khrushchev himself, at the moment when the question was raised whether he was worthy to rule the country or not, should have withdrawn and not interfered in the vote.

But Khrushchev voted to trust himself: I am worthy to rule! If even this illegal vote is taken into account, the majority was still against Khrushchev.

And then Zhukov, who did not even have a casting vote, intervened in the democratic procedure.

Zhukov announced that henceforth the Soviet Army was not subordinate to the supreme Kremlin authority.

Zhukov announced that the highest Kremlin authority would henceforth be subordinate to the leadership of the army.

Zhukov announced that he, who had no right to vote, was relying on the might of the army to oust most of the country's leaders from power.

Zhukov announced that his choice at the moment rested on the personality of Khrushchev.

Zhukov announced that henceforth the country would be ruled only by the one he dares to point to.

The highest Kremlin authorities surrendered and obeyed, because the threat was serious and real. If the Kremlin leaders had not obeyed Zhukov, all of them would have been crushed by the 2nd Guards Taman Motorized Rifle Division of the Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov. 215 T-54 tanks and 112 BTR-50P armored personnel carriers would have been quite enough for such a case.

6

From any point of view, Zhukov's actions can be evaluated unequivocally. There are no options.

It's a palace coup.

It's a military coup.

It's a coup d'état.

Therefore, the victorious Khrushchev is only a protégé of Zhukov.

At the Kremlin talk in addition to Zhukov were present two more marshals.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bulganin had the

casting vote. He was against Khrushchev.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Voroshilov Kliment Efremovich had the casting vote. He was against Khrushchev.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov Georgy Konstantinovich had no casting vote. He by his actions put Khrushchev in charge of the country.

Consequently, it was not merely a military coup, for the military was decisively against Khrushchev. The defeat and removal of a whole group of the country's top leaders and the statements made in the course of the defeat were nothing but the proclamation of Zhukov's personal dictatorship. This dictatorship was temporarily covered by the broad stern of Zhukov's protégé Khrushchev.

Zhukov threw the top Kremlin leadership off the top and put someone he chose himself in charge of the country.

While Zhukov was threatening the leaders of the country with force, on his orders generals and admirals, commanders of military districts and fleets, from all over the country were taking members of the Central Committee to the Kremlin on military planes.

Of the 309 members of the Central Committee, candidates to the Central Committee and members of the Central Revision Commission, they took 266 people to the Kremlin. From June 22 to June 29, the plenum of the Central Committee was held. Gathered in the Kremlin party leaders for eight days in a row unanimously stigmatized those whom Zhukov had pointed out.

Eight days!

The herd leaders stopped denouncing and insulting the so-called "anti-Party group" only because they had been given the signal to do so. Otherwise, they could have branded Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Shepilov, who had joined them, for a month without a day off.

Not one of the 266 people said a single kind word in defense of those being cast out. Why was this so? Because everyone agreed with Zhukov's line?

Not at all. Everyone was mortally intimidated. It would not be long before they would all tell Zhukov their true opinion.

7

Communist power existed in two forms: the dictatorship of the great leader or collective leadership.

Collective leadership arises not because the chiefs are good, but because the great chief can tolerate next to him only that heir who is his son. If there is no son in the leadership, the great chief does not tolerate other heirs near him.

He destroys the one who clearly stands out against the background of the rest of the cronies.

Therefore, after the death or removal of a great leader, regardless of the will of the remaining leaders, a collective leadership emerges, i.e. a period of temporary democracy and weakening of the central authority. This temporary democracy arises only because none of the remaining associates of the former leader can immediately subdue the others.

After Lenin, a collective leadership emerged: Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Stalin, Bukharin. Then Stalin strangled them all and became the great leader.

After Stalin, a collective leadership emerged: Beria, Malenkov, Bulganin, Khrushchev. Khrushchev came out on top.

After Khrushchev, a collective leadership emerged: Kosygin, Podgorny, Brezhnev. At that moment, for the first time in the history of mankind, three Soviet cosmonauts flew into space in one spacecraft. They took off under the great leader Khrushchev, and landed under the collective leadership of Kosygin, Podgorny and Brezhnev.

The collective leadership at the airfield met the team of cosmonauts, and the cosmonauts did not understand to whom exactly they should report on the fulfillment of the Motherland's task. The collective leaders did not know it either. None of them was daring to go, none of them wanted to reveal their cards ahead of time.

So the cosmonauts reported to the Communist Party and the Soviet government.

After Brezhnev, no collective leadership emerged because by the end of his reign, Leonid Ilyich was out of the

and did not run the country. Andropov seized power while Brezhnev was still alive, and he led the country after Brezhnev.

But let's get back to our sheep. Zhukov is attributed all sorts of merits and virtues. Even these:

Zhukov alone could say without any fear that any deviation from the proclaimed principles of collective leadership was inadmissible.

This was stated by the serious historian V. P. Naumov ("The Case" of Marshal G. K. Zhukov. 1957. New and Modern History. M.: Nauka, 2000. №

6. C. 84).

Let us remind the serious historian that the centralization of all means of production and all property in the hands of the state requires an equally centralized management of all these means of production and all this property. The centralization of power is a pyramid. The pyramid is quite naturally crowned by the power of one. There is no room for two, much less ten, at the top.

The situation when there was no one at the very top of the pyramid did not arise after Stalin because the great democrat Zhukov wanted it that way. Collective leadership arises naturally for a short time after the death or overthrow of the ruler. Collective leadership is not at all a rejection of socialism, that is, of the totalitarian domination of the bureaucracy. It is a temporary lull before the rampant absolute power of the new great leader.

And now there are bug-lovers who attribute outstanding mental qualities to their hero. It turns out that Zhukov was the only one who could protect the collective leadership, who could without any fear to say about the inadmissibility of any deviation from the proclaimed principles of collective leadership. These qualities are attributed to the one who personally dispersed the collective leadership that emerged after the death of Stalin.

By his actions and statements Zhukov crushed the supreme power in the country. He openly and unequivocally proclaimed himself the supreme leader of the country and its leaders - that is, he declared

the leader and dictator of the Soviet Union. This was clear to everyone who at that moment was a member of the country's top leadership.

And we are told by Zhukov's friends that Zhukov did not think of himself as a dictator, his actions as a seizure of power did not consider.

Let's go with that.

It turns out that the two and a half hundred leaders gathered at the plenum of the Central Committee in June 1957, regarded Zhukov's statements and actions as a proclamation of dictatorship, and Zhukov himself did not understand who he proclaimed himself to be.

If this was the case, then we can only question the mental abilities of the Marshal of Victory.

Key point

At the morning session of the June (1957) plenum of the Central

Committee, held on June 25, Marshal of the Soviet Union Konev accused Molotov of *"treating us, the military, front commanders, in a barbaric, dismissive manner, addressing us with swearing."*

Molotov, of course, is no angel. But he is also a good whistleblower. Ivan Stepanovich Konev with regard to his subordinate generals was, as they used to say in the army, "insolent to the hand", that is, beat their faces.

As soon as Konev dropped the line that Molotov "addressed us with swearing", Zhukov immediately added: "Threatened to shoot us more than once."

Who would be outraged by such behavior, but not Zhukov. This is how the Marshal of Victory himself acted:

Combat order to the troops of the Leningrad Front 17.9.41

<...> For leaving without a written order of the military council of the front and army the specified boundary, all commanders, political workers and soldiers are subject to immediate execution ...

Commander of the LF troops Hero of the Soviet Union, Army General Zhukov.

Member of the LF Military Council Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Zhdanov.

Chief of Staff of the LF Lieutenant General Khozin. (Military History Journal. 1988. No. 11. P. 95.)

And here is an excerpt from the cipher of the commander of the Leningrad Front, Army General Zhukov to the Military Council of the 8th Army on September 22, 1941:

Such a military council deserves severe punishment, up to and including execution. I demand: Shcherbakov, Chukhnov, Kokorev to go to 2 dn, 11 sdn, 10 sdn and personally lead them into battle. Shevaldin and Kokorev to warn commanders of all ranks that for the unauthorized abandonment of Peterhof will be shot as cowards and traitors (ibid. 1992. № 6. P. 18).

Major-General Shcherbakov VI - commander of the 8th Army.

Division commissar Chukhnov I. F. - member of the Military Council of

the 8th Army.

Lieutenant-General Shevaldin T. I. - Deputy Commander of the 8th Army.

Major General Kokorev P. I. - Chief of Staff of the 8th Army.

2 bottom is the 2nd Leningrad division of the people's militia, that is, 10 thousand untrained, unfit for military service people dressed in their own civilian clothes, armed with whatever they could find, including trophy Japanese sabers from the Russo-Japanese War and museum rifles. In Moscow, 16 such divisions were formed, in Leningrad - 10 divisions, not counting individual regiments and battalions. Zhukov ordered the commander of the 8th Army to run ahead of one of these divisions and shout "hurrah", dragging the men behind him into German minefields and under dense machine gun fire. No success - shot Zhukov. This is the whole secret of his commanding skill.

On September 23, 1941, Zhukov sent the commanders of the armies of the Leningrad and Baltic Fronts a ciphergram No. 4976:

Explain to all personnel that all families of those who surrendered to the enemy will be shot, and on their return from captivity they will also be shot (Journal "Beginning". № 3. 1991).

None of Hitler's field marshals and generals, not even Hitler himself, ever gave such orders.

Here is an excerpt from Zhukov's cipher to the commander of the 49th Army Lieutenant General I. G. Zakharkin from October 12, 1941:

...By counterattack to restore the situation. Otherwise, for unauthorized withdrawal from Kaluga. Kaluga not only the command of the units, but also you will be shot ... (Mertsalov A. N., Mertsalova L. A. Inoy Zhukov. Moscow: 1996. P. 66.)

November 8, 1941, the commander of the 43rd Army of the Western Front, Major General KD Golubev appealed to Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin: it is impossible to work under the command of Zhukov.

On the second day of my arrival I was promised to be shot, on the third day I was put on trial, on the fourth day I was threatened to be shot in front of

the army (Izvestiya TsK CPSU. 1991. No. 3. P. 220-221).

These are only some documents and only for incomplete two months, but this is what Zhukov did throughout the war. And now they are trying to convince us that after the war Zhukov was simply exhausted by his overwhelming desire to restore the historical truth:

One of the main issues in the life of the party, he considered overcoming the legacy of Stalin's personality cult. And in the years of Khrushchev's disgrace Marshal remained faithful to the course of the XX Congress on de-Stalinization, wanted to tell the people the truth about the "leader of all times", the truth about the events of the Great Patriotic War, as he saw them (Rodina. No. 10 (October). 2000).

CHAPTER 9

1

- I need to see Comrade Khrushchev. Nikita Sergeyevich.
- Who are you?
- Major Bulanov.
- What's the question?
- It's important.
- I'm Comrade Khrushchev's assistant. You can report your question to me.
- I can't.
- Hint.
- Not a hint.
- All right. Uh-huh. I'll make an appointment for you. In October.
- But it's July!
- Comrade Khrushchev is busy right now. Then he's going on vacation. And September is extremely busy.
- It's urgent.
- It won't come out right away. Not until October, Comrade Major.

2

The history of mankind is a chain of accidents. We learned this as children:

there was no nail - the horseshoe fell off, without a horseshoe the horse went lame, the commander on a lame horse became an easy target, the commander was killed - the army ran away. The enemy enters the city, sparing no prisoners because there was no nail in the forge.

Or here it is: one mom, sailing beyond the clouds in her fantasies, forgot to tie a scarf around her son's neck, he caught a cold, got sick and died. And we don't know what kind of villain, genius or brilliant villain we lost. And we don't know where history would have turned if the scarf had been tied around his neck on that cloudy November day. On that very day another mother carefully tied a thick red woolen scarf around her son's thin neck. And he didn't get sick and he didn't die. He grew up and became an adult. His name was Adolf. And the history of mankind took a different path. A bumpy ride.

It happened that on July 3, 1957 at 12:18 Moscow time, Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, came out of his office at the very moment when his assistant Shuisky Grigory Trofimovich said the words "only in October, Comrade Major".

Had Nikita left his office a minute later, would not have heard the words of his chief assistant - the history of mankind would have taken a different course.

But Khrushchev left the office at that very moment.

And I heard.

Khrushchev, nicknamed Kolobok and Bald Cock by his closest associates and subordinates in the country's leadership, perked up:

- Who's that?
- Some major.
- Last name?
- Bulanov.
- Did he leave his cell phone?
- No. He hung up on me.
- Find out where the call came from immediately.

Grigory Trofimovich Shuisky dialed three zeros and immediately received an answer: the call came from the telephone booth number 15 884 near the western exit of the Kievsky railway station in Moscow, the conversation was short, there was a crowd around, that's why the 326th brigade of external surveillance of the 7th KGB Directorate had no time to take control of the situation.

- Business... - Comrade Khrushchev sank heavily into his chair.

- Nikita Sergeyevich, we have been working together for many years. I do everything correctly if I understand your orders, your instructions, your logic. Now I can't understand it. What happened? What's the problem? Explain. I'll fix it, next time I won't miss.

- Appreciate, dummy boyar, why the hell would some Major Bulanov demand a meeting with the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union? And how could some Major Bulanov find the phone number of my most important assistant?

Comrade Shuisky Grigory Trofimovich thought about it, scratched the back of his head. There's no disputing it: he'd made a mistake. I should have questioned the major,

I should have gotten a phone number or an address.

- All in all, so: for me, Grigor Trofimych, get Major Bulanov out from under the ground. But so that no one - I repeat, no one - finds out that I was looking for him.

3

The task of searching was complicated by the fact that majors serve not only in the Soviet Army, but also in the militia, the KGB, the KGB border troops, and the internal troops of the Interior Ministry.

But still Trofimych's main attention was paid to the Ministry of Defense. Because officers of other departments present themselves differently. They call themselves not just majors, but KGB majors, police majors, internal service majors.

And now the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense received a call from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet: we are looking for war heroes with the names Berestov, Bulanov, Voznyuk, Rylsky, Smorodov. The case is under the personal control of Comrade Voroshilov, so you have two hours to search for them.

Grigory Trofimovich Shuisky, an aide to Comrade Khrushchev, sent urgent requests to both the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. And not in his own name either. And he also shuffled Major Bulanov's surname into a deck of other names.

Twelve years had passed since the end of the war, so it could be assumed with a high degree of probability that the major who called Khrushchev's private secretariat had fought in the war. Therefore, he was being sought, ostensibly as a hero who had not been awarded a prize.

But one could assume that he had not fought in the war. If he entered the school at the very end of the war or even after its victorious end, then it was high time for him to become a major.

If the major was not at war, a special search option was put in place for that as well.

4

That night Nikita Khrushchev stayed overnight in the Kremlin, ordering a sharp increase in security not only of the Kremlin but also of the Central Committee complex on Staraya Square. Trofimych was commanded to wake himself up at any time as soon as a result appeared.

Grigory Trofimovich Shuisky woke up the First Secretary of the Central Committee at dawn. At four in the morning with minutes to spare. He appeared in Khrushchev's Kremlin apartment unshaven, eyes red, swelling under his eyes. He reported, holding back a yawn:

- Major Bulanov Yuri Sergeevich, an officer for special orders of Lieutenant General Mamsurov.

- Where is Mamsurov? Commanding the 38th Army?

- Commanded. Until recently. On the recommendation of the USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov, Lieutenant General Mamsurov was appointed First Deputy Chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff.

- And approved?

- Your signature, Nikita Sergeyevich, is under the decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee.

- I remember now. We're in trouble, Grigor Trofimych.

5

Major Bulanov Yuri Sergeevich was stopped on the street by a passerby in a shabby tarpaulin coat, flashed a scarlet certificate with a golden coat of arms, and invited him to pass. An unremarkable gray "Victory" was waiting around the corner.

Soviet designers designed this vehicle during the war years. It was tested in the victorious year of 1945. And they gave the machine the proud name "Rodina". And showed it to Comrade Stalin. Comrade Stalin inspected the masterpiece of design thought and asked in between: at what price will you sell "Rodina"?

And then the car was given another name. They showed it to Comrade

Stalin again. Comrade Stalin praised it: "Victory, but a small one.

6

It was customary to hold meetings with senior management, if there was no reason for outsiders to know about them, at dachas, behind green fences, in pine forests. With the highest management - in Serebryany Bor.

Russian people know how to give beautiful names. Serebryany Bor! Somebody had the imagination to name the pine grove behind the

by a wide canal on the quiet outskirts of Moscow. It sounds even better than if this fabulous place were called Zolotoy Bor.

Serebryany Bor! It's always good here. In July - especially: squirrels chasing each other on the branches, birds of some unknown breed trilling with their love for life, bumblebees buzzing, satiated with nectar.

The first thing Comrade Khrushchev informed Major Bulanov was that his absence from his workplace would not be noticed: Lieutenant-General Mamsurov would be hard at work all day today in the administrative organs department of the Central Committee. This was taken care of. Comrade Khrushchev asked the major about his work, family, health, and then we got down to business.

- Nikita Sergeyevich, I realize I had no right to...

- You have the right. It is written in the CPSU Charter, approved by the 19th Congress of the Communist Party. Every communist has the right to appeal to any party bodies, up to the Central Committee. You are a communist. You have appealed to the Central Committee. I am the First Secretary of the Central Committee. I'm listening to you, Comrade Major.

- Nikita Sergeyevich, you can punish me, you can judge me if I'm guilty of anything, but let me ask you a question first.

- I'm listening.

- Do you know anything about the C.S.C.? It's the GRU Special Operations Center.

- No, I don't.

- Do you know who the head of this Center is?

- I don't know.

- The chief is Lieutenant General Mamsurov.

- Mamsurov is the first deputy chief of the GRU.

- That's right. But he also has a related position.

- Curious.

- Nobody's supposed to know about that.

- How did you find out?
- Accidentally.
- Can you elaborate on that?
- I can. Where do I start?
- From the beginning.

- I understand. The thing is that my position is an honorable one - an officer for special assignments for Lieutenant General Mamsurov. But an officer for special assignments sometimes has to perform the despicable duties of an adjutant. You realize the difference in duties, of course.

- I understand. But for the good of the case, please clarify.

- The adjutant receives documents and maps in the secret part. The adjutant carries the briefcase for the commander. The adjutant sits on the phone, keeps a log of messages, sharpening pencils. In the field, where there are no waitresses, he pours fire water for the commander for dinner, cuts sausage, provides a girl for the night, if the hint is given. I'm sorry, Nikita Sergeyevich, I'm speaking as it is, not as it should be.

- That's the only way to say it.

- But an officer for special assignments is higher in rank and in rank, and his duties are not the same at all. An officer for special assignments must know all the formations and units that are subordinate to his superior, all the weaknesses and strengths of these formations and units, their situation, condition and the tasks assigned to them. An officer for special assignments, even though it sounds strange, is obliged to know and understand the situation even better than his commander. Through his eyes the commander of high rank looks at the battlefield. Here, last fall in Hungary in the 66th Guards Rifle Division reported to the 38th Army headquarters that the first battalion of the 193rd Guards Rifle Regiment captured a railroad bridge across the Danube. Lieutenant General Mamsurov, commander of the army, immediately took the situation under his personal control. But there was no opportunity or time to go there himself, and no one would allow him to abandon control of the 38th Army. He sends me. I'm taking three BTR-152s. One of them is equipped with a twin anti-aircraft gun ZPU-2, which is good for hitting the upper floors with long bursts from two barrels at once, and the other two armored personnel carriers have a motorized rifle platoon. I'm rushing to the bridge. On the way we come under fire. One soldier killed, four wounded.

- Did you get through?

- We're through. I hate the battalion commander who's holding the bridge. Although he's a lieutenant colonel and I'm a captain. The bridge defense is

thin. I said to him, "The counterpart will smash you. and blow dynamite on the bridge. And the entire 38th Army on the west bank of the Danube will be left without ammunition and shells, without food and fuel. That's why I say that the defense of the object, you can say, strategic, you, Kombat, is organized in a sloppy way. Dig trenches! Dig trenches! Braid barbed wire. Cover the approaches with minefields!

- Covered it up?

- He did, Nikita Sergeyevich. It wasn't his fault. They gave him neither anti-personnel mines nor wire. And there's not enough men in the battalion to defend such an object. I'm rushing back to the army command post. I reported to the commander of the 38th Army, Lieutenant-General Mamsurov: the battalion commander was good. He should be presented for an award. It's not his fault that the defense is liquid. It's the regiment commander who should be given a slap on the neck. Why didn't he put another battalion in the defense? Why didn't he reinforce it with tanks? One weakened battalion can't hold that bridge.

- Did you hold the bridge?

- We held it, Nikita Sergeyevich. I met that commander after Hungary. I was given the rank of major for that bridge ahead of schedule, and he was given the Order of Alexander Nevsky on his chest. He and I drank a flask of alcohol on such an occasion.

- But sometimes you have to work for the adjutant?

- Yes, Nikita Sergeyevich. Three days ago Lieutenant-General Mamsurov sent his adjutant to Tambov on some business, so his duties have temporarily fallen to me. General Mamsurov is learning a new position. According to our procedures he, as well as I, as every officer and general is entitled in this case, a lifting allowance, that is, one more extra paycheck. And not at the end of the month, but immediately upon arrival at the new duty station. It is the adjutant's business - in the financial department to get money for the commander. Not the general himself in line to push. I'm going. I get it. I bring the envelope to General Mamsurov. Now I have to pay membership fees to the Party. The general counted out the interest, gave me a party card and money.

- Every communist is obliged to pay party dues personally.

- That's right. But General Mamsurov was busy. I went to the party committee of the GRU, paid. The secretary won't accept the money. Too much,
says I brought it.

- Was General Mamsurov wrong?

- That's the problem, Nikita Sergeyevich, General Mamsurov is never wrong.

- What's the matter?

- That's what I'm saying: what's the matter? Without disturbing the general, I start to look into it. Lifting allowance, like the salary, consists of three parts: money for military rank, for the position held and a percentage bonus for length of service. And I'm not making any sense. I firmly know that the general has one position - First Deputy Chief of the GRU, and he is paid for some other position I don't know.

- If I understood correctly, General Mamsurov received a raise for two positions at once. And, as an honest communist, he faithfully paid membership fees from all the money he received. But the secretary of the party committee of the GRU knew nothing about the second position, so he did not accept the money. He thought that the general had made a mistake, that he had sent too much.

- That's right.

- And you informed General Mamsurov that there was some misunderstanding....

- No, Nikita Sergeyevich. I didn't tell General Mamsurov anything. I went to the financial department to sort it out.

- H?

- And the cashier said that everything here was correct. On June 28, 1957, military unit 41 339 was established, and Lieutenant General Mamsurov was appointed commander of this unit in addition to his position as first deputy chief of the GRU, so the money was paid to him correctly.

- Didn't the financiers get confused by this oddity?

- No. Millions go through the GRU finance department. For financiers, a few extra thousand is an insignificant amount. The main thing for financiers is that debit and credit match. The new first deputy chief of the GRU has arrived, he gets money for this and this. If in the columns of figures everything matches to ruble and kopeck, then financiers have nothing else to worry about. There is an order to pay for the position of the first deputy - they pay. And there is another order to pay for as commander of some military unit. No problem - they pay for that too.

- Did you find out what kind of military unit it is? What's behind this number?

- Recognized.

- How?

- One of the adjutant's duties was to receive documents for the chief in the secret part, to carry his briefcase after him, and to return the documents to the secret part after work. Because I had to fulfill the despicable duties of an adjutant, because such a situation arose, I took the opportunity to look into the top secret documents of General Mamsurov. I am ready to be punished for this under the most terrible article of the Criminal Code.

- If the code will apply to anyone, it won't be you, Comrade Major. Who signed the order to create this military unit?

- The Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov.

- And what kind of military unit is this?

- Troop Unit 41 339, that is, the GRU Special Purpose Centre, is an absolutely fantastic organization. They train saboteurs there. In military academies, officers study for three or four years. At the Military Academy of the General Staff, even less. And here the training period for ordinary soldiers is set at seven years. What is this nonsense? The term of active service in the Soviet Army is three years, and these guys have seven. The personnel are only enlisted men, and this is a savagery for the Soviet Army, we have never had such a thing.

- What's with the soldiers?

- They are saboteurs, top-class athletes: wrestlers, sambists, boxers, shooters, motorcyclists, skiers, parachutists, pentathletes. There are at least two thousand of them. In our army, an ordinary soldier gets 30 rubles a month, and an ordinary soldier of the Central Defense Center gets exactly 24 times as much. That is, one gets as much as the privates of an entire platoon. That's not all. 720 rubles - this is only the basic salary. Zhukov established a whole bunch of bonuses for seniority, for class, for each day of field exercises, for parachute jumps, for admission to classified documents. The allowances in the sum exceed the basic salary. It turns out that ordinary soldiers receive more, than officers of the Soviet Army. Besides, the food is excellent, the barracks are the best, the equipment is good, and the uniforms are of the highest quality. I'm not talking about the officers of the Central Intelligence Service. They are given apartments in Moscow from the ministerial reserve, and their salaries are quite unbelievable. Mamsurov himself receives almost as much for his position as chief of the Central Intelligence Center as he does for his main job as first deputy chief of the GRU.

- Where is this Center located?

- There is no center as such. In order not to frighten the local authorities and the relevant watchful competent authorities, small units, platoons and

companies are dispersed in various garrisons and military camps: in Voronezh, in Tambov, in Tula. But if you make sense of it - all of them no more than one night by train to Moscow. And one company is in Alabino. Disguised as a training camp for sports teams of military districts and fleets.

- Let's do it this way, Comrade Major. I will now send a man to the party committee of the GRU, he will inform the secretary about the creation of a special military unit, which allegedly arose by decision of the Central Committee. No one must know of its existence. My man will demand from the secretary that he accept Lieutenant General Mamsurov's party dues without any questions. My man will remind the secretary of his responsibility for keeping state, military and party secrets. After that you will go to the secretary, give him the money. Let the secretary put a stamp in Mamsurov's party ticket certifying that the dues have been paid. You will return the party ticket to the general as if nothing had happened: he handed you the money, you handed it over to the party committee. No one will have any questions about it. You, Comrade Major, have never met me, you've never told me anything. Is that clear?

- All of them.

- Thank you, Comrade Major. We'll take care of it. Go on, don't worry about your future. I'll take care of your future.

7

Major Bulanov, an officer for special assignments (popularly known as an errand officer) of the first deputy chief of the GRU, found out quite by accident that his chief, Lt. Gen. Mamsurov,

In addition to his new main position, he was also given an additional top secret position as head of the Center for Special Purpose of the GRU. The major decided that the matter was unclean. And reported to Khrushchev.

The major, who was an analyst both by nature and by position, appreciated the piece of information he had accidentally received. And yet, due to his relatively low position, he could not understand the full depth of what had happened.

The essence of this discovery was that the Minister of Defense of the USSR, four times Hero of the Soviet Union Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov Georgy Konstantinovich, the head of the GRU Colonel-General Shtemenko Sergei Matveyevich and the first deputy head of the GRU Hero of the Soviet Union Lieutenant-General Mamsurov Khadzhi-Umar Dzhiorovich on June 28, 1957 committed another coup d'état.

Although it hasn't been reported to anyone yet.

Key point

Zhukov was a boor and a boor. A boor in his relations with those who were one star below him. A boor in his relations with those who were higher in rank.

He was a villein and a boor at the same time, without any transition between these states.

After the war revealed numerous criminal offenses Zhukov: illegal distribution of orders, theft, looting. And for looting, Article 266 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR provided for severe punishment, including the death penalty.

Stalin was surprisingly malleable. Marauder Zhukov he did not shoot or even imprison. Zhukov was merely expelled from the Central Committee of the Communist Party. But more and more details of his activities surfaced. Zhukov was threatened with expulsion from the party itself. And that meant the end of his career.

January 12, 1948 Zhukov sent a penitential letter to a member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee Zhdanov, who, on Stalin's orders, dealt with the dirty deeds of war criminal Zhukov. Zhukov whined like a beaten dog, asked not to kick him out of the party, promised to correct himself. Stalin in his letter called him simply great, or as a great leader. And himself as a servant of the great Stalin ("Military History Archive". 2007. No. 2. P. 57).

Let's get into it: Communists fight against the oppression of man by man, for the equality of all people on earth. And so the Communist Zhukov writes an official letter to the highest organs of the Communist Party leadership, in this letter he asks to remain in the ranks of the Communists and voluntarily recognizes himself as a servant, i.e. a villein, of another man.

Stalin's cult of personality was created by weak-willed people with elastic spines, who, like Zhukov, not only considered themselves, but openly called themselves Stalin's villeins. The overthrow of Stalin's personality cult was for them payback for their past despicable behavior, for voluntary self-abasement.

CHAPTER 10

1

The commander of the 38th Army of the Precarpathian Military District is not Central Committee nomenclature. Go higher. The army commander is a nomenclature of the Central Committee Secretariat, that is, it is not some chiefs in some departments of the Central Committee who decide on his appointment or removal. The nomenclature of the Secretariat of the Central Committee means that the fate of the army commander can be decided only by one of the secretaries of the Central Committee.

And the deputy chiefs of the GRU, especially the first deputy, are birds of even higher flight. They are the nomenclature of the Politburo, which in Khrushchev's time was called the Presidium of the Central Committee. Only there, at the very top, could approve a candidate for this post. Only the Presidium of the Central Committee could decide the fate of the first deputy chief of the GRU. And no one else.

It was the Presidium of the Central Committee, at the suggestion of Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov, that appointed Lieutenant General Mamsurov, commander of the 38th Army of the Pre-Carpathian Military District, to the post of first deputy chief of the GRU. Only the Presidium of the Central Committee had the right to remove him from this position, to give him or remove from him any additional duties.

Major Bulanov, being an officer for special assignments first for the commander of the 38th Army, and then for the first deputy chief of the GRU, having access to secrets of extreme importance, quite by accident learned about the existence of the GRU Special Purpose Center. And he felt with all his major's being a blatant strangeness: ordinary soldiers of this Center received the same amount of money as officers commanding companies and battalions who had served for many years.

The sergeants of the UNC, commanding squads of ten men, received as much as gray-haired colonels ruling regiments, brigades, or even divisions, that is, thousands of soldiers, sergeants, and officers.

TSOGRU, this whole unusual, secret organization, carefully camouflaged and hidden from outsiders, including the

of the country's leadership, was a kind of training school for saboteurs, with a seven-year training program, but with the possibility of entering combat at any

time. And that school was commanded not by anyone, but by the first deputy chief of the GRU.

And this is nonsense and absurd: subordinate to the GRU is the top secret Military Diplomatic Academy. It trains intelligence officers for intelligence departments and departments of the headquarters of military districts, fleets, groups of troops and fronts, extracting officers of illegal and diplomatic residences of the GRU, analysts of the GRU Information Service. The Military Diplomatic Academy is commanded by its head with the rank of colonel-general. And no one thought to put the first deputy chief of the GRU at the head of the Military Diplomatic Academy! It's too low for his flight. He has enough of his own worries.

But Lieutenant General Mamsurov, for whom even the position of the head of the Military Diplomatic Academy is too low, someone thought of putting him in charge of some school that trained privates and sergeants!

That's what struck Major Bulanov. This is what he reported to the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Comrade Nikita Khrushchev.

So, to summarize.

First. The Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov and the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, Colonel-General Shtemenko, without informing the leadership of the country, created a secret school of saboteurs numbering two and a half thousand selected thugs.

Second. Private personnel are recruited on a contract basis, which is a blatant savagery for the Soviet Army. This is not our custom.

Three. The secret school is for some reason divided into several small units scattered in different garrisons and military camps.

Fourth. The school is not created anywhere, its branches are not further than five hundred kilometers from the capital of the state. Why not in Kazakhstan? Why not in Altai? Why not in Transbaikalia? Who needs thugs in the immediate vicinity of Moscow, five hundred or even a hundred kilometers from the Kremlin?

Fifth. Marshal Zhukov, Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union, pays his thug soldiers unprecedented officer salaries, violating financial discipline and socialist principles of pay.

Sixth. Zhukov put the first deputy chief of the GRU in command of the school of saboteurs, which is like driving a forty-ton dump truck to deliver rattles to kindergartens or using a walking excavator with a bucket capacity of

25 cubic meters and a boom outreach of a hundred meters to dig a drainage ditch on the homestead.

Seven. All this is covered by the impenetrable darkness of military secrecy. The fact that Lieutenant-General Mamsurov, in addition to his main post, holds the position of head of a school for saboteurs must not be known to anyone, including his personal officer for special assignments.

What's behind all this?

But even having asked this question, even having given a logical and reasonable answer to it, Major Bulanov could not understand the true meaning of what was happening, for, like any ordinary Soviet man, he was not privy to the nomenclature's secrets, did not know and could not know the secret laws according to which the mechanism of power operated.

2

For all of us, both for the country, its people, and for the outside world, a parade picture was created: the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, local councils, elections of workers' deputies, voting, decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet....

But in reality there was a completely different mechanism of power operating in the country, hidden from the eyes of the crowd. This power lived and worked according to its own secret laws, just as the underground criminal world exists according to special laws unknown to outsiders, having its own rules, its own aesthetics and ethics, its own systems of punishment and encouragement, its own scale of values, its own notions of what is good and what is bad, and even explaining itself in its own language, incomprehensible to the uninitiated.

The main principle underlying the system of nomenclature positions itself was that only the

The Communist Party and its top leadership have the right to decide personnel issues. Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov, by secretly creating the Special Purpose Center and placing the first deputy chief of the GRU as commander of this Center, violated a fundamental principle of the functioning of power. Simply put, he was out of the control of the Communist Party. He took a swing at its monopoly right to appoint and remove leaders of any rank, to give them positions and remove them from these positions. A situation similar to that in a gang of criminals, when someone secretly, against the will of the boss, without informing him, decides questions of principle.

In the summer of 1957, the case was broadly the same as that of a gang of

criminals. The leadership of the Soviet Union was indeed a gang - the largest and most brutal gang in world history. On the gilded benches sat a pakhan nicknamed Khrushch, and the center uorka Zhuchilo secretly from the pakhan assembled his coterie.

By the way, the word "bug" was equivalent to the word "urkagan" and meant a hardened criminal, an agile thief, later a thief in law. The word had many derivatives: zhuketsalo, zhuchilo, zhuchka thief, zhukovaty, zhuki-kuki, zhuchit, zhukovat. Zhukov's surname for blatniks sounded like Urkin or Zhiganov. But Khrushchev's surname has a similar meaning, for May beetles, extremely harmful to agriculture and forestry, are called Khrushchevs.

The point, of course, is not in blat terms, but in the fact that both Zhukov and Khrushchev were criminals of the largest caliber. In the summer of 1957, the question arose: who was who?

Even if there was nothing self-serving and dark in Zhukov's plans, he should have been immediately driven under the bunk closer to the parashah. Because he's a bastard. Because he violated the sacred rules of the mob.

But Zhukov had no other choice. He secretly broke the law of the dark, closed to the uninitiated world called the nomenklatura. He knew that for such actions in all previous times killed. Zhukov himself for such actions four years ago in the former Stalin's office arrested Marshal of the Soviet Union Beria, because Lavrenty Palych Beria appointed several of his own guys to key positions in the Ministry of Internal Affairs without consulting the top leaders of the Communist Party.

For this, shot and Beria, and those whom he put in leadership positions. So Zhukov, who took Beria's path, had no choice but to go to the end - to overthrow the rascal and take his place. Otherwise, Zhukov's career at any moment could be cut short with unpredictable consequences for himself and his entourage, should anyone learn that the Minister of Defense is arbitrarily engaged in the distribution of positions to his subordinates, without asking the opinion and permission of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

3

In June 1957, Lieutenant General Mamsurov was appointed first deputy chief of the GRU and at the same time commander of military unit 41 339, i.e. the GRU's Special Purpose Center. Both appointments were secret. Outsiders were not supposed to know not only about who was the chief of the GRU and who was his deputy - neither ordinary Soviet people nor even the

overwhelming majority of officers and generals of the Soviet Army knew about the very existence of the GRU. Mamsurov's appointment to two positions at once was accomplished in different ways.

He was placed in the position of first deputy chief of the GRU by the usual procedure: Defense Minister Zhukov made a submission to the Presidium of the Central Committee, which made the appropriate decision.

But Lieutenant General Mamsurov was appointed to the position of the head of the GRU Special Forces Center in a different way. He was appointed to this position by Zhukov without asking anyone, without informing anyone, without informing anyone about the additional duties assigned to the general, and without even reporting to anyone about the creation of military unit 41 339. Only three people had to know about this military unit, about this Center: Defense Minister Zhukov, the head of the GRU, Colonel General Shtemenko, and his first deputy, Lieutenant General Mamsurov.

Two and a half thousand saboteurs, who were being trained at the UNC, were scattered across two dozen cities and towns. They

did not know the overall structure of the Center, its strengths and capabilities, the name itself, or the goals that would be set before them.

4

The first deputy chief of the GRU, Lieutenant General Mamsurov, was let down by accuracy - accuracy in calculating and paying party dues.

The money that financed the Bolshevik Party and later the CPSU, the "party money", the "party gold" - one of the biggest and most carefully guarded secrets of the 20th century - is a topic for a separate discussion. At first glance, everything was extremely transparent and lucidly stated in the Charter. The last, XII section of the CPSU Charter was called "On the Party's money". It read:

The monetary resources of the Party and its organizations are made up of membership fees, income from the Party's enterprises and other receipts.

The first and main item of income was membership fees. Those who had low wages paid one percent of the money they received to the party every month. Those who received something tangible paid two percent. And those who received a lot of money paid three percent. All members of the

Communist Party paid labor pennies into the party treasury. The Party secretary stamped the payment on the Party ticket and wrote the amount received in the column.

The second item of income was the Party's enterprises. The enterprises of the Communist Party included the newspaper Pravda, the magazines Kommunist and Party Life, the innumerable district, regional, krai, republican, and youth, professional and all other "Pravda"- "Komsomolskaya Pravda," "Pionerskaya Pravda," "Pravda of Ukraine," "Kiev Pravda," "Pravda of the East," "Magadanskaya Pravda," "Amurskaya Pravda," "Armavirskaya Pravda," "Akhtyrskaya Pravda," and so on. "Pravda," "Pravda," Pravda alone, and nothing but

"Pravda." But sometimes the kiosk would tell you: "Pravda" is gone, "Sovetskaya Rossiya" has been sold, the only thing left is "Trud" for two kopecks.

The third item of the Communist Party's income, "other receipts," was not deciphered in any way; it amounted to a tiny fraction of a percent. At least, this was the official statement.

We can judge about the income of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, for example, from the information officially announced at the XXII Congress of the CPSU.

The revenue part of the party budget in 1961 was formed:

- by 67.8% at the expense of party contributions of communists;
- by 31.7% at the expense of the party enterprises;
- "other income" amounted to 0.5%.

What did that interest really mean? Is it 100 million rubles or a billion? Or 10 billion? No one asked such questions. No one was supposed to know how much the CPSU received and how much it spent. It was comforting to know that if one added 31.7 percent to 67.8 percent and added another 0.5 percent, one would get exactly 100 percent! It all worked out! We were not advised to know more than that.

Financial wizards were clearly at the head of the CPSU. With the one, two, and three percent they collected from Communists and the pennies they sold Pravda for, they managed to erect a palace in the Kremlin for their congresses and to rebuild the complex of buildings on Old Square. They had enough money to meet the growing needs of the huge, bloated apparatus of the Central Committee, the central committees of the Union republics, hundreds of regional committees and thousands of district committees.

They had enough money to maintain a dense network of secret party distributorships and sanatoriums, closed restaurants and bathhouses, closed stores and movie theaters, closed health clinics and entertainment facilities.

They had money for huge fleets of personal automobiles, loyal servants and reliable security.

At each enterprise sat a party secretary, provided with a high salary, an office, an apartment, a secretary, transportation and means of communication.

A monument to Lenin was erected in front of each factory office at the expense of the Party.

In each district center on the best place in the city, on the central square, they erected a building of the district committee with a monument to Lenin.

In every city there is a city committee, in front of it there is a monument to Lenin.

In every regional center in the best place there is a luxurious building of the regional committee. With a monument to Lenin on the central square.

In every regional center in the best place there is a luxurious building of the regional committee. With a monument to Lenin on the central square.

In every republican center - a luxurious building of the republican Central Committee. With a monument to Lenin on the central square.

Tens of thousands of monuments to Lenin. On those percentages, on those labor pennies of the Communists.

The Communist Party had enough money to maintain the Main Political Department of the Soviet Army and Navy with a whole gang of figures in general and admiral's epaulettes, political departments of types of the Armed Forces, military districts, fleets and groups of troops, political departments and divisions in general armored, tank, missile and air armies, flotillas, corps, divisions, deputy police officers in regiments, battalions, companies and on ships.

And those kopecks were also used to organize grandiose party conferences and congresses in the districts and regions, in the provinces and republics, and, of course, in Moscow. On those pennies the Communist Party of the Soviet Union maintained the Higher Party School under the CPSU Central Committee, the Lenin Military-Political Academy, and a dozen higher military-political schools. And thousands and thousands of Party veterans, who had spent their entire lives in district committees and regional committees, were fed on those pennies.

A special article - the fraternal communist parties of the USA and France, Canada and Australia, Argentina and Austria, Great Britain and Belgium,

Uruguay and all other Honduras. All of them hung on the neck of the CPSU, all of them fed from its generous palm.

Realizing that the lion's share of the revenue part of the CPSU budget is made up precisely by the membership fees of Communists, the honest and accurate

Gen. Mamsurov paid exactly three percent of his raise allowance at his new duty station to the party committee of the GRU.

5

The story has innumerable possible outcomes. But only one works.

If Mamsurov himself, as he was supposed to do, went to the party committee and gave the party secretary three percent of the money he received, the secretary would not take it: the general had brought too much. And then Mamsurov, reacting instantly, would have asked: how much is needed? He would have counted out the amount required and apologized for the mistake. And he would never repeat it again.

Then we would be living in a very different country now. The history of the country and the world would have turned out very differently. I am not at all sure that it would have changed for the better. But Mamsurov was very busy and had no time to visit the party committee himself. He was too diligent in carrying out the orders of Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov.

If Mamsurov had sent his adjutant, Senior Lieutenant Yenakiev, to the party committee, even then everything would have been all right. The senior lieutenant would have brought the money to the party secretary, the latter would have refused to take it, and the senior lieutenant would have returned to Mamsurov. Further - as in the first variant.

But Senior Lieutenant Yenakiev was very busy. He was too diligently carrying out the orders of Lieutenant-General Mamsurov, running around garrisons and military camps, handing over packets with instructions from the first deputy chief of the GRU. Therefore, the despicable duties of the adjutant fell to the officer for special assignments, Major Bulanov. Yuri Sergeyevich.

This is how Khrushchev learned about the existence of the GRU Special Purpose Center.

Immediately, a cheerful, giggly girl from the Kremlin clinic called Mamsurov. She chirped foolishly and joyfully about the fatal illness: here it is, Comrade General, what an attack has befallen you, a man in his prime, who would have thought it.... So come at once.

Mamsurov has arrived.

And I got caught.

6

And at this time, Zhukov ordered his ceremonial portraits and paintings on which he was depicted on a white horse, trampling the banners of the defeated enemy. The painting "Zhukov on a Horse" is 298 by 198 centimeters. The area of Yakovlev's painting "Victory" is 12 square meters.

Meanwhile, Zhukov ordered a five-volume history of the past war to be composed and personally edited it^[12].

At the same time, Zhukov personally viewed the newly created, not yet censored and not yet released on the screens of the film "Stalingrad" and ordered it radically revised, emphasizing the key role of Zhukov in the Stalingrad offensive operation, although in fact Zhukov did not participate in this operation.

And at the same time, as if on cue, the country's leadership was suddenly flooded with letters from workers with proposals to award four times Hero of the Soviet Union Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov the title of Generalissimo of the Soviet Union.

7

So, Lieutenant General Mamsurov surrendered the 38th Army and left for Moscow. The 38th Army was taken over by Lieutenant General Lashchenko, who had previously commanded the Special Corps in Hungary. The Special Corps was transformed into the Southern Group of Forces. Army General M. I. Kazakov was appointed commander. This appointment had its own intention.

First, it was urgent to remove from Hungary all the generals who had distinguished themselves in the fall of 1956 by rendering fraternal international aid to the Hungarian people. Therefore, Lashchenko, Mamsurov, Babajanian and other fighters for the people's happiness were replaced by generals whom nobody in Hungary had known before.

Secondly, the replacement of a lieutenant-general by an army general was to emphasize our respect for the Hungarian people and to confirm our readiness to continue to defend the conquests of socialism: you see what a high chief we have sent to you, so don't worry about the future, if necessary, we will fulfill our duty again.

international duty and let no one disturb your peaceful life.

The new leader of Hungary, Comrade Janos Kadar and Army General

Kazakov found a common language, quickly worked together, but this for some reason did not like Zhukov.

The Minister of Defense decided, without the consent of the Central Committee, to recall and appoint Comrade Kazakov as commander of one of the internal districts (Georgy Zhukov. Transcript of the October (1957) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. C. 245).

It was a steep overkill. Zhukov had no right to decide the fate of an army general, and not just any one, but the one who commanded the troops in the newly pacified Hungary.

Previously, Zhukov had arbitrarily abolished the positions of a member of the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet Submarine Forces and a member of the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet Squadron. Zhukov allowed other similar liberties. But the attempted arbitrary dismissal of the commander of the Southern Group of Forces, who had four general's stars on his epaulettes, was nothing less than a declaration of Zhukov's complete independence from any authority.

Key point

Having attained power, Zhukov began to restore order in the army. He followed an inviolable principle: commanders are responsible for the state of military discipline. This principle had existed before Zhukov, but under Zhukov it was elevated to the rank of the main and only, and so it has been cherished forever until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Here is an example of the great strategist's ebullient activity:

Comrade Zhukov came to the Baltic and Northern fleets, to familiarize himself with the situation in these fleets. How did this trip of the Minister of Defense, a member of the Central Committee of our Party, end? It ended with the fact that 371 officers were dismissed from the Army, 24 were removed and demoted to the

In other words, almost 300 people were "unfit" as a result of only one excursion of the Minister (ibid. P. 264).

A trip to the Baltic Fleet - four days, and four days - to the Northern Fleet. It turns out that on average every day Zhukov chased out of the Armed Forces 46 officers, including generals and admirals. If he worked ten hours a day, then on average every 13 minutes he threw out one officer, general or admiral as a yard dog in the cold. Not counting those he merely demoted.

Throughout the war, the commanders of all four Soviet fleets were never changed - as they entered the war as commanders, so it ended. This is an indicator that Stalin had no complaints to the fleet. But here came Zhukov, and mow everyone in a row. He visited only two fleets, was preparing to visit the other two.

It's been 12 years since the war ended. Zhukov did not persecute lieutenants, he did not go down to that level. He persecuted captains of the 1st and 2nd ranks, colonels, generals and admirals - that is, people who had been through the war. Such a scale, such a number of dismissals indicate that Zhukov drove out of the army and navy in general almost everyone who caught his eye. He only kicked out, because in peacetime he had no right to shoot. When Zhukov had the right to shoot, he used this right with the same scope.

In the book "I take back my words" I cited statistics of "personnel work" Zhukov on Khalkhin-Gol. Stalin sent to the area of fighting General Secretary of the Union of Writers of the USSR VP Stavsky, so that a civilian to assess what is happening as if from the outside. Stavsky reported to Stalin: "*In a few months, 600 people were shot, and 83 were presented for awards*" (Vesti. July 10, 2003. P. 39).

Zhukov arrived in Mongolia on June 5, 1939. On September 16, hostilities were stopped, Zhukov's firing powers ended. The result of his work was 600 executions in 104 days. Zhukov averaged six death sentences each day. Without weekends and holidays. If we estimate that he slept about six hours a night, then in 18 hours of wakefulness he passed a death sentence every three hours on average.

I received my golden lieutenant's epaulettes 11 years after Zhukov was ousted, but the basic Zhukovian principle of imposing order, when the commander was responsible for the discipline of his subordinates, was never abolished. I use my own example to explain how this turned out in practice.

So, I am a platoon commander, I have four sergeants and thirty privates in my command: three squads of eleven men and my deputy. In my platoon there is an extraordinary incident: the platoon is on guard duty, at night the sentry

Private Rzaev, violating the Charter of garrison and guard duty, sat on a wooden box, which he had no right to do, and did what the Charter directly and categorically forbids a sentry on duty.

And sat down and fell asleep.

I was checking the posts as a watch commander and I caught him sleeping. In war, you were shot for sleeping on duty. In peacetime, you could limit yourself to disciplinary action, but you could be punished even more severely. Of course, the next day and onwards I pissed Private Rzayev off in class. He, the bastard, ran to the top of the height of 333.8 in my gas mask and in a rubber coat of chemical protection until he vomited and fainted. (I hope my soldiers will not forget the height of 333.8 until their grave.)

But I did not impose any disciplinary punishment on Private Rzayev. And I didn't report the emergency incident to the company commander. Not because I was so kind. But because I was personally responsible for the discipline of my subordinates.

My company officer, Valera Arbuzov, was a lieutenant like me, only a year earlier. The army was growing rapidly. In Czechoslovakia, the Central Group of Forces was formed, in the Far East they fought with the Chinese and deployed a lot of new divisions. There was a shortage of officers. In addition, from my native 66th Guards Division officers of all ranks were taken to Cuba, and Egypt, and Algeria, and Vietnam, and someone to replace those who left had to fulfill their duties, so the captain and major positions were held by lieutenants or starlets.

I will show you what was happening then in my Precarpathian Military District by example. The district was commanded by Army General Lashchenko Pyotr Nikolayevich - the same one who twelve years earlier, with the rank of lieutenant general, had commanded the Special Corps in Hungary. But we never saw the district commander. After the defeat of the Egyptian army in 1967, Lashchenko left for Egypt, where he restored the combat power of our African brothers. But he was ordered not to occupy the posts of those who had left on overseas assignments. He continued to be considered the commander of the troops of the Prikarpatya Military District. The military district, which had four armies and two separate corps, not counting separate divisions, brigades and regiments, existed for almost two years without a commander. The same thing was happening at all other levels. Because of this, lieutenants commanded not only companies, but rose much higher.

With the company commander Lieutenant Valera we are friends, but I could not trust him that I have an emergency incident, for which the soldier

would not be bad and in the disbat to put to death.

I am the first filter on the way to truthful information about the state of military discipline. The head of the guardhouse or his assistant checks the posts not alone, but with a shift of two or three guards. So the information about the incident could have surfaced. If the company somehow gets wind of what happened, he will smack me: disbanded the platoon! You can't keep order!

But after giving me a beating, Valera will report nothing to the battalion commander. Because the soldier is subordinate to me, and then to him. Any violation will be punished not only for me, but also for him. He's the second filter.

Lieutenant Colonel Protasov, the battalion commander, must not find out anything about it. And if he finds out, he will give me and the company, but he will not report to the regiment commander, Lieutenant Colonel Bazherin. Kombat - the third filter.

If regimental commander Bazherin got wind of what had happened, we'd all be in trouble. The division commander was Major General Nilga. Obviously, he couldn't find out anything, because the regiment commander is the fourth filter.

If something more serious happens, the division commander will be the fifth filter.

The commander of the 13th Army is the sixth.

Commander of the Precarpathian Military District - seventh.

And so it goes all the way to the top. Thanks to the application of Zhukovsky's principle of imposing order, the leadership of all ranks received filtered information. The higher the commander stood, the more beautiful the view opened up before him. And it turned out that Private Rzayev clearly understood that not he himself, but Guards Lieutenant Rezun and all his superior commanders would be responsible for his sleep at his post.

Many years later, when I was in the West, I wrote books about the Soviet army, which had some success. For this reason, I was invited to military schools and combat units of armies in various countries of the world to talk about the Soviet order. And I took the opportunity to ask how things were with discipline.

It turns out that in normal armies, an officer, from lieutenant and up, is a battle organizer. That's all. Discipline is controlled by sergeants, military police and military prosecutors. Each soldier is personally responsible for his crimes and misdemeanors. To the fullest extent of the law. And the others are

taught.

Zhukov imposed a different order in the Soviet army. Marshal of the Soviet Union Timoshenko testifies:

Meritorious regimental commanders and meritorious division commanders were usually removed from their posts and dismissed from the army for the misconduct of negligent soldiers and sergeants who deserved severe punishment (Georgy Zhukov. Transcript of the October (1957) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. C. 306).

Another example. A bride, having failed to wait for a soldier from the army, married another. The soldier shot himself, leaving a note in which he asked not to blame anyone for his death. Reported to Zhukov. Could Zhukov not blame anyone? He couldn't! Zhukov, of course, was furious. The division commander was reprimanded! The regiment commander is to be removed from his post! The deputy regiment commander was kicked out of the army!

What should be done to a deputy regimental commander who gave his whole life to the service, but did not make it to retirement? What is his fault? Should he have replaced the soldier's fiancée? Where can he go, with no money?

with no profession and, presumably, no apartment? The officer shot himself. (Ibid. p. 241.)

In this case, no one (except Zhukov) could ever pick on the commanders. When a commander could be criticized, the punishments were much more serious and widespread.

The same book states that as a result of the measures taken "*positive changes occurred: discipline was strengthened, the number of emergency incidents was reduced*" (ibid. P. 9).

No, citizens. Discipline is down, and there are actually fewer emergency incidents - in statistical reports.

Imposing on commanders the responsibility for misconduct and crimes of subordinates, Zhukov removed it from soldiers and sergeants, pushed commanders of all ranks from platoon and company to commanders of armies, districts, groups of troops, commanders-in-chief of branches of the Armed Forces on the path of showmanship, eyewash and concealment of crimes.

This is how Zhukov degraded the Soviet Army.

It is a pity that Zhukov was an example for those who ran the army after him. It was exactly such orders that were imposed in the Soviet Army by Marshals of the Soviet Union Chuikov, Grechko, Yakubovsky, Kulikov, Ustinov, Ogarkov, Akhromeev. It was easier for them to punish commanders than to establish a statutory order in the troops. Following the example of Zhukov, they brought the Soviet Army to complete decay and disintegration.

CHAPTER 11

1

Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beria believed that collective farms should be dissolved to hell, the land should be given to the people, let the people themselves work, decide what to plant and what to sow. But there was one obstacle. If the people were to be given the land, if the men were to feed themselves, why would they need the Communist Party?

That is why Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov personally arrested Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beria. Because Marshal of the Soviet Union Konev wrote Beria a death sentence. Because the future Marshal of the Soviet Union Batitsky personally killed Lavrentiy Beria.

Next after Beria was Malenkov. This one was more cautious. He only suggested not to strangle homestead plots with wild taxes. He only increased these plots.

And he was immediately removed. In the summer of 1957, Malenkov was ousted from the pinnacle of power and from Moscow altogether. Had it not been for Zhukov, there would not have been a military coup that removed from power the man who was trying to free the peasants from slavery and save the Russian countryside. Had Malenkov remained in the leadership of the country, perhaps the Soviet Union would not have had to buy bread abroad. Kolkhoz slavery was not abolished after Stalin's death, and Zhukov is to blame for that.

Outcome of the June 1957 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee: those who opposed Khrushchev were declared an "anti-party group". Personal composition of the group: Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Shepilov who joined them. This was repeated at all times from the pages of all newspapers, from high and low tribunes: and Shepilov who joined them. ... and who joined them.... and Shepilov who joined them...

In order not to make the "anti-party group" look too large, Comrade Pervukhin was not officially included in it. He was quietly transferred from Presidium member to candidate, that is, deprived of a casting vote. At the next congress, he will simply not be elected to the party's governing bodies.

Comrade Saburov was not officially included in the "anti-party group" either, but he was banished from the top of power at once.

Comrades Bulganin and Voroshilov, as repentant, were left in the

leadership of the country. Bulganin would be kicked out in a year, Voroshilov - in three.

There is an opinion: Zhukov saved Khrushchev.

The opinion is correct. However, we should add a very small clarification to it: *by saving Khrushchev, Zhukov was first of all saving himself.*

Zhukov was a protégé of Khrushchev. If Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Bulganin, Pervukhin and Saburov had kicked Khrushchev out of the First Secretary's chair, Zhukov would have followed him. An illiterate boor, his crazy actions ruined the army, was not needed neither the country nor its leadership.

2

Through Zhukov's efforts, the "collective leadership" that emerged after Stalin's death, was dispersed or neutralized. At the very top were two: Khrushchev, saved by Zhukov, and Zhukov himself, able with one word to remove anyone from any of the highest positions and appoint to it whoever he wished.

However, dual power could be neither long nor durable. That is why on June 22, 1957, on the first day of the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Zhukov summoned Lieutenant General Mamsurov, commander of the 38th Army of the Pre-Carpathian Military District, to Moscow and appointed him first deputy chief of the GRU and, at the same time, chief of the GRU Special Purpose Center. As we remember, Mamsurov's appointment to the post of the first deputy chief of the GRU was agreed with Khrushchev and approved by him. In those days Khrushchev had no time for Mamsurov: Zhukov slipped a paper, Nikita signed it. And Zhukov did not coordinate his second appointment to the post of the head of the GRU Special Purpose Center with anyone.

The Red Army Rifle Regiment, according to the staff approved on April 5, 1941, had 3,182 soldiers and commanders. In 1957, the first deputy chief of the GRU, Lieutenant General Mamsurov, having obtained a related position, commanded a military unit, in the

which had 2,500 soldiers, sergeants and officers. It turned out that Mamsurov, in addition to his main position as first deputy chief of the GRU, had secretly become something like a regimental commander.

Let's assess the situation. Twenty years ago in Spain, Mamsurov commanded not a regiment, not a brigade, not a division, but a corps. Not a

simple corps, but the world's first subversive corps. During the war Mamsurov commanded a division, was deputy corps commander and again commanded a division. After the war, Mamsurov became a corps commander, and then an army commander. But not an ordinary army, but the one that in peacetime was raised on alert, thrown across the border into a neighboring country, where it was engaged in extremely intense fighting. For their freedom the Hungarians fought steadfastly and assertively. The war was short but fierce.

In all his positions, Mamsurov proved himself to be an intelligent, decisive, brave and competent commander. And here was an unprecedented promotion: he was appointed first deputy chief of the GRU. And at the same time, and quite secretly, he, the commander of the army, was appointed something like a regimental commander!

Since a long time ago, I have accustomed myself to writing without exclamation marks. The text should speak for itself, shriek and scream. But here I can't do without exclamation points. I can't do it! I can't do it!

By arbitrarily appointing the first deputy chief of the GRU to some position, without informing the supreme leadership of the country, Zhukov thereby went out of control of Khrushchev, whom in these very days he defended from Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich and joined them Shepilov, as well as from Voroshilov, Bulganin, Saburov and Pervukhin.

That is, while committing an open coup d'état, throwing out of power all those who rebelled against Khrushchev, Zhukov simultaneously committed another coup d'état. A secret one. Against Khrushchev.

But Mamsurov's accuracy let him down.

3

Immediately after the plenum, a rumor whispered among the top party leadership: Khrushch was renewing the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee at a rapid pace. The technical staff of the Secretariat

of the Central Committee, all these referents and advisers, old Stalinist bison of all ranks, from the highest to the lowest, are gradually being retired, and those who are younger are being sent to distant provinces. The tactic: to break up established clans, to prevent party bureaucrats from gaining useful connections. To replace the old cadres, Khrushchev recruits new people to the Central Committee apparatus, who are not affiliated with any factions and factions. Khrushchev takes young specialists from a variety of structures - from industry, from agriculture, from scientific institutions, from the army

and the KGB, he needs people with a variety of labor and life experience.

The rumor spread, and immediately the chief of the GRU, Colonel-General Shtemenko, received an order to second five of his youngest and most promising officers to the Administrative Bodies Division of the CPSU Central Committee. The officers were to work in the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee, but all of them remained in the cadres of the Soviet Army.

The third on that list was Major Bulanov Yuri Sergeevich, an officer for special orders of Lieutenant-General Mamsurov.

4

The priests of the Zhukov cult inform us that this great commander was determined to bring the line of the XX Congress of the CPSU to an end, that is, to expose all the executioners and criminals. And the same people in the same books and articles, and sometimes right on the same page, prove that Zhukov was not preparing a conspiracy against Khrushchev.

But if the overthrow of the bloody executioners Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich was following the line of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, then the overthrow of Khrushchev should have been a continuation of the process started. How is Khrushchev better than Kaganovich?

If Zhukov decided to carry the line of the XX Congress of the CPSU to the end, then all the leaders of the Communist Party should have been overthrown. And not only them. All the leaders from the Central Committee to the lowest and outskirts were criminals.

To bring to an end the line of the XX Congress meant only one thing: to change the entire leadership layer, because all the leaders were chosen by Stalin, all were tied to him and his power by a circular bond.

In addition, it was necessary to catch in Moscow and throughout the territory of our vast homeland both active villains and veterans of the Cheka, VChK, GPU, OGPU, NKVD, NKGB, MGB, MVD, SMERSH and GULAG, as well as tens of millions of snitches.

But if the Marshal of Victory had really decided to bring the line of the XX Congress to the end, he should have started with himself: he should have written a letter confessing his crimes and shot himself.

Among the main Kremlin villains, Zhukov was one of the bloodiest executioners. Zhukov signed not only firing lists, but, surpassing all executioners, gave the order to shoot relatives of Red Army fighters and commanders in case a fighter or commander was captured. In other words,

Zhukov declared the wives, mothers, fathers, brothers and sisters of Red Army fighters and commanders to be hostages.

Zhukov's orders were not only criminal, but also stupid. Soldiers and commanders after such orders tried to stay away from the front line, scouts under various pretexts did not hurry to cross the front line, and having got to the rear of the enemy on the orders of commanders, hid in the woods and returned empty-handed. In order not to take risks. Fighter pilots kept more and more over their own territory, and bombers dropped bombs wherever they could in order to return home as soon as possible. Stalin himself was forced to cancel Zhukov's stupid orders.

5

After the defeat of the "anti-party group" Zhukov entered the role of a full master of the country and its army. With a sense of deep satisfaction, he tore epaulettes from officers, generals and admirals. And reveled in the process. There is an abundance of evidence to this effect. I do not quote them because the reading turns out monotonous, too tedious. But let's look at the cases of tearing off epaulettes and stripes from a slightly different point of view. From the Central Committee of the CPSU.

The conferral of general and admiral ranks, as has already been mentioned many times, as well as the deprivation of these ranks, is not within the competence of the Minister of Defense and his deputies. General and admiral ranks were conferred by a decree of the Council of Defense

Ministers of the USSR. And only the Council of Ministers had the right to reduce or deprive generals and admirals of their military ranks.

But that's the visible part of the case. There was also an invisible part. The Central Committee of the CPSU was in charge of all personnel issues in the Soviet Union. At first, the Central Committee made tacit decisions. It was called a vague bureaucratic phrase "the decision of the instance took place". After that, the Council of Ministers, as if on its own behalf, made the same decision that had been made at higher levels before.

Zhukov tore off epaulettes and ripped off generals' stripes. But this isn't about cruelty and sadism. It's about stupidity. Zhukov did not know and did not want to know the limits of his power. He did what he was not allowed to do without the consent of the Central Committee and the Politburo. In essence, Zhukov was appropriating the power of the so-called "decision-making instances". And there is no need to argue about whether Zhukov was

preparing to seize power or not. All his actions as Minister of Defense indicate that Zhukov was pulling the blanket of power on himself. Only he did it too clumsily and stupidly.

Zhukov's stupidity is this: first get the Central Committee and Politburo under you, then do what you like. But until you do, keep within the established orders and rules.

6

At the 20th Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev mercilessly criticized Stalin, but this criticism proved to be a powerful blow to the authority of the Party and the KGB.

At the time of the revelations, the Communist Party had been in power in the country for 38 years. Stalin had been at the head of the party for 30 years.

The reputation of the Communist Party was undermined immediately and permanently.

His crimes Stalin and the party led by him created the hands of the secret police, which in different years was called the Cheka, VChK, GPU, OGPU, NKVD, MGB and so on. The reputation of the state security agencies was also very thoroughly damaged.

Of the three main forces, only the army remained pure in the eyes of the people. It did not shed people's blood - at least in the view of most people. It crushed Hitler. It saved the country. And at the head of the army was Zhukov. And Zhukov clearly understood that he put Khrushchev on the highest post, that Khrushchev - a protege, that Khrushchev - a puppet.

Khrushchev himself understood this. In the hands of Zhukov was the power, relying on which he removed whomever he wanted and placed whomever he wanted on commanding heights.

Who should Khrushchev rely on? The party bureaucracy? What will it do against the tanks? KGB Chairman Serov? What if Serov is in cahoots with his old friend Zhukov?

Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the nominal head of the Soviet Union and a dozen conquered countries, suddenly felt like a lonely passerby who found himself on a rainy November night under a broken lantern creaking in the wind in a dark back alley. At any moment from the darkness could come out of the night vigorous guys and put a knife under the rib - and no one would help, no one would save. And there was no use asking for mercy.

And Zhukov was boorish and braggadocious. He was the sole, complete and absolute ruler of the Soviet Union.

7

Officially, Khrushchev was at the head of the party, the government and the state. But Zhukov was able to show the party, the government and the state that the master of the house was not Khrushchev, but Zhukov. Yes, Zhukov!

Zhukov publicly called Khrushchev Nikitka. Zhukov demonstrated his contempt for Khrushchev not only in a close circle, but also publicly. The newspaper "Krasnaya Zvezda" (May 13, 1997) describes one of many such antics of the Marshal of Victory.

Zhukov, as Minister of Defense, was invited to a "government event" - the premiere of a play that Khrushchev was to attend. The minister's rank obliged him to

to be present. Zhukov arrived with his wife and took a seat in the government box, second row. When Khrushchev appeared, the hall gave a standing ovation. Everyone applauded, except for the marshal, thoughtfully studying the program. His wife quietly asked: "Well, at least pretend..."

"Red Star" is delighted with this behavior of Zhukov: his wife asks him to "at least make an appearance", but he did not! What a brave man our Marshal of Victory was!

But this does not smell of bravery, it smells of boorishness. This is boorishness of the highest order, boorishness towards a man who is officially the first person in a great state. You may consider Nikitka a jerk, but why show your disrespect publicly?

In this case, Zhukov showed disrespect not only to the first person of the state, but also to the entire hall. If everyone is standing ovation, and one demonstratively ignores the general impulse, it is as if he is saying: I don't give a damn about all of you! But in the hall at the "governmental event" sat not only pigs and shepherds. Here sat the entire ruling elite. And everyone - I am sure of it - was thinking: what will happen if this boor eventually gets into power?

Zhukov's behavior insulted not only the leader of the country, but in his person the whole country. If someone publicly insults the head of state, he

insults the entire nation. And after all, the ambassadors of great powers and our many foreign friends were present in the hall.

With such antics - and he regularly pulled such stunts - Zhukov demonstrated not only complete contempt for everyone around him, but also amazing, simply unbelievable stupidity. It was as if Zhukov tried on the image of Nero or Caligula. It was as if he was living in this role, mastered it. The power in the country was almost completely owned by Zhukov, and at this point should have shown a little patience and cunning, but Zhukov even before the full seizure of power imagined himself the lord of the country and behaved accordingly. Well, it would seem, be patient a little more, here it is when you become a dictator, then you can be as rude as you like. And while you are not a hundred percent dictator yet, while you still have to share power with Khrushchev, so keep your dictatorial ways to yourself. You're considered a strategist. The main element of a good strategy is surprise. Know how to conceal your plans.

In the boorish behavior of this woe-strategist again and again manifested his incorrigible vice as a commander: Zhukov always underestimated his opponents. Including the simpleton Nikitka.

And Zhukov was rude. Often, a lot and with relish. Here's another example. There is a demonstration of new combat equipment to the top command staff of the Soviet Army. Zhukov is in the lead, followed by a whole army of marshals and generals. Show a new radar to detect aircraft. Deputy Minister of Defense, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Defense Forces of the country, Marshal of the Soviet Union Biryuzov asks the designer, who gives explanations: can not each new target that appears on the screen, make a different color?

And then Zhukov intervenes with this *remark*: "*What a stupid remark. You don't understand a damn thing about it, don't stick your nose where it doesn't belong*" (Georgy Zhukov. Transcript of the October (1957) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. C. 364). This Zhukov threw to his deputy, who has the same epaulettes of the Marshal of the Soviet Union on his shoulders.

It is not permissible to reprimand a commander in the presence of his subordinates. A lieutenant cannot reprimand his deputy, a senior sergeant, in the presence of sergeants who are commanding squads. Especially in such a brutal manner.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Biryuzov was the Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Air Defense Forces. The radar was designed for the troops he

commanded. Three years later, a radar of this type would detect an American spy plane in the airspace of the Soviet Union.

Biryuzov's question is intelligent. It's a good question. And here it is

Zhukov, in fact, calls his deputy in marshal's epaulettes fool in the presence of a whole crowd of generals and marshals, including subordinates of Biryuzov himself.

An intelligent person cannot be a boor - simply because an intelligent person, even if he is a villain, realizes: by boorishness he harms before anything else

first of all to himself. This rule has no exceptions: if you are a boor, you are a fool.

How could a fool be a great general?

8

Zhukov overthrew the collective leadership of the country and cleared a place at the top of the pyramid of power. For whom? For Khrushchev or for himself?

Let's assume that he did it for Khrushchev, whom he considered a fool, whose contempt he publicly demonstrated before the entire leadership of the country and representatives of foreign countries.

If Zhukov did indeed deliberately put Khrushchev, whom he despised, on the Moscow throne, then who was Zhukov himself?

If Zhukov put at the head of a great state a man to whom he publicly expressed his disrespect, what did he take all our people for?

Let's assume that Zhukov dispersed the collective leadership and made room at the top of the power pyramid not for Khrushchev. But if Khrushchev falls away, who is left?

Key point

On the example of one man's biography, let us consider Zhukovsky's method of imposing order and its results.

This man is Anatoly Ivanovich Losev. He was born in 1906. At the age of 17 he was drafted into the Red Army. Graduated from the artillery school. At the age of 32 - commander of an artillery regiment. Fought in Finland, received his first order. June 22, 1941 Lieutenant Colonel Losev met on the western border as commander of the 306th artillery regiment of the 155th Rifle Division of the 10th Army of the Western Front.

The great Zhukov, who was responsible for preparing war plans and

creating a grouping of troops for the war, drove the super-powerful 10th Army into the Bialystok bulge, which wedged into German-occupied Polish territory. Already in peacetime, the 10th Army was surrounded on three sides by German troops. Already in peacetime the German troops were behind the Bialystok bulge.

on the left and right shoulder of the 10th Army. Zhukov set the 10th Army and the entire Western Front up for defeat. In the first days of the war, the 10th Army fell into encirclement.

Lieutenant Colonel Losev together with his regiment broke out of the encirclement.

Then there is the Battle of Smolensk. All invaders, which went to Moscow from the west, in obligatory order passed through interfluvium of the Western Dvina and Dnepr. This area military strategists ^[13] call the Smolensk Gate. Strategist Zhukov did not know military history, Smolensk gate to the defense did not prepare either before the war, or even after the war began and clearly marked the direction of the main blow of the German army to Smolensk and Moscow.

As a result of the Battle of Smolensk, the Western Front, urgently reconstituted after the defeat in Belorussia, was surrounded and defeated for the second time. The German army was given an open road both to Moscow and to the rear of the super-powerful South-Western Front.

During the Battle of Smolensk, Lieutenant Colonel Losev's artillery regiment was encircled for the second time. For the second time, the Lieutenant Colonel and the remnants of his regiment broke out of the encirclement.

Then Losev took part in the defense of Moscow and Voronezh, was wounded. In October 1942 in Stalingrad, Colonel Losev took command of the 29th Rifle Division. Artilleryman is a rather narrow specialty. It is a rare case when an artilleryman is put in command of a general army unit. Losev had no experience in commanding an all-arms unit, but he coped. His division fought not on some quiet section of the front, but in Stalingrad itself.

March 1, 1943 for the heroic defense of Stalingrad 29th Infantry Division was transformed into the 72nd Guards Division, and thirty-six-year-old division commander Losev received the rank of major general.

Then there was the battle of the Kursk Bulge, then the forcing of the Dnieper. The 72nd Guards Rifle Division captured a bridgehead on the right bank and held it for 20 days. For this the division and its commander were

named by name in the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and Major-General Losev was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The 72nd Guards Rifle Division was unofficially called the Unchanged Division. From the moment of awarding the Guards rank until the end of the war and even a little longer, until May 11, 1945, it was part of the active army. It was never taken out for reorganization or to the reserve. Major-General Losev led his Guards Division through Ukraine, Romania, Hungary, Austria. In March 1945, Losev was given command of the 27th Guards Rifle Corps. He ended the war in Czechoslovakia and became an honorary citizen of Bratislava.

After the war, Losev graduated from the General Staff Academy, commanded a corps and then a military school in Kiev. In addition to the "Gold Star" of the Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General Losev was awarded two Orders of Lenin, four Orders of the Red Banner, two Orders of Suvorov 2nd degree, Order of the Patriotic War 1st degree, two Orders of the Red Star.

In February 1956, Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov, Minister of Defense of the USSR, kicked Major General Losev, forty-nine years old, out of the army. Without a pension.

Major-General Losev of the Guards had two professions. The first was an artilleryman. The second was a general army commander. He served in the army for 32 years, and every day of the war was counted as three days for front-line soldiers who were in the active army or in hospital for wounds.

Guards Major-General Losev fought the Winter War and the entire war against Germany from June 22, 1941, but not until May 9, but until May 11, 1945. Figure out for yourself how many years of service he should have been credited additionally.

Zhukov didn't give him any credit. Get out!

What exactly was the fault of Major-General Losev of the Guards, I do not know. I'm looking for it, but I haven't found it yet. If he was really guilty of something, he should have been tried. But the autocrat Zhukov drove generals out of the army without any trial.

Where to go for a Hero of the Soviet Union, holder of eleven battle orders, honorary citizen of Bratislava?

That's right. We found kind people. They arranged for a Hero of the Soviet Union and an honorable citizen as a janitor in Kiev. When we found out about it, even Khrushchev was indignant: "*How, without a pension at all?*" (Ibid. P. 335.)

A typical case, a standard case. One of many. A mentally healthy man could not act like that. Zhukov acted this way with regard to hundreds and thousands of honored commanders who had been through the war.

But this is not about Zhukov's sadism. It's about the fact that Zhukov had taken over the power in the country. Only the Central Committee of the CPSU could decide the fate of a major-general. In the end, the decision had to be made by the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Nikita Khrushchev. Such an order was established in our country. If a general made a mistake somewhere, the Minister of Defense was obliged to raise the issue of his fate in the CPSU Central Committee, in the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee, in the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. But Zhukov acted on his own accord, violating all laws and orders, without consulting anyone.

And here's the result.

The news of Zhukov's massacres spread throughout the army instantly. Zhukov did not prevent it. On the contrary, his thunderous orders were read out to all officers of the Soviet Army at every meeting of officers, often against a signature: you are familiarized with the order, here is your signature, do not say later that you did not know.

Officers, faced with wild arbitrariness and lawlessness, left the army under all sorts of pretexts. It was better to remind doctors about their wounds and illnesses and to be discharged to a quiet life than to wait until you were dishonorably discharged without a pension. And a sad song went around the country to the tune of a well-known melody of those years:

*That you're standing there swaying,
A reserve officer?
Waiting for you at the collective farm
Hog herder position.*

The voluntary mass withdrawal of thousands of officers from the army is one side of the coin. The reluctance of young men to enter military schools is another.

In all previous times it was not at all easy to enter any military school in the USSR. There were two main categories of young men to fill military

schools.

First of all, the sons of officers. The boys grew up in distant garrisons, among tanks and cannons, and from childhood they raved about military service and, after graduating from school, followed in their fathers' footsteps.

The second main source was guys from collective farms. They were drafted into the army, served as soldiers, saw the officer's life and after one or two years of service submitted reports about enrollment in the school.

In 1956, for the first time in its history, the Soviet Army faced the problem of staffing military schools. This had never happened even under the tsars, under Nicholas and Alexander. The profession of an officer in Russia has always been an honorable and respected profession, and suddenly no carrots could lure one to a military school.

The grown-up sons of officers saw with their own eyes what the autocrat Zhukov was doing to their fathers. After serving three decades, fighting two wars, earning orders on your chest, the Motherland would throw you out like a dog without a pension, without a profession. And rural boys, having entered the army as soldiers, saw this arbitrariness and lawlessness. The number of those willing to join the officer's ranks decreased sharply.

And all this was happening at a time when Zhukov had not yet officially reached the supreme power. If he had, the Soviet Army would have fallen apart in the short term.

Without officers, an army cannot exist. An officer accepts the burden of service voluntarily. But there were no volunteers to serve under Zhukov's command in the Soviet Union.

CHAPTER 12

1

After the defeat of the "anti-party group" Zhukov demanded special honors for himself. He wished that his equestrian statue of white marble be installed not anywhere, but in the St. George Hall of the Kremlin.

Painters painted portraits of Zhukov. Sculptors carved his jaws out of granite and marble. Writers composed novels about his exploits. Historians found hitherto unknown evidence of his greatness in the archives.

Zhukov's appearance at the naval parade in Leningrad on July 14, 1957 is worthy of a separate mention. In general, parades in all fleets have always been accepted by admirals. Zhukov broke the tradition: I will take the parade!

Moreover, violating his own orders, Zhukov took the naval parade in Leningrad in a white uniform, not provided for by any orders and rules. In terms of color, his clothes resembled the uniform of admirals, but they were not: the cut was different, the trim on his cap was not black, but red, and the cap was overdecorated with gold leaves (see photo).

On June 30, 1955, Soviet Defense Minister Zhukov signed Order No. 105 "On Enactment of the Rules for the Wearing of Military Uniforms by Marshals, Generals and Admirals of the Soviet Army and Navy". Article 2 of this order stated:

Military uniforms shall be worn strictly in accordance with these Rules. All items of military uniform shall conform to the established patterns and descriptions.

Article 4 established nine occasions on which marshals, generals, admirals, and officers must wear dress uniforms

of dressing in formation. The first of these is when participating in parades. For the Marshals of the Soviet Union, Zhukov's order established the following summer parade dress uniform for the formation:

A parade cap of sea-wave color with a red trim, a parade open uniform and pants of sea-wave color with boots, a white shirt with a black tie, boots, a

parade belt, a dirk, white gloves; orders, medals and breastplates (Rules of Wearing Military Uniform. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1956. P. 9).

All marshals had to wear the uniform prescribed by Marshal Zhukov when participating in parades. All except Marshal Zhukov himself.

All marshals - in black boots, and Marshal Zhukov - in white shoes.

All marshals - pants in boots, and Marshal Zhukov - pants off.

Three summer parade dress uniforms for formation were established for admirals and naval officers:

No. 1: white jacket, white pants, white half-boots, white gloves, dirk, orders and medals;

No. 2: white jacket, black pants, black boots, the rest as for form No. 1;

No. 3: black dress jacket, the rest as in uniform No. 2.

Traditionally, to participate in naval parades in the Black Sea Fleet admirals and officers were dressed in uniform No. 1, in the rest of the fleet - in uniform No. 2, but on the eve of the naval parade in Leningrad Zhukov ordered to dress admirals and officers in uniform No. 3 - in all black.

And he's all in white.

Three parade formation uniforms were also established for sailors and petty officers:

No. 1: all white,

No. 2: white uniform (uniform shirt), black pants;

No. 3: dark blue cloth flannel and black pants.

Zhukov ordered to dress sailors for the parade in uniform No. 3.

The cruiser Mikhail Kutuzov arrived in Leningrad from the Black Sea to take part in the parade. No one expected that a hot summer day would require a cloth parade uniform. Not all sailors had it with them. They were urgently changed at the warehouses of the Baltic Fleet. After the parade, a reception was held in honor of the top leadership of the fleet and commanders of the ships that took part in the parade.

It's been a hot day. All admirals and officers were in black. During the parade, the exception was Admiral Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, who by mistake appeared in uniform No. 2. Before the reception he corrected the mistake: a black uniform was urgently delivered to him.

And only Zhukov still fluttered as a white crow. It is impossible to find any other explanation for such an act, except the desire to stand out in a white

tunic against the general background.

News of Zhukov's defiant arrogance spread instantly among the top leadership of the country and the Armed Forces. His behavior was too reminiscent of the manner of Reichsmarshal Goering, who made up his own outfits for himself, not provided for by any orders and rules. The only difference was that Goering, while dressing up, did not force thousands of his subordinates to dress in some special uniform to stand out from them.

Kozlov Frol Romanovich, a member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee and First Secretary of the Leningrad Regional Party Committee, who was next to Zhukov during the parade and at the reception, reported the incident to Khrushchev. Khrushchev held back, but did not forget Zhukov's antics, and two and a half months later, at the plenum, he recalled that incident to Zhukov:

Zhukov made all the fleet commanders in black bushlats to celebrate, while he himself wore a white navy suit. People steamed in black so that he, like a white seagull, would be better seen against a black background (Georgy Zhukov. Transcript of the October (1957) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. C. 346).

2

- Georgy Konstantinovich, let's be honest.
- What's wrong, Nikita?
- Nothing's wrong. I just think we need to share the power.
- Aren't they separated?
- Separated, but not clearly.
- And what do you want for yourself?
- I want agriculture. Let's face it, Georgy Konstantinovich, you don't know a damn thing about agriculture.
- And keep me out of farming?
- That's right.
- Okay, I'll think about it. What's in it for me?

3

The state-led (i.e. bureaucrat-led) socialist economy of the Soviet Union

could not satisfy the population's needs for the simplest and most vital items of consumption. Therefore, the problem of preserving the Soviet Union could be solved only by bringing the surrounding countries down to our level, only by destroying the basis for comparison.

The attempt to block the Suez Canal by the hands of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel "for all Nasser" and thereby collapse the economy of Europe failed. In those years there were no supertankers yet. There were ordinary tankers. They went from the Persian Gulf to Europe by the Suez Canal. It was too expensive to race them around Africa. Increasing the length of the route by 8 thousand kilometers sharply increased costs and the price of delivered oil, which turned into a crisis for Europe. Therefore, Khrushchev and Zhukov did not give up the idea of putting a heavy proletarian hand on the Suez Canal to block it if necessary.

The 1956 attempt failed because the Soviet Union had no foothold in the Mediterranean, that is, no naval bases in the region.

Strictly speaking, there was one base. In Albania. But its value is not great: it was impossible to keep a powerful fleet at that base. The fact is that one refueling of an ordinary destroyer is 500 tons of liquid fuel, of a light cruiser like "Chapaev" - 3,600 tons.

To refuel a light cruiser once, it is necessary to bring two railroad echelons of 30 sixty-ton railroad tanks each. And for intensive combat operations, how much refueling would that cruiser need?

But a warship doesn't just need fuel. It needs shells, ammunition, sea mines. If a squadron is brought to the Mediterranean not only with light cruisers, but also with heavy cruisers, destroyers, submarines, patrol boats, if this squadron is covered by aviation from the air, how much fuel, ammunition and everything else will have to be supplied? And what will happen if the ships go to the Mediterranean Sea, and the enemy blocks the Bosphorus, putting a hundred rows of mines across the strait, and on the shores put tanks in shelters? The whole squadron without supplies would be in a mousetrap.

One could pay big money to the leaders of Egypt or Syria and establish bases on their territory. But their value would be exactly the same as the bases in Albania.

The Soviet Union needed not just bases in the Mediterranean, but bases to which echelons of tanks could be shipped from our territory. Such bases could be created only in Yugoslavia. Which still refused to obey Comrade Stalin.

That the Soviet Union is now ruled by Zhukov, realized all who attended the plenum of the Central Committee in June 1957.

Furtseva Ekaterina Alekseevna also realized this, and she was one of the first to realize it.

What to do if a completely new balance of power has emerged? That's right: to invite the irresistibly rushing upward leader to his dacha for a heart-to-heart talk. Especially since Zhukov and Furtseva had so much in common.

Zhukov and Furtseva became candidates for the Presidium of the Central Committee at the 20th Congress of the CPSU in February 1956.

Zhukov and Furtseva became members of the Presidium of the Central Committee in June 1957.

Zhukov and Furtseva became members of the Presidium because they saved Khrushchev.

Furtseva saved Khrushchev by the fact that at the moment when the rebellious leaders threw Nikita from the top post, she was not confused and summoned Zhukov to the Kremlin. Zhukov saved Khrushchev by threatening to settle the leaders' dispute with the help of tanks. Zhukov summoned members of the Party's Central Committee from all over the country and flew them to Moscow by military aircraft, demonstrating the Soviet Army's determination to defend Khrushchev by any means necessary.

Ekaterina Alekseevna Furtseva loved the beautiful life. There was a place to invite a distinguished guest - to a palace-like dacha on the banks of the Moscow River. There was something to treat them to.

Catherine Alexeevna had a passion for power.

There was a lot to talk about with the soon to be chief already and officially.

That's why Ekaterina Alekseevna talked about the heroes of the war. About those who saved humanity from the Nazi dictatorship, from the brown plague. About how to evaluate the merits of heroes.

There, in the West, social injustice is blatant, the rich are drowning in luxury, living in palaces, while the proletariat is poor. No equality! But in one matter we have something to learn from them.

Who is America's biggest war hero? That's right, Eisenhower. And who is he now? He's now the President of the United States.

Who is the main hero of the war in France? That's right, Charles de Gaulle. After the war, he headed the French government, now he's in opposition, but soon he'll be president. Because there's no one else.

Who is the main hero of the war in Yugoslavia? That's right, Josip Broz Tito. Marshal. He took over and will rule the country for the rest of his life. If he won the war, he should rule the country in peacetime. Isn't that right?

Because the conversation was about Yugoslavia, Ekaterina Alexeevna called her husband: Kolya, come here, meet Georgy Konstantinovich.

Ekaterina Alekseevna introduced her husband, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Yugoslavia Firyubin Nikolai Pavlovich. Nikolai Pavlovich told Zhukov about what he had no right to tell: Marshal Tito, who Yugoslavia

He will rule, maybe he will cede naval bases and airfields to the Soviet Union. The thing is, he's got a bad economy, he needs money badly. Right now. A lot of it. Only trouble is, he won't talk to Nikita Tito. Who's Khrushchev? A lieutenant general. Not a combat general, but a political supervisor. And Tito is a battle marshal. Tito was awarded the Soviet Order of Victory. There are 19 such orders in the world. Tito has it, but Khrushchev can't even come close to having such an order. For Marshal Tito to meet with Khrushchev is a humiliation. If Tito had met with Khrushchev, he would not have succumbed to Khrushchev's entreaties.

5

Khrushchev called the new Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee for a meeting. On the agenda is the question of the international situation. The picture is clear. Last year we would have repulsed the Suez Canal from the damned enemies, if there had been at least one naval base on the Mediterranean Sea, but one that could be supplied by railroads without hindrance, that is, the base in Yugoslavia. Nikita Sergeyevich sighed:

- I'll have to go to Yugoslavia, comrades, to negotiate with Tito. Maybe I'll persuade him.

- What if Comrade Zhukov were to be sent there? - Comrade Furtseva asked cautiously. - Two marshals would agree more quickly.

- And that's true," said Comrade Brezhnev.

- We can arrive there with a hint," Comrade Kozlov put in. - Not by airplane, but by cruiser. Comrade Tito, where should we dock?

The comrades cheered up. A joke, said in the right place, adorns any business conversation. And they all turned to comrade Zhukov at once: what do you think, Georgy Konstantinich? Can you handle a diplomatic mission?

6

Immediately after the meeting with Zhukov, Nikolai Pavlovich Firyubin left for Yugoslavia. Forgetting everything, abandoning all his business, he demanded a meeting with the leaders of Yugoslavia, with the state government

secretary of defense, the ideological front-runners, the secretary of state for foreign affairs. He spoke to generals and diplomats, ministers and their deputies. He secured a meeting with Marshal Tito and had a long conversation with him. And on July 12, 1957, the Soviet Foreign Ministry received a cipher from Belgrade:

The State Secretary for National Defense of the FNR Yugoslavia, Army General I. Gošnjak, transmitted through the Deputy State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the FNR Yugoslavia, D. Vidic an official invitation to the Minister of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov to visit Yugoslavia at a time convenient for him. Firyubin (Georgy Zhukov. Transcript of the October (1957) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. C. 166).

7

On July 12, 1957, at 15 hours and 53 minutes, an 8K71 rocket was launched at the Tyura-Tam state test range. At the 33rd second of flight, the missile lost stability. The signal to detonate was given.

During a review of the reasons for the failure, Artillery Marshal Nedelin, Deputy Minister of Defense for Special (i.e., nuclear) Weapons and Missile Technology, announced that neither the country nor its army needed such a missile, and that he was raising the question with Comrades Khrushchev and Zhukov about stopping the tests.

Chief Designer Korolev Sergey Pavlovich was sitting in his chair, dropping his head on his chest. His left hand slipped from his knee and sagged. A light whisper rustled through the hall and died down.

Korolev shook his head almost imperceptibly, as if to drive away a fragment of a dream or a bad thought. His right hand reached for the decanter. His gnarled fingers gripped the neck.

And Korolev exploded!

He was suddenly thrown out of his chair by a spring of steel, lifted the decanter above his head, and with a kind of diabolical fury smashed it against

the edge of the table. The shards of glass and two liters of water splashed like a pomegranate

The Russian army was also in the midst of an explosion, forcing everyone present to cover their eyes and faces with their hands with a shriek. Marshal Nedelin was bombarded with wild accusations of sabotage, mixed with pearls of Russian diction like "a dick around your neck instead of a blackbeard".

Korolev shouted that the 8K71 was an outstanding achievement of human civilization. That no one in the world had anything like it. That the industry ordered twelve pieces for testing. And so far only two products have burned during testing. And now there are some tra-ta-tas who tra-ta-ta-ta and tra-ta-ta-ta instead of tra-ta-ta-ta, tra-ta-ta-ta and tra-ta-ta-ta!

Korolev glanced around, thinking what else to smash against the edge of the table or the marshal's head, but finding nothing suitable, he proudly walked out of the hall, kicking the door with his foot so hard that he knocked a board with splinters out of it.

Key point

Zhukov imposed an ironclad order in the Soviet Army.

Example. Lieutenant Pavlov shot Sergeant Ochkasov in front of three sergeants for refusing to report for duty. The sergeant was wounded in the cheek with the first shot and killed with the second shot in the head. In wartime, for refusal to obey the orders of a superior officer you are shot. But is it possible to shoot without trial in peacetime? By decision of the Military Council of the Moscow Military District, Lieutenant Pavlov was arrested for 20 days. Reported to Zhukov. Zhukov ordered the lieutenant to be immediately released and returned to the regiment.

Second example. Sailors came to visit friends. A drunken citizen appeared who did not like the presence of the sailors. He ordered the sailors to return to the barracks. The sailors did not obey the order. The drunken citizen became furious and sicced a sheepdog on the sailors. The sailors left. The drunken citizen returned home, grabbed a pistol, caught up with the sailors at a streetcar stop and shot sailor Kondratyev in the chest. The bullet passed through the lung two centimeters from the heart.

The drunken citizen turned out to be Rear Admiral Narykov. The sailors did not know that they were facing a Rear Admiral and therefore did not follow his orders. Zhukov ordered the case of the Rear Admiral not to submit

to the court. The Rear Admiral was demoted to the rank of captain of the 1st rank and was dismissed to the reserve with a full pension (Georgy Zhukov. Transcript of the October (1957) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. C. 331).

We see that Zhukov, bringing order to the Soviet Army, supported those who acted in his style. The leadership style of Zhukov and those who imitated him can be called high demanding.

But it is more accurate to call it rampant lawlessness.

CHAPTER 13

1

On July 28, 1957, the World Festival of Youth and Students broke out in Moscow. 34 thousand guests from 131 countries sang the Anthem of Democratic Youth in different languages:

*Children of different nations,
We dream of peace.
In these formidable years.
We fight for happiness!*

The last time Moscow saw such a number of foreigners was 13 years ago. On July 17, 1944, on Stalin's order, 19 captured German generals, 1,227 officers and 41,000 soldiers captured by Marshal of the Soviet Union Rokossovsky's troops during Operation Bagration were driven through the streets of Moscow.

But back then they were escorted. Now thousands of foreigners were traveling the same route without any escort. You could approach them, even touch them with your hand.

There were foreigners in Moscow before the festival, of course. But not in such numbers at all. They lived behind the walls of their embassies, they had their own clubs and stores. They whizzed through Moscow streets in their shiny limousines. They had no need to socialize with the Soviet people, and the Soviet people were trained to stay away from them: any contact with a foreigner could get you a full sentence.

All of a sudden! 34,000! Right on the streets! For two weeks!

Moscow plunged into a state of riotous lunacy. A grand parade was organized in Luzhniki at the new stadium. 3,200 athletes demonstrated strength and prowess. Tens of thousands of white doves soared into the sky. And circled over the stadium.

No one else in the world has ever done anything like this. We're the only ones who can organize an event of this magnitude. And the pigeons themselves had never seen themselves in such a mass. The mad birds circled

and circled over the stadium.

White doves are a symbol of peace. With their flight they as if called people: be vigilant! Don't allow war! Look what will happen to you if a nuclear war breaks out. After a nuclear explosion, a radioactive cloud will form, from which fission products will fall out. Just like that, from a white cloud, from tens of thousands of pigeons' intestines, a stream of fission products fell on the audience.

And at night on the Moscow River - a mass swim with torches. And dancing until dawn.

And not a single one of the 34,000 *darbodniks* who came to the festival from different countries thought: who needs all this? And why? Who paid to gather lazybones from all over the world and bring them to Moscow?

At that time, passenger airplanes were exotic. Delegates from distant countries were first taken by ship to Soviet ports - Leningrad, Odessa, Vladivostok, then by train to Moscow.

The journey from Brazil and Argentina to Marseille is many days. Then from Marseilles to Odessa - the same number of days. And the freebooters are voracious. They need to be fed. They also need to ensure the way back, so as not to spoil the impression of our hospitality. It's no shorter from Sydney to Vladivostok. Then seven days on a train. And back.

Our rulers have no pity. Our good rulers provided all the guests of the festival with tickets, fed them on the way to Moscow, received them in Moscow and brought them back. Just a few months ago, these rulers robbed their own people of hundreds of billions of rubles ^[14] - they had no money to pay back their own people, from whom they were snatching the last of it. But they found the money to organize a show for foreign fools: admire how beautifully we live, take in the advantages of socialism! And forget Zhukov's exploits in Hungary!

By the way, the organizing committee of the festival included a fellow in a gray suit. His name was Ivan Alexandrovich.

In his free time from festival worries, he performed the duties of the KGB chairman. Under Ivan Alexandrovich's supervision, thousands of freebies from the USA and Canada, Cuba and Brazil, Uruguay and Australia frolicked in the squares and streets.

Freebies corrupt. Two weeks of peace and friendship, plenty of food and dancing. And nothing to do.

The hostels of the festival's foreign delegates turned into hotbeds of debauchery unprecedented in Moscow. Russian girls were eager to go there as

if to meet great singers and actors. And soon the first results appeared:

- an outbreak of STDs in Moscow that spread across the country;
- A certain part of the youth of Moscow, and after it Leningrad, Kiev, Odessa, and then the distant suburbs sharply changed the style not only of clothes, but also of life; there were stilyagi-singles before, but after the festival they became especially numerous;
- everything foreign became fashionable: narrow short pants with cuffs that could be pulled on only by soaping the feet, thick rubber soles, colorful ties almost to the knees, short narrow skirts with slits;
- In full swing were the farzovchiki, who bought up worn rags from foreigners and sold them to the Soviet people at triple the price;
- shortly after the festival, our native Soviet children with an unusual dark skin color were born for the first time in Moscow maternity hospitals.

In those years, they used to joke: who stayed in Moscow after the festival delegates had left? Children of different nations.

2

Zhukov picked up the receiver of a white telephone with a golden profile of the Spasskaya Tower on the dial:

- Comrade Gorshkov, what is the best cruiser in the Black Sea?
- "Kuibyshev."
- In what condition?
- In excellent.
- Give me two of your best destroyers to escort.
- Take the Bullseye and the Shiny.
- Prepare all three ships. They're going on a visit to Yugoslavia.

3

On August 21, 1957, at 3:25 p.m., another 8K71 rocket exploded into the sky at the Tyura-Tam proving ground. Perhaps fearing the all-consuming wrath of its creator, this time it behaved like an obedient first-grade girl. She fulfilled the lesson. She traveled all the way to Kamchatka and got, as she was taught, into the given square.

On August 27, a TASS report was published that the Soviet Union had successfully tested a multistage intercontinental ballistic missile for the first time in the world.

This meant that, for the first time in history, an enemy could launch a devastating strike on U.S. territory.

The cruiser "Kuibyshev" of project 68-K was laid down on August 31, 1939 and launched on January 31, 1941. After June 22, 1941 the construction was suspended, the unfinished cruiser was taken to Sevastopol, then to Poti, and mothballed. After the war the construction was continued. On April 20, 1950 the cruiser entered into service.

The total displacement of the cruiser is 14,100 tons. Total engine power 124,600 horsepower. Maximum speed 33.4 knots. Armament - 12 152 mm cannons in four turrets, 8 100 mm universal guns in four turrets, 13 twin 37 mm anti-aircraft automatic guns, sea mines. Crew - 1,184 men.

In 1957, the Black Sea Fleet included the cruiser Frunze, laid down two days earlier than Kuibyshev. It was a cruiser of the same project, the same series, it had exactly the same history and exactly the same characteristics.

Admiral Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, chose the cruiser Kuibyshev. By coincidence, the city of Kuibyshev was the secret reserve capital of the Soviet Union. In the summer of 1957, everyone who was close to the government clearly understood: friendship with a crocodile could

The Khrushchev-Zhukov dual power is short-lived and unstable. No one doubted that soon the dual power would end, that Zhukov would devour Khrushchev without choking.

Zhukov had already ousted two former heads of government of the Soviet Union, Molotov and Malenkov, and the fate of the third, Bulganin, the then incumbent, was already sealed. Zhukov had already knocked out of the top leadership of the country Marshals of the Soviet Union Beria, Voroshilov, Vasilevsky, Biryuzov, Baghramyan, Admiral of the Navy of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov. At the top of political and military power except for Zhukov himself remained only Khrushchev, not the head of the government and not a Marshal.

Advising Zhukov to choose the cruiser "Kuibyshev", Gorshkov as if hinted Zhukov: reserve capital of the country at your disposal, the main take yourself.

Meanwhile, the secret capital could also be a trap. In May 1937, Stalin sent Marshal of the Soviet Union Tukhachevsky to the city of Kuibyshev, as if giving him a secret promotion: I will rule in Moscow, and you - in the reserve capital. There, in Kuibyshev, Tukhachevsky's power ended.

On August 21, the 8K71 missile fell in the target area. It is clear that the missile was not carrying a nuclear warhead, but only its mockup - its overall weight equivalent. Before reaching the ground, the mockup of the warhead collapsed and burned up due to errors in the design of the heat shield.

And that was Korolev's double stroke of luck. The burned mockup of the head part of one rocket turned the history of the XX century in a new direction.

Here's what happened. When they launched missiles with a range of two or three thousand kilometers, everything went fine. But an intercontinental ballistic missile goes into airless space. Then, on the final section of the trajectory, it returns to the dense layers of the atmosphere at a monstrous speed. Therefore, the returning part of the missile heats up and burns up like a star falling from the sky.

Korolev's first good fortune was that his rocket delivered the cargo to the target. The launch vehicle acted as a cab that delivered a drunken passenger to the door of the house. And then what happened to the passenger

What happened was not the cab driver's concern or his responsibility. Korolev wasn't the one who designed the warhead. So let other guys now fight over the problem of how to keep the charge safe until the explosion when it enters the dense layers of the atmosphere.

Korolev's greatness consisted, among other things, in the fact that any complex problem he could explain to completely ignorant people, using simple and clear images.

It is easy to explain something to a person to whom you look in the eyes, helping to express the thought clearly with your hands. Korolev had to explain on the phone, without looking into the eyes of the interlocutor, without supporting his arguments with gestures. It has long been known that if students do not understand the teacher, it means that the teacher is not good enough to be understood by everyone. Korolev in this sense was a very good teacher: he could explain the essence of the problem to anyone.

In this case, Khrushchev had to explain.

Korolev expressed the point succinctly and simply:

One. Now we can get America with our missiles.

Second. It is necessary to improve the head part, which enters the dense layers of the atmosphere at almost cosmic speed. This problem should be dealt with by those who are authorized to do so.

Third. Refinement of the head part requires the most complex theoretical calculations and scientific experiments.

Fourth. In the meantime, we have three ready-made 8K71 rockets sitting idle. So why not use one of them and launch an artificial satellite into space? A significant date is approaching - the 40th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The launch of a satellite, even if we end up second in space after the Americans, will still be a victory.

At the other end of the government communications wire, Nikita Khrushchev looked questioningly at his aide Shuisky Grigory Trofimych.

Trofimych sat beside him, making notes in his notebook. In response to Khrushchev's questioning look, he clenched his hand into a fist with his thumb upward, confirming with a gesture that he was correct!

6

On September 7, 1957, another launch of the 8K71 rocket took place. This time the rocket successfully reached the target area, but the finalized head part again failed to reach the surface of the earth, burning up in the final part of the trajectory. So, the launch vehicle was ready, but the head part still needed to be finalized. Therefore, until the creation of a more perfect design of the head and more effective protection of the head from thermal loads did not make sense to continue to throw rockets over the horizon in vain.

This was Korolev's second good fortune: he had two more rockets at his disposal, which had nothing to do yet. If the designers at the first attempt to develop a head part that does not burn up in the final part of the trajectory, the testing of missiles and head parts would have continued in accordance with the program. No one would have allowed Korolev to dabble and launch artificial satellites that no one needed.

In this case, a year later, the Americans would be the first to launch an artificial satellite. The world would certainly pay attention to this event, but it would probably cause no more excitement than the completion of a new record-breaking skyscraper in New York City. If the satellite had been launched first by the Americans, it would not have been a sensation. If the satellite had been launched first by the Americans, there would have been no space race between the USSR and the USA. In this case, the history of the 20th century would have been quite different.

7

On the same day, September 7, 1957, the Soviet ambassador to Yugoslavia, Firyubin, received a cipher with orders to return to Moscow immediately.

Comrade Firyubin was met in the Kremlin by Comrades Khrushchev, Furtseva and Kozlov, members of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. Khrushchev gave Nikolai Pavlovich an unkind look and cut him off:

- By decision of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, we have relieved you, Comrade Firyubin, of your duties as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Soviet Union to Yugoslavia.

Firyubin expected anything but that. And Khrushchev smiled:

- By decision of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, we appoint you, Nikolai Pavlovich, as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

8

The crazy summer of 1957 had died down. The leaders of the Soviet Union, Comrades Khrushchev and Zhukov, went on vacation.

Crimea. Tsar's Palace. Velvet season. Zhukov and Khrushchev meet every morning on the beach. And smile at each other.

Zhukov suddenly stopped being rude to Khrushchev. Zhukov and Khrushchev established normal relations - warm, businesslike, friendly.

Just like Stalin and Hitler in May 1941.

Key point

The Soviet Union had an inordinately huge Armed Forces. Soldiers were drafted for three years, sailors for four. During their service, soldiers and sailors could be promoted to the ranks of sergeants and petty officers.

In addition to compulsory service, there was superannuation service. After serving, soldiers, sailors, sergeants and petty officers could stay in the army and navy and continue their service. In this case, they were sharply increased wages, were given other uniforms of higher quality, they could live outside the barracks. In terms of their position, an enlisted man was closer to an officer than to a soldier or sailor.

An enlisted man had already completed three or four years of compulsory service, he had the relevant experience. He knew the service and loved it. He was not a slave, he was a volunteer, so he did not count the days and hours that were left until demobilization. If a soldier or a sailor was humiliated in the service, if he was not respected, he never stayed for an extra term. There were those who could stand up for themselves, who could make themselves respected.

Overstayers were used wherever knowledge and skills were required: junior aviation specialist, driving instructor, tank maintenance section commander, radar operator, photo decoder, and so on. There was a huge demand for super enlisted men in the aviation, navy, communication troops, and topographic units.

Zhukov was breaking the life-tested and well-established foundations of the service. He decided to save people's money. He reasoned as follows: a soldier and sailor nowadays is literate, if he was told about Pushkin and Lermontov, about parallel lines and the water cycle in nature in a rural seven-year school, he will somehow manage to repair and adjust the tropospheric communication antenna.

And Zhukov hit the super enlisted men. Recruitment for long terms was canceled. The conditions of recruitment for short terms were sharply worsened. In the Navy it looked like this:

He [Zhukov. - Author's note] stated that due to the fact that the conscripts had secondary education, the super enlisted men had lost their role in the Armed Forces and first of all ordered to sharply reduce their number.... What was the result? Of the 28,000+ thousand super enlisted men [who served in the Navy. - Author's note], 12,800 people left after that.... Where did the enlisted men leave from? From submarines, from machine commands of surface ships, specialists of instrumentation technology (Georgy Zhukov. Transcript of the October (1957) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. C. 279).

This was the case not only in the Navy, but also in aviation, artillery, tank and all other troops. The blow to the super enlisted men sharply reduced the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. The worst of all was the aviators, signalers, topographers, and missileers.

After urgent reports, Mr. Zhukov admitted that a mistake had been made in this case, but when considering this issue recently at the Collegium, he stated that since only a year had passed since the new regulation had been issued, it was inconvenient to enter the Council of Ministers with the question of changing it (ibid.).

Similarly, Zhukov decided to save money on quality control of military equipment. The military factories employed officers from the Ministry of Defense, who monitored the quality of the work being done

and carried out the acceptance of weapons and military equipment for the Soviet Army and Navy. Zhukov decided to reduce their number.

Without studying where the apparatus should be reduced, and where it is necessary, the Minister gave a corresponding instruction to the General Staff, and the latter, accustomed to not really consider the arguments of the chief commanders, obediently reduced the control and reception apparatus by 38 percent, leaving without this apparatus even such plants where ships are being converted for missile equipment In the coming months, we will be forced to dismiss from the army and navy several hundred experienced specialists who have been released from work in the control and reception apparatus, many of them without pension benefits (ibid. P. 279).

These officers gave their youth to the Motherland, served in the Armed Forces for many years, but fell a little short of retirement. They were not guilty of anything - Zhukov simply ordered them to save money.

Such austerity was hurting our country.

CHAPTER 14

1

Fall is the time of military exercises. The crops are harvested. The rooks have flown away. The forest is bare. The fields are empty. We can fight.

1957 was an unusual year. The 40th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution was approaching. The entire Soviet people were reporting to the Motherland about the successes they had achieved.

The Soviet Army was also going to report to the Motherland about its successes. For this purpose, the command decided to hold unprecedented military exercises in the Kiev Military District with the participation of four tank, five motorized rifle and four aviation divisions with appropriate artillery, engineering and other reinforcements. The highlight of the program was to be the forcing of the Dnieper by the 41st Guards Tank Division without bridges or ferry crossings.

The plan for forcing the river was as follows: from the left bank of the Dnieper, two 2B1 self-propelled mortars of 420 mm caliber and weighing 55 tons each would launch two nuclear strikes on the enemy's location on the right bank of the river. I think Zhukov regretted very much that the exercises were not real nuclear strikes, but only imitations of them. Following the nuclear strikes, the reconnaissance battalion of the tank division and the reconnaissance companies of the motorized rifle and three tank regiments crossed the Dnieper.

All reconnaissance units of the Soviet Army were armed with floating PT-76 tanks and light, open-topped BTR-40 armored personnel carriers. The 41st Guards Tank Division, instead of the BTR-40, received the new, as yet uncommissioned BRDM combat reconnaissance and patrol vehicles. These exercises for the BRDMs, as well as for the 2B1 self-propelled mortars, were to be troop tests.

A total of 19 floating tanks and 43 BRDMs in the first wave of forcing. The task of the division's reconnaissance battalion and the regiments' reconnaissance companies was to cross the Dnieper and rush forward, continuing to conduct force reconnaissance [\[15\]](#)

to greater depths, to capture and hold beachheads near the epicenters of nuclear explosions.

The second wave should be followed by the second wave - a motorized rifle regiment on tracked floating armored personnel carriers BTR-50P. These armored personnel carriers ferried across the Dnieper not only infantry, but also 85-mm anti-tank guns ^[16]. The regiment's task: to capture and hold a bridgehead on the western bank of the Dnieper.

In the third wave, three tank regiments and a tank battalion of a motorized rifle regiment are to pass along the river bottom. A total of 315 T-54 tanks.

And then the artillery on floating transporters K-61 was to be ferried across. For transport vehicles, and there were more than a thousand of them in the tank division, it was still necessary to build a ferry crossing or a pontoon bridge, but this was not part of the program of the performance.

Tank companies used to go along the bottom of rivers. Battalions, too. Once, even a whole regiment. But it was the first time that a division had to go across the Dnieper, not just across some little river, but across the Dnieper.

Wait, why do we have to cross the Dnieper during the exercises?

Why? The proletariat of West Germany, France and other countries of Western Europe were groaning under the oppression of the capitalists. Their class brothers had to be liberated. Marshal Zhukov found a way to break through the most powerful front of any enemy and worked it out at the exercises at the Totsk range in September 1954^[17]. But on the way of our tank and motorized rifle divisions, general and armored armies in Western Europe will be many water obstacles. Among them is the Rhine.

In order to break through the Rhine in the future, it was necessary to try on the Dnieper.

2

Korolev's rockets were built in Kuibyshev at the Progress plant.

On September 22, 1957, product 8K71PS was delivered from Kuibyshev to Tyura-Tam.

SAR is the simplest satellite.

3

September 29, 1957 at 16 hours and 22 minutes rumbled in the Urals. In the city of Chelyabinsk-40.

Don't look for it in Chelyabinsk. This address is from the same series as Arzamas-16, Krasnoyarsk-26, Tomsk-7, Sverdlovsk-44, and Moscow-400, Moscow-600, and so on. In secret documents Chelyabinsk-40 was called Ozyorsk, but this name was not on any Soviet map. The residents of Chelyabinsk-40 had no right to give the name of the city to the uninitiated.

Immediately after the war, the closed city of Chelyabinsk-40, aka Ozersk, was being built by prisoners at the same time as the Mayak Chemical Combine. Only those who worked at the plant and those who guarded and serviced them lived in the guarded city. The chemical plant produced goods, reporting to Moscow for every gram produced. The products were called plutonium.

Plutonium is needed to produce nuclear bombs with romantic names like "Tatiana" and various thermonuclear "Kuzka's mothers. The production of grams of plutonium is accompanied by thousands of cubic meters of liquid radioactive waste. What to do with them? The solution is simple and ingenious in its simplicity. The Techa River flows nearby, so - into the river!

Until 1949, they poured a lot. Then people in the villages along the banks of the river began to die out, and they began to pour less.

The Techa flows into the Iset, the Iset into the Tobol, the Tobol into the Irtysh, and the Irtysh into the Ob. The source of the Irtysh is in China, from China the river flows to Kazakhstan, gaining radioactive power from the Semipalatinsk test site, receiving on the way all new doses, including from Tobol. The basin of the Irtysh is more than one and a half million square kilometers. Its length is 4,248 kilometers. The Irtysh is the world's longest tributary river. The Missouri is in second place.

The current, followed by the Iset, Tobol, Irtysh, and Ob, have been so polluted that they have started to dump waste into lakes. There are enough of them in the Urals. When the lakes in the area were polluted as well, it was necessary to look for a new solution. And they found it. They dug excavations 20 meters in diameter and 12 meters deep, fixed reinforcement on the bottom and walls and poured concrete. Then the bottom and walls were lined with stainless steel and welded together. The result was a kind of large pot. At the bottom of the pot, a round stainless steel pole with a diameter of one and a half meters was placed in the center. From the top steel stainless steel trusses were placed on top of the pole. The result was

something like a bicycle wheel with spokes. Steel sheets were laid on the wheel, reinforcement was attached, and concrete was poured. The concrete lid was a meter thick. The cover was covered with a layer of earth. Hundreds of such tanks were built. The most active waste was poured into them.

But because the waste is radioactive, it kept generating heat, so every such structure had to be constantly cooled. But such waste is an extremely aggressive environment. Due to corrosion, the cooling system of can No. 14 of the C-3 complex failed. The contents self-heated. The water instantly evaporated. The dry residue continued to heat up rapidly. When the temperature jumped over 300 degrees, the lid of the "pot" jumped up - just like in your kitchen, when your wife was watching a TV show on TV. The lid wasn't very heavy. Only 160 tons. And a layer of earth on top. It didn't get very far. Only 25 meters.

There was no nuclear explosion. There was a thermal explosion. The contents of the "pot" were thrown two kilometers into the air. The wind picked up the cloud and carried it in a northeasterly direction, showering everyone below with radioactive fallout, like pigeon droppings at a festival parade in Luzhniki.

Residents of the Ural cities observed a majestic picture in the evening: the sky was shimmering with emerald pink glow. People were reassured: in these latitudes, it turns out, there is also the northern lights. Sometimes. It will continue to recur, so don't worry.

Convicts, soldiers, students, and schoolchildren were thrown into the liquidation. From Chelyabinsk-40 to the north-east by a corridor of 300 kilometers and a width of 5-10 kilometers, the East Ural radioactive trace ran forever. Its area is 23 thousand square kilometers. In 1968 a reserve was established here, which cannot be visited even half a century after the catastrophe. It will not be opened even centuries later.

All those who took part in the liquidation of the consequences signed a non-disclosure agreement. But they could have done without it. Students and schoolchildren, soldiers and convicts were not told about what had happened here and

what danger they were exposing them to. They simply removed and hauled away soil, destroyed houses in abandoned villages, dug some ditches, washed sidewalks and streets of Ozyorsk, shook dust off windowsills and benches, collected fallen leaves in gardens and parks, carried out some incomprehensible work.

Therefore, they could not tell anything interesting and unusual.
And they didn't live long after that.

4

We've always been lucky. We've always been wildly lucky. South of Ozyorsk is Chelyabinsk, north is Sverdlovsk. The radioactive trace passed between them! It didn't hit them! Near Tyumen, Kurgan, Kamensk-Uralsky, Shadrinsk. And it passed!

Only 270,000 people lived in the fallout zone. And there was only one pot that went off. And it wasn't full. And there was no nuclear explosion. The lid just popped off.

And yet, the release of radioactive waste at Mayak was a record for that time. No one in the world had ever experienced anything like it. Our country held the record of radioactive contamination for 29 years!

This record was broken only by the explosion at Chernobyl. And once again we were ahead of the whole planet! We have never ceded the palm of superiority in the scale of nuclear catastrophes to anyone in the XX century!

It's a pity that our bureaucrats kept information about what happened at Mayak in the strictest secrecy until 1990. The world knew nothing about our "accomplishments" for three decades.

5

They reported to Zhukov: there was a rumble at Mayak, the plant is contaminated. Plutonium production plans are in jeopardy.

Ordered Zhukov to throw troops to liquidate.

They reported to Khrushchev: there was a rumble at Mayak. Measures are being taken. Minister of Medium Machine Building Slavsky and his deputies are working on the spot. On Zhukov's order, troops with engineering equipment began to work. There are plenty of camps in the Urals, the place of the explosion is being cleared by prisoners. The local population is helping.

Khrushchev is gritting his teeth. No other way than someone is digging under him, trying to put a pig under him. He had just fought off Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Voroshilov, Bulganin, Pervukhin, Saburov and Shepilov, and then Zhukov started something. Zhukov can't get away to Yugoslavia.

6

2 October 1957. Tura Tam. Early morning. From the assembly and test

building to the launch position - one and a half kilometers of open steppe. Diesel locomotive slowly pushes ahead of itself a railroad platform with the installer, on which rests the product 8K71PS. Sergey Pavlovich Korolev, Chief Designer, is walking silently beside it.

The product was taken to pad No. 1 and lifted into a vertical position. On that day, the State Commission signed the act: "Launch the First Artificial Earth Satellite on October 4".

And on October 2, 1957, a delegation of Soviet scientists headed by Academician Anatoly Arkadyevich Blagonravov arrived in New York. The appearance of Soviet scientists in those years in America was a sensation. This event could only be overshadowed by the landing of aliens in the city. "The Three Reds" - that's what the newspapers called them.

Blagonravov was an outstanding scientist in the field of ballistics, lieutenant general of artillery, and until 1950 president of the Academy of Artillery Sciences. Now he was not dealing with artillery, but with some other problems.

The Soviet delegation was invited to establish cooperation between scientists of the two countries in the study of the upper atmosphere. But the real purpose of the invitation was to find out how great the Soviet Union's lag in the field of missile technology was, how true were the TASS reports that the Soviet Union had allegedly developed an intercontinental ballistic missile, that it had allegedly even successfully tested it.

3 October was a business meeting between the two delegations, which lasted many hours. Blagonravov and his two companions talked more and more about cosmic rays, solar activity and other nonsense. It was becoming clear that the Russians were not well versed in the

They have been a bit hasty in publicizing their imaginary successes. They are somewhat hasty in publicizing their supposed successes.

To be finally convinced that the Russians have nothing but cosmic rays behind their souls, a grand banquet was scheduled for October 4: let's get drunk and find out everything.

7

In the Kiev Military District, preparations were being finalized for a grand military exercise with the 41st Guards Tank Division forcing the Dnieper without pontoon bridges and ferry crossings.

All the top leaders of the Soviet Army were going to come to Kiev for the

exercises. Khrushchev was expected to arrive. Only the USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov could not attend the exercises. He was to travel to Yugoslavia.

4 October 1957, the commander of the Kiev Military District Marshal of the Soviet Union Chuikov Vasily Ivanovich, who was to lead the exercise, on the channel of high-frequency government communication called Zhukov:

- Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union, Georgy Konstantinich, you should be here yourself, at our meeting. Our business is very serious.

- I'll figure it out when I get there.

- Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union, Georgy Konstantinich, you'd better be here yourself.

CHAPTER 15

1

Having completed his short vacation, Zhukov departed for Moscow and gave his final instructions, including to the GRU chief, Colonel General Shtemenko, and the GRU's first deputy chief, Lieutenant General Mamsurov.

Asked if everything is going according to plans.

The answer I got was, it's totally fine.

2

Preparing for a foreign visit is a serious matter. It was necessary to smooth out the sharp diplomatic corner. Ambassador Firubin issued an invitation to Zhukov to visit Yugoslavia on July 22, 1957. This invitation was not even formalized in writing (Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI). Fond 3. Inventory 12. Case 247. Sheet 34). The Soviet side had to conceal the fact that Zhukov, with the assistance of Ambassador Firubin, had asked for a visit himself.

Comrade Firubin, former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Soviet Union to Yugoslavia and now Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, managed to settle this question as well. With the consent of the Yugoslav comrades, a TASS report was prepared to the effect that an invitation to Zhukov from the command of the Yugoslav army had long ago been received.

Firubin's merit was also in the fact that he was able to organize not just a visit, but a grandiose and long visit, for many days. Zhukov went to Yugoslavia at the invitation of Army General Goshnyak, but Firubin organized meetings with many important persons. Zhukov was given the opportunity to meet Marshal Tito and personally visit those places that were of special interest from a strategic point of view.

Before leaving, Comrade Firubin brought Marshal Zhukov of the Soviet Union up to speed on the situation in Yugoslavia, described Marshal Tito and his immediate entourage, told of their

political views, aptitudes and hobbies, about the Yugoslav comrades' plans for the future.

3

By a decree of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, Colonel-

General Radzievsky, commander of the troops of the Odessa Military District, and Vice-Admiral Chursin, deputy commander of the Black Sea Fleet, were included among the persons accompanying Marshal Zhukov during his visit to Yugoslavia.

The choice is not accidental: if the consent to the deployment of Soviet bases in Yugoslavia is obtained, it will be mainly ships from the Black Sea Fleet and troops from the Odessa Military District that will operate in the Mediterranean Sea.

In addition, the number of accompanying persons included the deputy head of the Main Political Directorate, Lieutenant-General Stepchenko, who was soon promoted to the rank of colonel-general, and Lieutenant-General Kitaev, a general for special assignments under the Minister of Defense, who had recently distinguished himself in Hungary.

The delegation's escort group included correspondents from TASS, Pravda, Izvestiya, Krasnaya Zvezda, representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the desk officer of the Administrative Bodies Division of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Yuri Bulanov.

4

The newspaper Pravda on October 5, 1957 described Zhukov's departure to Yugoslavia in great detail:

Departure to Yugoslavia of the USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov

5 n October, the USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov, left Moscow for the Crimea by plane. He is going on a visit to the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in response to an invitation made to him on behalf of the Yugoslav Government by Army General I. Goshnyak during his visit to the Soviet Union in the summer of this year.

At the Central Airfield, Marshal Zhukov was seen off by Marshal of the Soviet Union I. S. Konev, Deputy Foreign Ministers of the USSR N. S. Patolichev and N. P. Firyubin, Adm. G. Gorshkov, Air Marshal S. I. Rudenko, Army Generals M. S. Malinin and G. K. Malandin, Colonel Generals A. V. Gerasimov, A. A. Gryzlov, N. I. Gusev, A. S. Zheltoye, S. U. Rubanov, E. G. Trotsenko, M. A. Shalin, Major-General I. S. Kolesnikov, Commandant of Moscow, other generals and officers of the Soviet Army, Colonel D. F. Chikin, Acting Head of the Foreign Relations Department of the USSR Ministry of

Defense, Deputy Heads of Departments of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs P. S. Dedushkin and K. A. Kochetkov, and representatives of the press.

Among those seeing off were the diplomatic staff of the Embassy of Yugoslavia in the USSR, Ambassador of the People's Republic of Albania to the USSR Mihal Prifti, the military attaché of Albania Colonel X. Aranitasi.

Those gathered at the airfield bid a heartfelt farewell to Marshal G. K. Zhukov, whose plane took to the air at eight o'clock in the morning.

On board the plane at the invitation of Marshal Zhukov is the military attaché of Yugoslavia in the USSR, Colonel Sava Popovich.

Sevastopol. October 4 (TASS). Today at noon the USSR Defense Minister Marshal of the Soviet Union Marshal G. K. Zhukov arrived in Sevastopol by plane from Moscow on his way to the FPRY on a visit.

At 15 hours 25 minutes Marshal Zhukov climbs on the boat at Grafskaya pier and bypasses the destroyers, standing in the South Bay. Minister of Defense of the USSR greeted the personnel of the destroyers and congratulated the sailors on the campaign in friendly Yugoslavia. Above the bay spreads a multivoiced sailors' "Hurrah!". The boat is heading towards the cruiser "Kuibyshev", on the deck of which the ship's crew is lined up.

On the parade ladder Marshal Zhukov rises to the ship. The watch officer commands "Attention!" The flag of the USSR Defense Minister is hoisted on the mainstay. The commander of the group of ships, Rear Admiral AN Tyunyaev reports on the readiness of ships for the campaign.

The commander of the ship, Captain First Rank VV Mikhailin gives a report.

Comrade. Zhukov is going around the guard of honor. The ship's orchestra plays the anthem of the Soviet Union. Then the Minister of Defense of the USSR goes to the personnel. In response to the greeting is heard loudly: "Greetings, Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union".

USSR Minister of Defense Marshal G. K. Zhukov and his entourage were seen off:

*Deputy
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Admiral AG Golovko, Commander of the Black Sea Fleet Admiral VA Kasatonov, First Secretary of the Crimean Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine VG Komyakhov, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Crimean Regional Council of Workers' Deputies IM Filippov and others.*

The ships are anchored and leaving Sevastopol Bay. On the ships standing in the bay, and on the coastal posts are raised signals: "We wish you a happy voyage. Signalers of the cruiser "Kuibyshev" raise a signal in

response: "Thank you for your kind wish".

Many residents of the Hero-City came to Primorsky Boulevard to see off Comrade G. K. Zhukov to the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (TASS).

5

October 4, 1957. Tyura-Tam. The 5th research polygon of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

- Attention. Stand by for one minute.
- Key to start.
- There's a key to start.
- Stretch one.
- There's broach one.
- Blow!
- There's a blowout!
- Wrench on the drain.
- There's a wrench on the drain.
- Start!
- Stretch two!
- There's broach two!

The engines roared. The cable mast snapped back.

- Preliminary!
- Intermediate!
- Home!
- Wake up!

At 22 hours 28 minutes and 34 seconds Moscow time, the 8K71PS product smoothly descended from the 1st launch pad and rumbled into the night sky, rapidly gaining speed. After 4 minutes and 55 seconds, the central block of the launch vehicle weighing seven and a half tons entered an elliptical orbit.

After another 19 seconds, the 83.6-kilogram Sputnik separated from the central block of the launch vehicle. The satellite, weighing 83.6 kilograms, separated from the central unit of the launch vehicle.

6

Having briefly said goodbye to the 5th Research and Development Range

of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Sputnik went over the horizon. Its signals faded away.

The polygon was jubilant. Sergei Palych, the chief designer, was pumped again and again. His deputies were rocked, the launch calculation was rocked. People were hugging each other and shouting to let each other know what had happened.

Suddenly everything went quiet. The exuberant joy was replaced by a wary and even sad silence.

A longing of agonizing expectation came over everyone. Would he appear again?

He didn't show up.

Seconds stretched into centuries, minutes into eternity. The clock struck the longest hour of human history and many more endless minutes. All eyes on the floor. Silence as in an empty church. No one at such moments wants to look into the faces of his comrades.

And suddenly, quietly through the crackle and rustle of the ether, the now forever native "beep-beep-beep-beep" came again from the icy abyss.

This is where joy overcame all barriers. The nervous tension of the last few days exploded into exuberant delight. That is how the sticky stifling stuffiness is suddenly broken by a cheerful gleam, a joyous crackle, and a

the rumble of a spring thunderstorm. Hundreds of people came out into the black night. And they saw their man-made star. It floated across the sky, and from the bunker its joyful signal "beep-beep-beep-beep-beep" grew in a victorious march.

If we approach the question officially and dryly, there were two satellites in orbit at once: Sputnik itself weighing 83 and a half kilograms and the central unit of the 8K71 launch vehicle, which weighed seven and a half tons, which also entered the same orbit.

People heard the Sputnik's signals, but of course they did not see it. They saw the huge central block of the rocket illuminated by the Sun, which did not signal.

But no one went into these little things, and no one wanted to go into them.

The satellite was in orbit.

It was a great victory.

The sea is black. The sky is black. Stars in the sky. The cruiser "Kuibyshev" is steadily heading for the Bosphorus at full speed. Two newest destroyers "Byvaly" and "Shiny" - a little behind, right and left.

The navigator of "Kuibyshev" determines the exact position of the ship by the stars. A star of the first magnitude is moving across the sky.

Stars don't walk across the sky. Or rather, they do, but not with such speed, they walk imperceptibly.

The navigator on the "Kuibyshev" is not an ordinary one. The best navigator of the Black Sea Fleet is on "Kuibyshev". He knows everything about the stars. He knows every constellation by name, knows every star in the constellation. Looking at the stars, he can calculate the way to the North Pole or the South Pole without a chronometer or sextant. It's his job to look up at the night sky. But something unimaginable is going on in the sky: a strange star is shining. And it's not just shining. The star is defying the laws of astronomy. The navigator knows it can't be because it can never be.

Request for Ex: Have you seen it?

The answer is: That's right!

Request for "Brilliant": Confirmation?

The answer is: That's right!

Navigator to officer of the watch: record in the logbook! Time, coordinates!

That night the appearance of a new star in the sky was recorded in the watch logs of a multitude of ships of all the world's navies.

Key point

On October 4, 1957 at 16:00 the cruiser Kuibyshev disembarked from the barrel, left the bay of Sevastopol and set a course for the Bosphorus. The cruiser, guarded by destroyer squadrons, was taking Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov away from his native land.

4 On October 1957, six hours after the cruiser Kuibyshev left the Sevastopol bay, the 8K71 rocket built in Kuibyshev took the first Sputnik from its native land.

By decision of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, the launch of Sputnik was entrusted to the Ministry of Defense. That is, in the final analysis, to Zhukov. The launch was carried out from the range of the Ministry of Defense, that is, from a facility directly subordinate to Zhukov. The range was built by the Soviet Army's construction crews. Preparation of the missile

was carried out by officers of the Soviet Army, that is, subordinates of Zhukov. The key on the console was turned by Lieutenant Boris Chekunov, again a subordinate of Zhukov.

Zhukov, as noted in his service record, was "morbidly self-loving."

Zhukov demanded honors, up to and including the erection of an equestrian statue in the St. George Hall of the Kremlin.

Zhukov personally supervised the writing of the official five-volume history of the war, in which he was the main hero. (The diligent executors did not have time to publish this version of our heroic past.)

Zhukov personally demanded that the movie "Stalingrad" be revised to more vividly highlight his role in the great battle. Zhukov even demanded that the title of the movie be changed so that Stalin's name would not be heard. Although in Stalingrad Zhukov appeared only once, in August 1942. Zhukov's attempted counteroffensive at Stalingrad failed. A successful counteroffensive in the Stalingrad area was carried out two and a half months later without a

Zhukov's involvement, who at that moment was on a completely different section of the front, where he was leading another grandiose offensive, which he failed.

After Zhukov's appointment as Minister of Defense, the central newspapers did not place his portrait. For this, *"the Main Political Directorate was subjected to such a scolding as it had never seen before"*^[18] (Georgy Zhukov. Transcript of the October (1957) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. C. 252).

Zhukov used the money of the Ministry of Defense - that is, the people's money - to pay for the painting of huge pictures on which he was depicted on a white horse resembling George the Victorious.

Question: why didn't Defense Minister Zhukov use the launch of Sputnik to cover his name with undying glory for centuries? He should have been in Tyura-Tam on October 4, 1957. He should fatherly put his hand on the shoulder of Lieutenant Chenunov sitting at the console and say something simple and meaningful under the sound of movie cameras. And after that - by plane to Sevastopol. The Minister of Defense of Yugoslavia, Army General Goshnyak, would have forgiven a few hours' delay.

But what would have been the effect if it had been announced: on Zhukov's orders, under his personal guidance and control, an unheard-of technological and scientific breakthrough was made!

Having checked in at the Tyura-Tam range at the right moment, the great

commander, without wasting a minute, could go on a visit to friendly Yugoslavia. Here would be a platform for Zhukov to negotiate: under my leadership, mankind opened the way to space! I have an indestructible force behind me! Under my command, the Soviet Union can outrun any America!

It turned out otherwise: in Zhukov's absence, his subordinates performed a miracle. So why didn't Defense Minister Zhukov seize the opportunity to snatch for himself at least a piece of space glory? Why didn't he use such a trump card to seduce a wavering Yugoslavia?

It would have been possible for Zhukov not even to fly to Tyura-Tam. On the cruiser "Kuibyshev" was deployed command post and communication center of the USSR Minister of Defense. It was possible before going to sea majestically (again to the sound of movie cameras) to listen to the report on the radio

the head of the 5th polygon of the Ministry of Defense, Guards Lieutenant-General of Artillery Alexei Ivanovich Nesterenko. And stamp: act in accordance with my instructions!

Or, even better, to call on board the cruiser Marshal of Artillery Nedelin Mitrofan Ivanovich. Nedelin's position was Deputy Minister of Defense. So it was called in open documents. And in closed documents - Deputy Minister of Defense for Special Weapons and Missile Technology.

And let the Deputy Minister of Defense report to the Minister of Defense: Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union, the 5th test site of the Ministry of Defense is ready for the beginning of the space age! Permission to start? Then, after the launch, show the people the declassified chronicle: Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov, four times Hero of the Soviet Union, and his subordinates are preparing a breakthrough into space!

But Zhukov showed absolutely no interest in the launch of Sputnik. He did not make any attempt to register his participation in the great accomplishment of the XX century, although, I repeat, the launch was officially entrusted to the Ministry of Defense, that is, to Zhukov, although his subordinates from Lieutenant Chekunov, who turned the key, to the Deputy Minister of Defense, Marshal of Artillery Nedelin, were preparing the breakthrough into space.

How to explain such strange behavior of Zhukov?

I don't have an answer to that question. I'm just guessing:

Zhukov did not realize the epochal significance of the upcoming event.

CHAPTER 16

1

October 4, 1957. Washington, DC. Reception in honor of physicists from different countries. Chairman of the U.S. National Committee for the International Geophysical Year Dr. Berkner and Academician Blagonravov are talking about the possibility of launching an artificial satellite.

Someone in black whispers something into Berkner's left ear. Berkner flinches, asks for a repeat. Turns back to the audience:

- Ladies and gentlemen, the Russians have launched Sputnik.

Then turns to Blagonravov, shakes his hand.

American professor John Kaplan apologizes. He has to fly urgently to California to organize tracking of Sputnik.

At the end of the meeting Blagonravov wanted to hand each of those present a bottle of "Stolichnaya", but Professor Kaplan hurriedly leaves without waiting for the end of the reception. Blagonravov catches him by the sleeve on his way out and hands him the bottle.

At that moment, the press bursts into the hall like a herd of elephants. The magnesium flashes merge into a continuous dazzling glare.

The next morning, the front pages of the newspapers featured a close-up photo of Blagonravov holding out a bottle to Kaplan. And the headlines in huge letters: RUSSIAN CONVINCES AMERICA!

2

The planet exploded with delight. The newspapers screamed:

100 PERCENT SATELLITE TALK IN AMERICA, 100 PERCENT BUSINESS IN RUSSIA!

5 October at 4:31 p.m. Sputnik passed over Washington, DC. The space race has begun.

America couldn't afford to let anyone get ahead of her.

Khrushchev could not allow the Soviet Union to retreat to second place location.

Call Korolev: prepare the second launch! Immediately! And the third! What? The rockets are for testing a new warhead? To hell with the warhead! All rockets to demonstrate our achievements!!!

3

On the Soviet Union, on the Soviet people, on its leaders fell a shaft of enthusiastic congratulations.

And Zhukov was rocked by the waves in the distant sea.

6 October a detachment of Soviet ships entered the Aegean Sea. October 7 - in the Ionian Sea. On October 8, the cruiser "Kuibyshev", destroyers "Byvaly" and "Shiny" entered the port of Zadar, saluted with cannon salvos and dropped anchor.

Zhukov went ashore. He was met by the Yugoslav Minister of Defense, Army General Gošnjak. Zhukov and his entourage departed for Belgrade. Followed by all those who served the delegation.

Due to the fact that the cruiser "Kuibyshev" was carrying the distinguished guest and his entourage, due to the fact that the command post and communication center of the Minister of Defense were deployed on the cruiser, the crew had to be squeezed. For the same reason, the technical staff accompanying the delegation was placed not only on the cruiser, but also on the destroyers.

Comrade Yuri Sergeevich Bulanov, a referent of the Administrative Bodies Division of the CPSU Central Committee, was on his way to Yugoslavia on the destroyer Byvaly. After the delegation and all its attendants disembarked in Zadar, Bulanov stayed on the Byvaly.

The commander of the ship, Captain 3rd rank V.X. Sahakyan, did not ask any questions. We were ordered to squeeze and accommodate a few people on the ship before the trip - we squeezed and accommodated them. All passengers went ashore, one remained. That's the way it's done. The visit will be over, the passengers will return to the ships and we will go home.

4

9 October in the port of Zadar, access to the Soviet cruiser and destroyer squadrons was open to all comers. On the shore stood a crowd of those wishing to do so. And the sailors were allowed to leave for shore.

The commander of the "Byvaly" suggested to the silent passenger: the XO will stay for me, maybe we'll take a walk along the quay?

The passenger shook his head: I'm not allowed.

5

On the night of October 10, the ships left Zadar and arrived in Split in the morning. Here the Soviet ships were given an equally warm welcome.

The next port was Dubrovnik. Here the ships were to wait for Zhukov and

his accompanying delegation.

11 October again crowds of people crowded on the piers, ship's bands played, on the upper decks guests were fed buckwheat porridge with stew and flotsam macaroni. In the evening the song and dance ensemble of the Black Sea Fleet tapped their heels on the armored deck, dashing tap dancing, the chorus troubled the souls of the gathered "Katyusha" and "Kalinka". Flocks of Soviet sailors (one at a time) wandered the streets of the amazing fortress city.

On the evening of October 12, Comrade Yuri Sergeevich Bulanov, a desk officer of the Administrative Bodies Division of the CPSU Central Committee, boarded the cruiser Kuibyshev. He demanded a meeting with the ship's commander, Captain 1st Rank Mikhailin.

In the commander's cabin Bulanov showed his documents and asked to invite Rear Admiral Tyunyaev, the commander of the squadron of ships, to talk to him.

The admiral came in.

The civilian man from the Central Committee introduced himself in quite a military manner:

- Comrade Rear-Admiral, Bulanov, desk officer of the Administrative Bodies Division of the Central Committee of the CPSU. I have documents of special importance for you and for Captain 1st Rank Mikhailin.

Bulanov opened his leather briefcase, took out a flat metal box the size of a geographical atlas, and carefully opened it. Diplomatic couriers carry documents of extreme importance in such metal containers: in case of danger, a red lever is pulled, and all the contents instantly turn into a disgusting stinking mess.

The box contained two envelopes with addresses: "To Rear Admiral Tyunyaev A. N." and "To Captain 1st Rank Mikhailin V. V.".

- Comrade commanders, sign the envelopes, return them to me. The orders are top secret, you have the right to seal them, register them and deposit them in the secret part of the cruiser. This is your justification just in case: you were carrying out a written order of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union Bulganin, the First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union Malinovsky and the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Admiral Gorshkov. As stated in the documents presented to you, you must get in touch with Sevastopol, you have no right to get in touch with anyone else.

At night, the cruiser and two destroyer squadrons, following a written

order from the head of the government, first deputy defense minister and commander-in-chief of the Navy, dropped anchors and quietly departed into the darkness.

Without saying goodbye.

6

Having uncovered the Zhukov-Shtemenko-Mamsurov conspiracy, Khrushchev lured Lieutenant General Mamsurov to the Kremlin clinic, forced him to confess everything, listened attentively and let him go: go and work.

Khrushchev reasoned soberly: Mamsurov could report to Zhukov that the conspiracy had been uncovered, or not.

If he reports, Zhukov will be forced to immediately launch a coup. But if Zhukov seizes power, he will never forgive Mamsurov anyway.

If Mamsurov does not report to Zhukov, he still has hope to hold on to the heights he has managed to climb.

Conclusion: Mamsurov will not report the incident to Zhukov.

The calculation turned out to be accurate: Mamsurov had no reason to tell Zhukov that Khrushchev knew everything.

Having uncovered Zhukov's plot, Khrushchev began preparing a plot against Zhukov.

We know that Zhukov was boorish to anyone he considered below his rank. In 1957, Zhukov was very high up, so below his rank.

he considered everyone. That's why it can't be said that he had many enemies. He didn't. Zhukov didn't just have a lot of enemies. His enemies were everyone.

The entire Central Committee of the CPSU Central Committee was against Zhukov - after Zhukov declared that the tanks were subordinate only to him and no one else.

Against Zhukov was the entire Soviet Army and certainly the entire Navy. Zhukov managed to make enemies not only in the Soviet Army, but also in the Interior Ministry and the KGB. Zhukov tried to take these structures under his own control, the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB to subordinate the Soviet Army, that is, to himself, to appoint the heads of these departments of his people. KGB chief Serov knew this and was already working against Zhukov.

They will say: how could it be so? After all, the head of the GRU Colonel-General Shtemenko went to the alliance with Zhukov! Right, but he went for an alliance with Zhukov not because he strongly loved and respected the

Marshal of Victory, but because he was offended by Khrushchev, who had demoted Army General Shtemenko, a marshal without five minutes, to lieutenant-general and drove him to Siberia. The alliance with Zhukov was the only way for Lieutenant-General Shtemenko to return to his former heights.

And Mamsurov did not ally himself with Zhukov because of his great respect for him. In 1936, Mamsurov commanded a corps. Not just any corps, but the world's first subversive corps. And not in peacetime, but in the war in Spain. Mamsurov went through the entire war, received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, but in 1954 he still commanded the corps.

Zhukov promoted Mamsurov to the post of commander of the 38th Army, Zhukov got Mamsurov the post of first deputy chief of the GRU. And promised a bright future in case....

7

Having penetrated into Zhukov's plans, calculating the most likely timing of the coup plot, Khrushchev organized a visit of Zhukov to Yugoslavia with the hands of Ambassador Firyubin. And not a simple visit, but an unusually long one. And immediately after Yugoslavia, a visit to Albania. Equally long and intense.

The order to return to Sevastopol to the commander of the detachment of ships Rear Admiral Tyunyaev and the commander of the cruiser "Kuibyshev" Captain 1st Rank Mikhailin Khrushchev prepared without difficulty.

Zhukov hated Marshal Bulganin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Bulganin paid Zhukov in the same coin. Three months ago, Zhukov, saving Khrushchev (but above all - himself), overthrew Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich from the top of power, shaking the position of Bulganin. And just before Zhukov left Moscow for Sevastopol, Khrushchev came to the defeated Bulganin and said: now we are both against Zhukov!

Oh, that's good! Bulganin immediately signed an order to return the ships to Sevastopol.

The second signature on the order was given by Marshal Malinovsky, First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union. When in November 1942 the troops of Vatutin and Rokossovsky surrounded the German grouping near Stalingrad, Hitler ordered Manstein to break the encirclement and save Paulus's army. To stop Manstein, Stalin threw the 2nd Guards Army of Lieutenant General Malinovsky towards him. Malinovsky stopped Manstein, received the rank of Colonel-General for this, and 75 days later - General of the Army. And now Zhukov, who was not at Stalingrad at that time, declared

himself a hero of the Battle of Stalingrad. What was it like for the real heroes to hear about it!

In August 1945, Marshal Malinovsky of the Soviet Union performed a real miracle. German Major General von Mellenthin writes:

To illustrate the growing flexibility of the Red Army's combat operations and its ability to successfully conduct broad and rapid tank operations, I would like to point to Marshal Malinovsky's sensational advance into Manchuria in August 1945 (von Mellenthin F. W. Tank Battles. 1939-1945. M.: Publishing House of Foreign Literature, 1957. C. 249).

Malinovsky's dash to the ocean is a masterpiece of military art. Nothing like it and close to it Zhukov had never done in his life.

Zhukov was jealous of other people's glory. The relationship between Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov and his first deputy Marshal of the Soviet Union Malinovsky came to the point that Malinovsky went to Zhukov's report every time with a firm intention: if Zhukov punches him in the face, do not tolerate it, and in return give the "great strategist" himself a punch in the face (Georgy Zhukov. Transcript of the October (1957) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. C. 363).

Knowing about Zhukov's relationship with his first deputy (and with the rest of his subordinates), Khrushchev gave Malinovsky two papers to sign and immediately received these signatures - beautiful, energetic, sprawling.

The third signature under the order for the squad of ships to return to Sevastopol was put by Admiral Gorshkov. And here Khrushchev had no problem. Zhukov hated the Navy. The navy hated Zhukov.

Khrushchev only had to find a person who could be near Zhukov's delegation, without attracting attention neither by his high position nor by his high-sounding title, having the orders to return with him, and at the right moment to hand them over to the commander of the squadron of ships and the commander of the cruiser. The choice fell on the desk officer of the Administrative Bodies Division of the CPSU Central Committee.

The orders were prepared separately for the commander of the squadron of ships, separately for the commander of the cruiser. But they had to read the orders at the same time, being in the same room. If one had doubts, the other

would still follow the order.

Rear Admiral Tyunyaev, as instructed in the order, requested Sevastopol and received confirmation.

CHAPTER 17

1

12 October in Moscow from Yugoslavia sent a cipher:

Off the line.

Top secret.

To Comrade Khrushchev N. S.

At a luncheon on October 8 at the home of the Secretary of State for People's Defense of Yugoslavia, Gošnjak, speeches were made by Gošnjak and myself.

All Yugoslav newspapers published the texts of these speeches in full. Our Pravda confined itself to merely stating that Soviet Defense Minister G. K. Zhukov and Goshnyak, State Secretary for People's Defense of Yugoslavia, had exchanged speeches.

I believe that this attitude of the Soviet press toward my stay in Yugoslavia may be viewed unfavorably by the Yugoslav leading comrades and the public.

If the Central Committee of the CPSU considers it inexpedient to publish the speeches in full, I believe that they should have been announced at least in outline before my departure from Yugoslavia.

G. Zhukov (Georgy Zhukov. Transcript of the October (1957) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. C. 171).

2

The first stage of the plan: to lure Zhukov to Yugoslavia.

Phase Two: Bring home the ships that housed the Secretary of Defense's command post and communications center.

Late at night on October 12 from Sevastopol to Moscow reported: a detachment of ships went to sea.

Zhukov found himself in Yugoslavia without transportation to return home and with only one channel of communication: from the Soviet Embassy in Belgrade to the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This channel was closed to Comrade Firubin and serviced by an office headed by Comrade Serov.

Zhukov did not know that he found himself without means of command and communication and even without transportation to return to Moscow. Theoretically, Zhukov could buy an airplane ticket and, having made a connection in Budapest, fly to the Soviet Union. But here, the people of Comrade Serov, under whom Zhukov energetically and deeply dug, could, *prigodavshivayuschi* anything, Zhukov delayed. We know how to do it. But Zhukov made no such attempts, for he had not yet realized that he had fallen into a mousetrap.

Khrushchev knew that.

And this signaled the introduction of the third phase.

3

Khrushchev immediately flew to Kiev. There, at the grandiose exercises of the Kiev Military District, the entire top command staff of the Soviet Army gathered.

The first meeting was with the commander of the Kiev Military District, Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov. Two years ago, Khrushchev promoted Chuikov to the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union, although Chuikov was only a district commander. Khrushchev asked about the state of the troops, the process of combat training. Chuikov cheerfully answered. And suddenly:

- What's all this serious business with you, Vasil Ivanych?
- What's the matter?
- It has come to my attention that you have some problems here that you can't solve without Zhukov's presence. Can't you handle it?
- I'm doing fine, Nikita Sergeyich!
- Can you solve problems without Zhukov?
- We can do it! We can do it! We'll do our best!
- Do your best, Vassily Ivanovich.

High-frequency government communications are secure. No one can eavesdrop on it. No one except the KGB chairman, Comrade Serov, who is obliged to organize, ensure and guard this communication. As soon as Zhukov demanded that Serov be replaced by a person of his own choosing at the head of the KGB, all of Zhukov's telephones, in the

including high-frequency government telephones, were put under special control.

True, they had been listening quite intently up to that point.

Serov's interest is to take Zhukov down by Khrushchev's hands. Therefore, the most interesting of Zhukov's conversations immediately reported to Nikita Sergeevich. Khrushchev, having received a printout of Chuikov's warning to Zhukov, hinted Vasil Ivanovich that he has something to think about and correctly decide on which side to defect.

Sometimes it is useful for a manager to show his subordinates: I see everything, I know everything.

And the subordinates understand!

And they're trying to get better.

4

Next, Khrushchev had conversations with each of the marshals present. Individually. In a relaxed atmosphere.

The plan of the conversation is simple: Zhukov is great, his power is enormous. Now he will return from Yugoslavia and take power. And you, Sergei Semenovich Biryuzov (Andrei Ivanovich Eremenko, Ivan Stepanych Konev, Kirill Afanasyevich Meretskov, Kirill Semyonovich Moskalenko, Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky, Vasily Danilych Sokolovsky), will remain in his subordination. And I, Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, will not be around. I am a weak man, he will throw me out. It's not about me. What will it be like for you under his brilliant leadership?

5

Meanwhile, the Soviet press changed its tone in mentioning Zhukov. In Yugoslavia, Zhukov received newspapers the day after they were published. And the newspapers reported that Zhukov was in Yugoslavia, and arrived in neighboring Albania on October 17. And that was it.

Pravda correspondent Tkachenko reported to Moscow:

Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov in a conversation with me expressed sharp dissatisfaction with the fact that the Moscow newspapers gave

abridged dry materials about his stay in Yugoslavia (ibid. P. 177-178).

Do not try to imagine what the sharp dissatisfaction looked like when it

was expressed by Comrade Zhukov. It is impossible to imagine or describe. Colonel Makeyev, editor-in-chief of the Red Star, received a telegraphic beating from Zhukov and a promise to sort things out after his return from Albania. Makeev excused himself: Sputnik was in space, the world was rejoicing, there was not enough space in the newspaper.

In response, Zhukov exploded in a way that only he could explode. He sent ferocious orders to Moscow, but for some reason Moscow stopped responding. And then Zhukov sent Lieutenant General Kitaev in Dubrovnik so that Kitaev, using the communications center on the cruiser, swear not only the editor-in-chief of "Red Star", but also "Pravda". Zhukov is not just the Minister of Defense, he is first of all a member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee! Why does the main party newspaper put so little coverage of the visit? Where are the huge photos? Where are the full-page articles?

6

Khrushchev personally talked not only with every Marshal of the Soviet Union, but also with the commanders of troops of all military districts. The meetings were one-on-one only. The plan of conversations is simple and short: in front of each general Khrushchev drew the following picture: I will leave, I can not cope with Zhukov, you stay under his command. How do you rate the prospect?

On October 17, 1957, a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee was held, during which the question of Zhukov's leadership style was considered.

Comrade Kirichenko said: we are connected with the leadership of the army only through one person, through Zhukov.

Comrade Furtseva: the liquidation of the Military Councils is an aspiration to unlimited power.

Comrade Khrushchev: we will raise the question not of Zhukov, but of strengthening party work, and no one will dare to object.

It was decided to prepare a Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On the Improvement of Party and Political Work in the Soviet Army and the

Fleet."

On October 19, a new meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee was held. A resolution on the improvement of party-political work

was adopted and sent to the troops. At the same meeting it was decided to hold on October 22-23 a meeting of party activists in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and other cities where the headquarters of military districts and fleets were located. The speakers at these meetings were to be members of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee Khrushchev, Kozlov, Mikoyan, Brezhnev and other comrades.

7

On the evening of October 19, Lieutenant-General Kitaev drove from Dubrovnik to Tirana, the capital of Albania.

Here Zhukov was received by the Albanian Minister of Defense, Colonel General Bekir Baluku. The official part had long since ended and had smoothly degenerated into a friendly army drinking party.

A pale General Kitaev took Zhukov aside:

- There are no cruisers or destroyers in Dubrovnik.
- How not?

CHAPTER 18

1

On October 22 and 23, a wave of meetings of party activists of military districts swept across the Soviet Union.

The day begins in the Far East when Moscow has just gone to bed. So the very first meeting is at the headquarters of the Far Eastern Military District in Khabarovsk. In the District House of Officers gathered the commander of the troops of the district, Colonel-General VA. Penkovsky, his deputies, chief of staff of the district, chiefs of staff departments, commanders of armies, their deputies and chiefs of staff, commanders of corps, divisions, brigades and regiments with their deputies and chiefs of staff, military commissars of regions and territories, military prosecutors, members of military councils of the district and armies, deputy police officers of corps, divisions, brigades, regiments, editor of the district newspaper "Suvorov's Onslaught", other persons controlling a huge mass of troops. In all, 880 officers and generals sat in the hall.

The report was made by Lieutenant General Leonid Brezhnev, a member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, who arrived from Moscow. The subject of the report was "On the improvement of party-political work in the Soviet Army and Navy".

Since then, it has been generally believed that Zhukov did not prepare any conspiracy, no evidence of conspiracy preparation was not presented, the great commander was removed simply because he underestimated the party chatter.

But let's look at the same events from a different angle.

First of all, in the Soviet Union, things, especially serious ones, were not called by their proper names.

In aviation and astronautics, we have never had a catastrophe. There have been emergencies.

We did not have radioactive exposure of military personnel and civilians. We had fumigation. That's how they wrote in the documents: got under fumigation. And radiation sickness was called by some abstruse medical term - for example, in the members of the

of the crew of the nuclear submarine K-19, who suffered in the nuclear reactor accident in 1961, for the sake of secrecy, the official diagnosis was not "radiation sickness" but "astheno-vegetative syndrome".

Our convicts in Kolyma didn't mine gold. They mined metal. It was not specified in any documents.

The press talked about missiles and nuclear charges when they denounced the enemy and glorified our power. But when it came to specific missiles and specific charges, it turned out that we did not have them at all. They were not listed in any top secret documents. Instead, there were "products" and "special charges".

And there was no assassination of the legitimate leadership of Afghanistan and no invasion of that country by Soviet troops in 1979. There was only noble and heroic fulfillment of international duty. And they didn't bring home zinc coffins from Afghanistan. Cargo 200 was. Regularly.

We are told: the reason for Zhukov's expulsion was just some stupid underestimation of party-political chatter. We will not argue with this, but, without losing sight of "fumigation", "products" and "instances", let us try to figure out what this strange formulation actually hid behind it.

And let us imagine together: could the Communist Party have informed thousands of officers and generals, that is, the whole world, two weeks before the 40th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, that one of the leaders of the Soviet Union had almost wrested all power from the hands of this party. And he has already succeeded in this endeavor to a great extent.

And another thing. Citizens of men, confirm: if your wife is not satisfied in some very important matter, will she reproach you openly and directly? She, the viper, will nag and nag about nothing. So do you really think that our dear and wise Communist Party was worse than your wife?

2

In the North Caucasus Military District, 875 officers and generals attended a meeting of the Party activists. Comrade Mikoyan, a member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, who arrived from Moscow, made a report.

He told the audience that Comrade Zhukov slightly underestimates party-political work, and in general, Comrade Zhukov has been very bad lately. Those present unanimously agreed. That Zhukov skid, they felt on their own skins. That same day, Comrade Mikoyan left for the Odessa Military District to make a report to the generals and officers the next day.

In Kuibyshev, 1,250 officers and generals gathered in the Officers' House of the Volga Military District. The report was read by Comrade Belyaev, a

member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee.

In Leningrad, the activists were assembled in the Assembly Hall of the Smolny. Comrade Kozlov, a member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, made a report.

But the main meeting was held in the Grand Kremlin Palace. Here the party activists of the Ministry of Defense, the Moscow Military District, and the Moscow Air Defense District were gathered. Comrade Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, made a great report. He said in particular:

We learned that it had been decided to organize a school of saboteurs of more than 2,000 people. This school was to take people with secondary education, who had completed military service, for 6-7 years. Soldiers would be paid 700 rubles in addition to their allowance, sergeants 1,000 rubles. And most importantly, no decision was made by the Central Committee, this issue was not submitted to the Central Committee. Lieutenant General Mamsurov was appointed head of the school. Mamsurov started to form this school, but he apparently had doubts. He came to the Central Committee and said that always the Central Committee had approved him, and this appointment was not known to anyone. Only three people should know, Comrades Zhukov, Shtemenko and Mamsurov. Shtemenko did not do well. As a Communist he should have told us. Calm down. Saboteurs. Hell knows what kind of saboteurs, what kind of sabotage they will do. (Laughter in the hall) (Georgy Zhukov. Transcript of the October (1957) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. C. 217-218).

Two thousand generals and officers of the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, the central departments of the Ministry of Defense and the main departments of the General Staff, the leadership of the Moscow Military District and the Moscow Air Defense District, military academies and other institutions interrupted Comrade Khrushchev's report with tumultuous applause, and the same tumultuous applause escorted him from the podium.

3

On the night of October 22-23, a cipher went from Moscow to Tirana: the director ordered the navigator to urgently inform the guest: there was an activity of the Ministry of Defense, should immediately return to Moscow [\[19\]](#).

4

During the night, Zhukov was awakened by a man in civilian clothes - the first secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Albania. The man briefly introduced himself:

- GRU resident Colonel Polishchuk. Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union, the chief of the GRU, Colonel-General Shtemenko, has reported that a meeting of the party activists of the Ministry of Defense has been held in Moscow. You should return to Moscow immediately.

5

In the early morning of October 23, Lieutenant General Kitaev, a general for special assignments under the Minister of Defense, sent a request from Tirana to the Ministry of Defense in Moscow: send a plane urgently.

The answer came by evening: the plane would arrive tomorrow. On October 24, it was reported that the plane was delayed and would arrive on October 26.

On the same day Lieutenant-General Kitaev sent an order to his deputy in Moscow:

Major General Kolobov. Marshal ordered to prepare and report to him on arrival at the airfield on 26.10.57 the following materials:

1. List of the most important decisions of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU concerning the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defense adopted in the

his absence.

2. A list and summary of major emergency incidents and the actions taken on them.

3. Synopsis of a Defense Department party activist meeting held with a history of the issue.

In addition, please prepare him the next TASS [\[20\]](#) and a summary of the most important TASS responses related to his trip.

Lieutenant General Kitaev. 24.10.57 (Georgy Zhukov. Transcript of the October (1957) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. C. 658).

6

Major-General Kolobov, as ordered, immediately passed a copy of the order to the First Deputy Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union Malinovsky. Malinovsky rushed to the Kremlin to report to Khrushchev.

Khrushchev summoned Comrade Malin, head of the General Department of the CPSU Central Committee, and ordered him to reproduce Lieutenant General Kitaev's order and distribute it to members and candidates to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee.

Lieutenant General Kitaev's order contained a very strange third paragraph, which inevitably raised the question: how did Zhukov know about the meeting of party activists of the Ministry of Defense?

7

October 25, 1957.

Top secret.

П120/16

On the convocation of the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

To convene a plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on October 28 this year at 10 a.m.

To put the issue of improving party-political work in the Soviet Army and Navy up for discussion at the plenum.

Secretary of the Central Committee

(Ibid. p. 224.)

Key point

In the Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On Improving Party Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy" of October 19, 1957 one can find a lot of things that are not interesting to read, let alone retell. But after a lot of empty phrases at the very end of the decree contained the main thing:

In order to strengthen party control over the selection and placement of leadership and military personnel, to expand the list of positions of command and political workers approved by the CPSU Central Committee (ibid. P. 188).

This is the accusation against Zhukov. However, the accusation is expressed in such a way that only those who are supposed to understand can understand it.

Zhukov removed someone and appointed someone without asking the permission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The big bosses were given to understand that in this matter will be put in complete order. Party control over the selection and placement of personnel will be strengthened. The list of positions to which appointments are made only by decision of the Central Committee will be expanded. No one will be allowed to interfere in the delicate issues of selection and placement of personnel.

And the one who allowed such liberties will now get a slap on the neck. However, they will only accuse him of not paying enough attention to party-political chatter.

CHAPTER 19

1

The TASS report of Zhukov's return to Moscow was noticeably shorter than the TASS report of Zhukov leaving for Yugoslavia on a visit:

*Departure from Albania of Marshal G. K. Zhukov
Tirana. October 26. (TASS) Today Marshal G. K. Zhukov left Tirana for his homeland.
The same day Marshal Zhukov returned to Moscow.*

He who had a tendency to pay attention to the little things paid attention to them.

One. Zhukov's official title is Marshal of the Soviet Union. This is what he was called at the time when he left on a visit to Yugoslavia. It is possible to call him simply Marshal, but it would be a violation of state and military etiquette. Such a title carries a considerable amount of disrespect.

Second. The TASS report did not name Zhukov as defense minister.

2

October 26, 1957. At Moscow's Central Aerodrome, a cold wind dried the puddles of yesterday's rain. Chilly after the blissful Adriatic.

The plane taxied to where the red carpet should be. But the meeting was strange. No orchestra, no red carpet, no honor guard. And the group of officials is pathetic.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Konev, throwing his hand to his visor, reports that Zhukov must urgently arrive in the Kremlin.

- Right now?

- Right now.

Zhukov's daughter Era rushes to his neck, hugs, whispers in his ear: there is an important message.

Zhukov - Konev: now I will go home, change clothes and come.

Konev glances at his daughter. If he could, he'd burn her.

3

In the car, Era Zhukova informs her father that something strange is happening, some rumors are wandering around Moscow, nothing is clear, but clearly someone is up to something.

Zhukov himself realizes that something strange is happening. His soul is boiling with rage. Now he will give them all a good time! Now he will pay them back!

In an apartment on Granovsky Street, Zhukov grabs the telephone receiver. Zhukov calls the head of the GRU, Colonel-General Shtemenko.

Phone's not answering.

Zhukov calls the first deputy chief of the GRU, Lieutenant General Mamsurov.

But this phone is silent, too.

Zhukov calls his longtime buddy KGB Chairman Army General Serov:

- Vanya, what happened here?

Serov is surprised:

- Zhora, nothing happened. I'm going hunting on Sunday, to shoot quail. Apart from that, nothing special.

Zhukov hurried to the Kremlin. He got into the car, and as soon as the car started, the government telephone in Zhukov's apartment rang slightly audibly. His daughter picked up the receiver. In the tube - dead silence. Government communication in Zhukov's apartment turned off (Zhukovy Era and Ella. Marshal of Victory. Memories and reflections. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1996).

4

From the Central airfield reported: the plane landed, Zhukov stepped down the ramp. The plane was driven to the parking lot.

Khrushchev hung up the phone and declared the meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee open. There were ten different issues on the agenda. In the minutes of the meeting, the issues to be decided were marked with Roman characters

with figures. A decision was made on five questions when Zhukov entered. Khrushchev invited him to sit down. The discussion continued. Decisions were made on the fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth questions.

The ninth was Zhukov's report on his trip to Yugoslavia and Albania. Khrushchev suggested reporting on the results of the trip. Zhukov reported. It was decided:

October 26, 1957.

Strictly Secret P 121/IX

To consider the trip of t. Zhukov's trip will be useful for the rapprochement of the Soviet people with the Yugoslav and Albanian peoples.

To note the hasty and not quite correct conclusions of Mr. Zhukov in assessing the situation in Yugoslavia. Zhukov in his assessment of the situation in Yugoslavia. Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee N. Khrushchev

(Georgy Zhukov. Transcript of the October (1957) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. C. 225.)

Having adopted the ninth decision, we proceeded to the tenth. There was no transcript of the meeting. There is only a protocol record, which only notes who spoke and what they said. But we will never know what the speakers said.

After discussion of the tenth question, another decision was taken:

October 26, 1957.

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1. Release t. G. K. Zhukov from the duties of the USSR Minister of Defense.

2. To appoint Mr. Malinovsky R. Y. Minister of Defense of the USSR. Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee N. Khrushchev (Ibid. p. 227.)

5

27. October 1957 - Sunday. Army General Serov, chairman of the KGB, went hunting to shoot quail. And maybe some more

someone. At least that's what he said: hunting. Where he was that day, I don't know.

On October 27, Colonel General Shtemenko was demoted to lieutenant general. A day earlier, he had been removed from the post of GRU chief. This was the first issue considered at the meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee the day before.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov decided to turn in his files that day.

But he was not allowed into the Ministry of Defense. Lieutenant General Kitaev said that Zhukov should hand over the keys to his personal safes, the contents of the safes will be accepted by a special commission. Personal belongings will be returned to the Marshal in the coming days.

6

On Monday, October 28, the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee opened in the Kremlin. Comrade Suslov, a member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, made a report:

The facts testify to the tendency of t. Zhukov's tendency to unlimited power. Recently Mr. Zhukov proposed to replace the Chairman of the State Security Committee and the Minister of Internal Affairs with military officers. Zhukov proposed to replace the Chairman of the State Security Committee and the Minister of the Interior with military officers. What dictated this proposal? Is it not in order to head the leading posts in these organs with his own people, cadres on the basis of personal loyalty? Is it not a desire to establish its control over the State Security Committee and the Ministry of Internal Affairs? (Ibid. p. 244.)

Suslov revealed that Zhukov had forbidden all servicemen, including the head of the Main Political Department, which officially acts as a department of the CPSU Central Committee, to contact the CPSU Central Committee.

Comrade. Zhukov ignores the Central Committee. Recently, the Presidium of the Central Committee has learned that Comrade Zhukov, without his knowledge

The Central Committee decided to create a school, like a school of saboteurs - that's what it was called, with a contingent of over two thousand people. The school was put in special, amazing conditions. Comrade Zhukov did not even consider it necessary to inform the Central Committee about this school.

But General Mamsurov, as a Communist, considered it his duty to inform the Central Committee about this illegal action of the Minister.

At the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Zhukov explained that the saboteur school was nothing special. There were separate special-purpose companies in the Soviet Army, and they were brought together:

We had 17 companies scattered all over the districts. Since this work in the districts could not be carried out with special sensitivity, with the preservation of military secrecy, and military languages were not taught there, I decided to bring these 17 companies together in one place and organize a school. Indeed, I believed that it was necessary to have not fixed-term, but supernumerary service (ibid. P. 261).

Any military interpreter knows that if a prisoner lies during interrogation, his attention is focused on the most important thing. He pays little or no attention to secondary details. That's why he talks.

Here is a classic confirmation of this rule: Zhukov gathered all the saboteurs in one place for the sake of teaching them "military languages".

Military languages? What's that? It's a lie indicator.

Zhukov also gathered all the saboteurs together for the sake of military secrecy. Yes, the saboteurs were gathered under the unified command of Mamsurov, but not at all in one place. Separate units of the GRU's TsON were located in Tambov, Kursk, Voronezh, Alabino and other places. So the argument that for the sake of conspiracy 17 companies were gathered in one place is false.

Zhukov's excuses are full of inconsistencies. There were 17 separate special-purpose companies, in which soldiers served

and enlisted sergeants. They served for three years each.

Mamsurov's sabotage organization was staffed by conscripts. But it is possible to bring 17 companies, which are staffed by conscripts and sergeants, under unified control, but it is impossible to turn conscripts and sergeants into super conscripts at a moment's notice.

A super enlisted man, as the name implies, is someone who has served his term. How could Zhukov turn ordinary soldiers and sergeants into overstayers if they had not yet served their term?

An enlisted man is a volunteer. There are relatively few such volunteers

among soldiers and sergeants. How could it happen that 17 companies were gathered under the unified leadership of the GRU Central Command, and all the soldiers and sergeants suddenly enlisted as overstayers?

Zhukov's lies were immediately exposed by his former first deputy and now Minister of Defense, Marshal Malinovsky of the Soviet Union:

He says it's an innocent affair, there were companies of saboteurs in all the districts, and here these 17 companies were brought together. It was nothing of the sort. For this school was ordered to find the necessary number of personnel in addition to those 17 companies that were in the districts (ibid. P. 368).

Key point

There is a point that needs to be clarified in the matter of the GRU Special Purpose Center, which in the course of the altercation between the leaders and subsequent publications was mildly referred to as a school of saboteurs.

Zhukov twice reported on this school to Khrushchev. About this Zhukov said and from the rostrum of the plenum, and Khrushchev remained silent, did not object to him, thus confirming the truthfulness of the words of the Marshal (Naumov VP "Case" Marshal G. K. Zhukov. 1957. New and Modern History. Moscow: Nauka, 2000. № 6. C. 85).

In the title of a series of articles by the serious historian Naumov, "case" is taken in quotation marks. The very title of the series of articles makes it clear: there was no "case", Marshal of Victory was slandered!

This series of articles was published in the Journal of the Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The cover of the journal bears all these titles: Institute, Academy. At the bottom is also the name of the publisher: "Nauka". In short, here it is, the real history! To add scientific weight, the editors placed a series of articles by Naumov in the section "On declassified archival materials". And we believe it.

And having believed it, let's take it and check it out. Let's open those very

declassified archival materials and read what Zhukov said in his defense, and try to understand why Khrushchev did not dare to respond to the truthful words of the Marshal of Victory.

Zhukov stated at the plenum:

I told Comrade Khrushchev twice: Comrade Khrushchev, we have conceived such an organization, I will report to you on this case. I reported twice, but I did not report, because the circumstances were such that it was impossible to report (Georgy Zhukov. Transcript of the October (1957) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. C. 261).

No kidding! It's in the transcript: TWO REPORTS, BUT NO REPORTING!

And further, *"I consider it my mistake."*

That's a confession!!!

And now the Russian Academy of Sciences reports on the pages of its scientific edition: Zhukov reported twice! And Khrushchev did not object! Thus Khrushchev confirmed the truthfulness of the words of the great commander!

The discoveries of the serious historian Naumov immediately entered into circulation and into the treasury of our knowledge about the deeds of almost St. George. In the scientific environment Naumov's discoveries are often retold: Zhukov reported twice! There was no "deed"! These discoveries are immediately quoted by other authors, including foreign ones: twice

reported! Khrushchev by his silence confirmed the truthfulness of the outstanding strategist!

It turns out that poor Zhukov organized a secret subversive military unit with absolutely unbelievable conditions of service of soldiers. For more than three months Zhukov found time to boor everyone around him, including Khrushchev, including publicly. But the circumstances were such that it was not possible to report. And historian Naumov continues:

The position of head of the school had not yet been introduced into the nomenclature of the CPSU Central Committee. General Mamsurov, who had

been appointed to this position, applied to the Central Committee department, where he apparently could not get any clear explanations.

There is an order: first pay at the store cash register, then go outside.

There is an order: first enter a position in the nomenclature of the Central Committee, then appoint someone to that position.

It turns out that Zhukov appointed Lieutenant General Mamsurov to a position that is not listed anywhere, that does not exist. It turns out that Zhukov simply humanly forgot to establish such a post.

But he did not forget to appoint the first deputy chief of the GRU to it. And no one is confused by the strange fact that the school of saboteurs, where two thousand soldiers and sergeants were trained, was commanded not by a lieutenant colonel or a colonel, but by a lieutenant general, and not just any lieutenant, but the first deputy chief of the GRU.

And why was Mamsurov in charge of a school on a part-time basis? Didn't he have enough on his plate as first deputy chief of the GRU? Two thousand men is a regiment. Put a lieutenant colonel in charge of the regiment. If he does well, make him a colonel. Or was there no lieutenant colonel in the Soviet Army for such a job?

And our scholars are not surprised by the strange behavior of Zhukov, who declared that *"super enlisted men have lost their role in the Armed Forces,"* who ordered a drastic reduction in their number in the Soviet Army, who canceled the recruitment of super enlisted men for long periods of time.

In addition, he immediately formed a secret sabotage structure, which was staffed exclusively with super enlisted men, and for a long period of time. This was contrary to the Regulation on the passage of overtime service, which Zhukov himself in March 1956 submitted to the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the approval of which he achieved.

Serious historians urge me to write books only on the basis of declassified archival documents. I heeded the advice and write "on the basis of". At the same time, I demonstrate how serious historians use this support to distort our understanding of the past.

CHAPTER 20

1

Found defenders and the head of the GRU. Here is how Lieutenant General I. Potapov tells about Shtemenko:

He joined the General Staff as a major after the Academy of Armored Forces and rose to General of the Army, Chief of the General Staff. He was Antonov's right-hand man, he never went anywhere without him.... (Krasnaya Zvezda. February 11, 2006).

That's the way it was. Indeed, Shtemenko is a clever man, a walking encyclopedia. Listen to what happened next:

Shtemenko started to form special-purpose brigades, the same brigades that we later landed in Afghanistan, but he did not know that this had to be reported to the General Staff. So they "snitched" on him, and as a result he was demoted to lieutenant general (Krasnaya Zvezda. February 11, 2006).

Objection. First of all, Shtemenko did not form any brigades. He formed one Special Purpose Center, which was called a school for disguise. The GRU Special Operations Center has nothing in common with the brigades that later fought in Afghanistan, even in name. The difference is even terminological: in Afghanistan fought units of special, but not special purpose. But the name is not the point.

In Afghanistan, soldiers and non-commissioned officers in SPN units fought as privates and sergeants, who, like everyone else, were drafted under the Law on Universal Military Duty. And Shtemenko, on Zhukov's orders, formed a sabotage center, in which mercenaries served under contract, receiving salaries comparable to those of officers, if not exceeding them. And not

There was such an SPN brigade in Afghanistan that would have been commanded by the first deputy chief of the GRU with the epaulettes of a

lieutenant general on his shoulders. So let us not confuse the sinful with the righteous.

Lieutenant General Potapov presents Shtemenko as an intelligent man, which corresponds to reality, but immediately makes a fool of him: Deputy Chief of the General Staff Colonel General Shtemenko, himself a former Chief of the General Staff, did not know that the creation of any new military formation must be reported to the Chief of the General Staff.

Anyone can be imagined to be a complete moron, but not to this extent!

The chain of command in the fall of 1957 was as follows:

1. The Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov.
2. Chief of the General Staff Marshal of the Soviet Union Sokolovsky.
3. Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Chief of the GRU, Colonel General Shtemenko.

Something was going on that Defense Minister Zhukov and Deputy Chief of the General Staff Shtemenko knew about, but they forgot to tell Chief of the General Staff Sokolovsky, who is the head of the "brain of the army," about their secret. The Deputy Chief of the General Staff did not realize to inform his direct and immediate superior about his actions.

So: independent formation of any military units, be it a construction or repair company, is categorically forbidden. All the more so - secret formation.

GRU is the 2nd Main Directorate of the General Staff, that is, one of the subdivisions of the General Staff, an organic part of it. As part of the GRU, that is, as part of the General Staff is created UNC, but the Chief of the General Staff knew nothing about it. Zhukov acted through the head of the Chief of the General Staff, giving orders to his deputy, Colonel-General Shtemenko. If this is not a conspiracy, what is?

For such actions, both Zhukov and Shtemenko could well get a criminal offense. But it was extremely unprofitable for Khrushchev to draw the attention of the country and the world to the sad fact that a military coup was really being prepared in the Soviet Union.

2

In October 1957, not only those marshals, generals and admirals who were members or candidates for membership in the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Revision Commission were invited to the plenum of the Central Committee, but also 60 marshals, generals and admirals who were not candidates for membership or members of the Central Committee or the Central Revision Commission.

Eighty people signed up to speak. In addition to Zhukov himself, 26

people spoke at the plenum - 10 civilians (some of them, such as Brezhnev, Khrushchev and Ustinov, had military ranks) and 16 military men. After that, the debate was terminated. Everything was clear.

The tone at the plenum was set not by party bosses, as they sometimes want to present it, but by combat commanders, nine of whom were neither members of the Central Committee nor even candidates for membership in the Central Committee.

Marshals of the Soviet Union Biryuzov, Eremenko, Konev, Malinovsky, Rokossovsky, Sokolovsky, Timoshenko, and Chuikov sharply opposed Zhukov. Besides them, Marshals of the Soviet Union Bulganin, Baghramyan, Meretskov, Moskalenko signed up to speak. There was no need to guess what they were preparing to speak about: after the debate had stopped, all those present unanimously voted against Zhukov.

In addition to Zhukov himself, twelve Marshals of the Soviet Union were present at the plenum. All of them opposed Zhukov. The plenum was absent three Marshals of the Soviet Union - Budyonny, Voroshilov and Vasilevsky. It is not difficult to calculate what position these Marshals took, if they were in the meeting room. For example, Vasilevsky, his first deputy and relative (Vasilevsky's son Yuri was married to Zhukov's daughter Era), Zhukov forced out of the Soviet Army, "in a friendly way" advised to leave [\[21\]](#).

Maybe the marshals were afraid of Khrushchev? No. These men were not the fearful type. All of them had gone through not only the war, but also the school of Stalin's management of the country and the army. After the war, Stalin planned to try Zhukov for criminal offenses, but it was these marshals and generals who unanimously opposed. Then they saved Zhukov from a well-deserved punishment.

They were not afraid of Khrushchev. Khrushchev in 1957 was connected to the power by a thin thread. If they wanted to, these marshals and generals could have not only Zhukov, but also Khrushchev himself. But Zhukov had pissed everyone off so much that it was all about him.

In addition to marshals against Zhukov were Army Generals Zakharov, Luchinsky, Batov, Kazakov, Admiral Gorshkov, Colonel-General Zheltov, Lieutenant-General Alexandrov, Rear Admiral Torik. Chief Air Marshal Zhigarev, Air Marshals Vershinin and Sudets, Army Generals Galitsky, Gorbato, Krylov, Malinin, Colonel Generals Penkovsky, Radzievsky, Getmansk, Radzievsky, and Getmansk had signed up to speak, but did not have time to speak, Radzievsky, Getman, Kuznetsov, Lelyushenko,

Stepchenko, Admiral Kharlamov, Lieutenant Generals Lisitsyn, Nachinkin, Tsibenko, Efimov, Vice-Admiral Komarov, Major Generals Egorov and Lukashin. All those who did not have time to speak submitted individual or collective notes to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, stating that they all sharply condemned Zhukov's actions.

The condemnation of Zhukov was universal. And not only at the plenum of the Central Committee. Before that, as we remember, there were meetings of party activists of the Ministry of Defense, military districts and fleets, which were attended by a total of more than 13 thousand officers, generals and admirals. The discussion of Zhukov's actions involved virtually the entire top command staff of the Soviet Army.

And the entire top command staff of the Soviet Army spoke out against the arbitrariness, lawlessness and autocratic behavior of the untalented commander.

3

The course of the vote to remove Zhukov from all leadership positions is described in the transcript of the plenum coldly and with ruthless punctuality.

October 29, 1957.

Evening session [of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. - Author's note].

Comrades Zhukov and Khrushchev spoke at the evening session.

Mr. Khrushchev presiding. There is a proposal to end the debate. 27 comrades have spoken, 80 have signed up. No objections?

Voices. No.

Mr. Khrushchev presiding. There is such a proposal: now to resolve the issue of withdrawal of Mr. Zhukov from the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee and from the membership of the Central Committee. Let's solve this issue, and then we'll talk about the resolution. No objections? No.

How shall we vote - together on the withdrawal from the Presidium of the Central Committee and from the membership of the Central Committee, or separately?

Voices. Let's separate.

Presiding Mr. Khrushchev. Members of the CPSU Central Committee are voting. Those in favor of removing Mr. Zhukov from the Presidium of the Central Committee, please raise your hands. I ask you to lower your hands.

Who is against? None. Who abstained? None. Adopted unanimously.

Now the candidates to the CPSU Central Committee vote in the same order. Those in favor of removing Mr. Zhukov from the Presidium of the Central Committee, please raise your hands. I ask you to lower your hands. Those against? None. Who abstained? None. Adopted unanimously.

The members of the Central Revision Commission are voting. Those in favor of removing Comrade Zhukov from the Presidium of the Central Committee, please raise your hands. I ask you to lower your hands. Who is against? None. Who abstained? None. Adopted unanimously.

Perhaps we should ask the comrades invited to the plenum who are not members of the Central Committee - the commanders of districts, armies, fleets, members of military councils, all the Communists who have been invited. Who is in favor of removing Comrade Zhukov from the Presidium of the Central Committee, please raise your hands. I ask you to lower your hands. Who is against? None. Who abstained? None. Adopted unanimously.

The following proposal to remove Comrade Zhukov from the CPSU Central Committee. Members of the Central Committee are voting. Those in favor of removing Mr. Zhukov from the CPSU Central Committee, please raise your hands. I ask you to lower your hands. Those against? None. Who abstained? None. Adopted unanimously.

Candidates for Central Committee members are voting. Those in favor of removing Mr. Zhukov from the Central Committee, please raise your hands. I ask you to lower your hands. Those against? None. Who abstained? None. Adopted unanimously.

The members of the Central Revision Commission are voting. Those in favor of removing Comrade Zhukov from the CPSU Central Committee, please raise your hands. Please lower your hands. Those against? None. Who abstained? None. Adopted unanimously.

All those invited to vote. Those in favor of removing Mr. Zhukov from the Central Committee, please raise your hands. I ask you to lower your hands. Those against? None. Who abstained? None. Adopted unanimously.

(Tov. Zhukov left the room.)

(Georgy Zhukov. Transcript of the October (1957) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. C. 233.)

source of information that allowed to reveal the conspiracy Zhukov, Khrushchev launched into circulation at once two versions of the events that occurred.

First: Lieutenant General Mamsurov came to the Central Committee and told them that he had received a strange appointment as head of the GRU Special Purpose Center.

The second version: Lieutenant General Mamsurov did not come to the Central Committee, but shared his doubts about the GRU Special Purpose Center with Lieutenant General Tumanyan, who was distantly related to Anastas Mikoyan, a member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. Tumanyan allegedly told Mikoyan about it.

Mikoyan is a cunning fox. He was a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks from 1935 to 1966 (let me remind you that from 1952 to 1966 the Politburo was called the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, remaining the governing body of the CPSU Central Committee, which determined the policy of the party and the state). And in the Central Committee, breaking all records, Mikoyan lasted more than half a century - from 1922 to 1976.

From Lenin to Brezhnev.

From Ilyich to Ilyich without heart attack and paralysis.

Mikoyan allegedly reported to Khrushchev, then Khrushchev allegedly summoned Mamsurov, and the latter, as an honest Communist should, told everything in good faith.

So, two versions.

First: Mamsurov voluntarily came and told everything.

Second: Mamsurov expressed doubt in the legality of Zhukov's actions, and expressed this doubt in words that reached Khrushchev. That is, Mamsurov confessed as if almost voluntarily.

Both these versions do not stand the test of logic. If Mamsurov came voluntarily or almost voluntarily, why did Khrushchev need to reveal the source of his knowledge? Nikita, before the giddiness of success, was not a fool. His interest was to make a fog, to show himself omniscient, without giving away the sources of his awareness: I see everything! I know everything!

Instead, Khrushchev publicly pointed his royal finger at Mamsurov: here he is, a snitch. In this way, Khrushchev discouraged potential snitches from snitching: tell Khrushchev, he will turn you in.

Why did Khrushchev publicly reprimand a volunteer or almost volunteer? Why publicly shame the snitch? Because Mamsurov was not a volunteer. He was caught. And Khrushchev at the plenum of the Central Committee in front of hundreds of party and military leaders "lowered" him. Khrushchev publicly reprimanded Mamsurov as a petty schoolboy: here he is, a snitch, admire him.

The fact that the recognition was neither voluntary nor almost voluntary is also evidenced by the second fact: the rank of Colonel-General Mamsurov was conferred on April 27, 1962.

Mamsurov had commanded the 38th Army since 1955.

The position of an army commander is a career "fork": one can leave such a military commander as a lieutenant general, or for special merits one can give him the rank of colonel general. In 1956, the 38th Army distinguished itself in Hungary. Then Khrushchev did not give Mamsurov the rank, but instead awarded him a high military order.

Since 1957, Mamsurov has been the first deputy chief of the GRU. The deputy chief of the GRU, especially the first, is a position of a colonel-general. Let's assume that in June 1957 Mamsurov voluntarily came to Khrushchev and confessed sincerely. That is - he saved Khrushchev. In this case, he should have been awarded!

Let's assume that Mamsurov showed up almost voluntarily: he shared his doubts with his old comrade-in-arms, and it reached Khrushchev. But even in this case it is necessary to reward! At least in order to entice the future saviors with a honey carrot.

Khrushchev didn't spare military ranks. Khrushchev gave more marshal ranks in peacetime than Stalin did in war. But it's not even a question of an award. Mamsurov held a high position, so at least give him a rank that corresponds to this position.

But Mamsurov remained a lieutenant-general for almost five more years after 1957, until he received the rank he was entitled to in accordance with his position. Not only did Khrushchev not reward Mamsurov, but he did not give him what he was entitled to for a long time!

And this indicates a complete lack of gratitude on Khrushchev's part.

This precludes the voluntary or near-voluntary nature of their cooperation.

But then why did Khrushchev not remove Mamsurov if he was a participant in the conspiracy? Why did he leave him in such a high position?

O! That's a wise decision.

First, Khrushchev disgraced Mamsurov in his party-military circle, and then left him in a responsible position, clearly understanding that from now on

Mamsurov was his man and nobody else's. After Mamsurov was publicly declared a snitch, no one would ever have a conversation with him on slippery topics again.

And so it happened. Mamsurov continued to serve, but no longer took part in any conspiracies. He could not get rid of his reputation as a snitch either during his life or after his death, and his career growth stopped.

Judge for yourself. In 1956, two Soviet armies entered Hungary - the 8th Mechanized Army of Lieutenant General of Tank Troops Babajanyan and the 38th of Lieutenant General Mamsurov. Subsequently, Babajanyan rose to the head of tank forces of the Soviet Army, successively received the rank of Colonel-General of Tank Forces, Marshal of Armored Forces and Chief Marshal of Armored Forces. But he did not save Khrushchev from death.

In Hungary, Lieutenant-General Lashchenko commanded the Special Corps. Lashchenko did not save Khrushchev from death either, but he also surpassed Mamsurov, receiving the third and then the fourth star on his epaulettes, rising to the position of First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces.

And for Colonel-General Mamsurov, the position of the first deputy chief of the GRU turned out to be his last.

5

Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov took part in a conspiracy against Marshal of the Soviet Union Beria, a member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Minister of Internal Affairs, and personally arrested Beria.

Using his position as Minister of Defense, Zhukov dismissed Marshals of the Soviet Union Vasilevsky, Biryuzov, Baghramyan, and Admiral of the Soviet Union Fleet Kuznetsov.

By threatening to use Soviet Army tanks, Zhukov personally staged a coup d'état, overthrowing the collective leadership of the country that had emerged after Stalin. Zhukov removed the majority of the country's leaders from power, installing a minority in power, led by Khrushchev, who held a position not provided for in the Communist Party Charter.

Among those overthrown by Zhukov were two former heads of government of the Soviet Union, Molotov and Malenkov, and the current first deputy head of government, Kaganovich. Zhukov shook the position of the then incumbent Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Marshal Bulganin, and sealed his fate.

In the Soviet Union there was only one person who was higher in rank than Zhukov - a member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Nikita Khrushchev.

However, in 1957, Khrushchev did not hold any public office. He was the head of the Communist Party, occupying a position, I repeat, not envisaged by the CPSU Charter. Zhukov did not recognize the power of the Communist Party in general and the power of Khrushchev (as the head of this party) in particular and did not reckon with it.

The power of the Communist Party lay in the monopoly distribution of leadership positions. Zhukov pushed the Communist Party away from the leadership of the Armed Forces, arbitrarily reducing the role of military councils at all levels and transforming them from supervisory bodies to advisory ones.

Zhukov made decisions on appointments to senior positions on his own, without asking anyone about it, without informing anyone about it.

Deciding on executive appointments is the power grab.

Zhukov's expulsion from the pinnacle of power was a crushing blow to relations with Yugoslavia and Albania. For the governments and peoples of these countries, Zhukov's removal from all leadership positions was an insult.

How could it be otherwise? The governments and peoples of the two countries welcomed Zhukov as a distinguished guest, and it turned out that their hospitality was only used as a trap.

Zhukov was welcomed as a star of the first magnitude with orchestras and a guard of honor, and he turned out to be an empty man, not deserving a reception at the state level.

The governments of Yugoslavia and Albania were engaged in serious negotiations with Zhukov, and it turned out that they were talking to a man who had already been effectively removed from power.

They were negotiating not with a statesman, but with a retired person.

7

On October 4, 1957, the day Zhukov left for Yugoslavia on his cruiser, the 8K71PS launch vehicle put the first artificial satellite into orbit. The satellite made 1,440 revolutions around the Earth, and the last stage of the launch vehicle soon entered the dense layers of the atmosphere and burned up.

It was joked in those days: Zhukov carried Khrushchev into orbit, and he himself burned up.

It must be said bluntly: during his reign, called by sycophants the Great

Decade, Nikita Khrushchev broke a lot of wood. That can't be taken away.
And yet he deserves a grand monument.
Khrushchev saved the country and the world from Zhukov.

Key point

Let's move from "Bummer" to "Icebreaker". They say to me: everything in your "Icebreaker" seems to agree, but there is no document to prove it.

There is a document, citizens. It is kept in the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI). Fund 2, inventory 1, case 263, sheets 59-60. This is a transcript of the second meeting of the October plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on October 28, 1957, at which the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union Sokolovsky, in his speech stated Zhukov's plans to unleash World War III:

Comrade Zhukov. Zhukov, no matter how much the General Staff insisted, no matter how much he reported, no matter how much he motivated, still made us write in the preamble of the corresponding document [Operational Plan. - Author's note] that we are the first to attack.... How can a plan be drawn up to involve our country in a war, and voluntarily!

The transcript of the plenum has been declassified and published in the collection "Georgy Zhukov. Transcript of the October (1957) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents" (p. 300). This document was published not by any haters of Zhukov, but by people who can be called the most important priests of Zhukov's cult - A. N. Yakovlev, G. A. Arbatov, E. T. Gaidar, E. M. Primakov, S. V. Mironenko, A. O. Chubaryan; all of them were members of the editorial board of the above-mentioned collection. All the comments on both the individual documents and the collection itself are a hymn to Zhukov's greatness: he wanted to expose the bloody tyrant Stalin! He wanted to bring to the end of the line of the XX Congress! He wanted to punish the bloody executioners! He wanted to tell the whole truth about the war!

This collection was created "by the decision of the Commission under the President of the Russian Federation for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repressions, which studied the materials on the charges brought by the party-state leadership of the USSR against Marshal Zhukov" (ibid. P. 12).

So, Zhukov is a victim of unjustified repression. This collection was

published for the rehabilitation of an innocent victim.

The documents "*remained in secret storage, and were declassified specifically for this collection*" (ibid. P. 13). But even in this collection, whose purpose is to whitewash Zhukov, there are absolutely surprising facts: Zhukov, having reached the supreme military power, demanded that the preamble to the plan of the coming war should include the words that the Soviet Union would attack first.

It should be noted here that, of course, it was not only about the preamble. It could not be that in the preamble of the plan for the coming Third World War it was written that we would be the first to attack, and then went on to describe the purely defensive actions of the Soviet Army. It is clear that the whole plan corresponded to the preamble. It was just that it was customary for us to cover ourselves with arguments about the peace-loving policy of the USSR: if the enemies forced us, we would have nothing left but to attack them first.

It is clear that the Chief of the General Staff Marshal Sokolovsky, when developing the plan, wanted, as usual, to write in a top secret document of special importance the usual fable about our incredible peacefulness, but the Minister of Defense Marshal Zhukov demanded to write directly. Why be shy if the document would forever be available only to a very narrow circle of leaders?

It may be asked: but how can all this serve as evidence of the Soviet Union's preparations for an attack on Germany, as recounted in *The Icebreaker*?

Answer.

In 1956, the strategic outlook for the Soviet Union was a dead end.

First: there were nuclear weapons, and if the Soviet Union launched a new war, it would face an inevitable retaliatory strike by Western countries on Moscow, Leningrad and other cities, and such a possibility made the war pointless.

Second, the Soviet Union's adversaries were the United States, Great Britain, France, West Germany, and a host of other countries. Economically, demographically and militarily, it was madness to attack them.

Third, peace had been established in Europe, and in the event of a Soviet attack on West Germany and other countries, the Soviet Union was losing politically - such actions would have drawn universal condemnation.

But even in this situation the kind, peace-loving and democratic Zhukov, over whom there was no power of a bloody tyrant, planned a war in which the Soviet Union was to be the attacking party.

In the spring of 1941 the situation was completely different, the situation was fantastically favorable for the Soviet Union.

First: there were no nuclear weapons, a retaliatory strike could not be feared.

Second, the West was divided. Great Britain, with the United States behind it, was waging war against Germany. Most of Europe was occupied by Germany and was waiting to be liberated.

Third: both Great Britain and the United States in every possible way tried to pull the Soviet Union to their side, promised him any military, economic and other assistance, the leaders of these countries literally pulled Stalin by the hand in their camp.

Fourth, economically, demographically and militarily Hitler could no longer win, he had already lost the war.

Fifth, if Stalin had stood up to Hitler, he would have been welcomed by all of occupied Europe and the world.

In the deadlocked and hopeless situation of 1956, Zhukov was still preparing a war that the Soviet Union should have started anyway. Why, in the splendid situation of the spring of 1941, should the same Zhukov have plotted something different?

In 1962, Khrushchev brought the world to the brink of annihilation in a nuclear war. It was done foolishly. Khrushchev did not count on such a turn of events.

And Zhukov was quite consciously planning World War III as early as 1956. He had planned a new war even earlier, when after Stalin's death he volunteered to prove in practice that it was possible to capture Europe by breaking through the front with nuclear strikes.

Khrushchev knocked the madman Zhukov out of power.

If Khrushchev had not accomplished this feat, life on our planet today would be very different - if at all. And I would not be writing this book, and you would not be reading it.

EPILOGUE.

In June 1957, at the moment when Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich,

Voroshilov, Bulganin and other members of the Presidium of the Central Committee decided to remove Khrushchev from supreme power, the head of the GRU, Colonel-General Sergei Matveyevich Shtemenko, on the orders of the Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov, met at the Central Aerodrome of Moscow members of the Central Committee of the Party arriving in the capital on Air Force planes. Shtemenko gave them all valuable advice on who to bet on in the heated battle.

It was at this time that Shtemenko, on Zhukov's orders, began to form the GRU Special Purpose Center, at the head of which Zhukov placed Shtemenko's first deputy, Lieutenant General Mamsurov. But Khrushchev pre-empted the blow by sending Zhukov to Yugoslavia and removing him from the post of defense minister on October 26, 1957. On the same day, Shtemenko was removed from the post of GRU chief, and on October 27 he was demoted and became a lieutenant general for the third time in his life.

For six months Shtemenko had no position. In May 1958, Khrushchev gave him a position. And he did it, I would say, with some mockery. January 15, 1958 the South Ural Military District was disbanded. Its troops and most of the territory, including the Totsk range, were included in the Volga Military District. Khrushchev put Lieutenant General Shtemenko on the post of deputy commander of the Volga Military District. He was to serve in Kuibyshev. (Kuibyshev again! It's mystical!)

First of all, the position is not independent - deputy. Secondly, another symbolic coincidence (and is it a coincidence?): you are at the Totsk firing range with Zhukov - so sit there, near the Totsk camps. Breathe the fresh air of the polygon.

In July 1962, the Soviet leadership began preparations for Operation Anadyr - the transfer of missiles to Cuba. Case

It was heading towards a very serious aggravation of the international situation, if not war. At this point, Khrushchev remembered Shtemenko's talents and appointed him Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces and First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces.

In April 1964, Shtemenko was appointed Chief of the Main Organizational and Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff. He is the only general who in different years was not only the Chief of the General Staff, but also the head of three different Main Departments of the General Staff - operational, intelligence and organizational and mobilization. In 1966, he was promoted to the rank of Colonel-General. On February 22, 1968, on the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Shtemenko was

promoted to the rank of General of the Army.

Shtemenko was a major general only once and only for a partial five months. This rank was awarded to him in 1942, when Shtemenko was only 35 years old. He became a lieutenant general three times. These ranks Shtemenko received in 1943, 1953 and 1957. The first time - as a sign of encouragement, the other two times - as a sign of punishment. Colonel-General he also became three times - in 1945, 1956 and 1966, and the rank of General of the Army received only twice - in 1948 and 1968. Shtemenko became army general for the second time twenty years after the first time.

In August 1968, at the time of the Soviet and Allied troops' entry into Czechoslovakia, Army General Shtemenko was appointed Chief of Staff of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact. Sergei Matveyevich Shtemenko died in 1976.

Ekaterina Alekseevna Furtseva lost her title as a member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee in October 1961, but remained a member of the CPSU Central Committee and Minister of Culture of the USSR. She died suddenly on the night of October 24-25, 1974 from heart failure, but there were persistent rumors of her suicide in Moscow.

Nikolai Pavlovich Firyubin served as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1957 until his death in 1983.

Squadron destroyer "Byvaly", on which Comrade Bulanov, referent of the Administrative Bodies Division of the CPSU Central Committee, followed the cruiser "Kuibyshev" to Yugoslavia, in July 1961 took part in the rescue of the Soviet nuclear submarine K-19, whose crew with heroic efforts prevented a nuclear explosion in the Atlantic Ocean, paying for it with the lives of several sailors.

Major Yuri Sergeevich Bulanov was promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel and soon to colonel. In 1962, he graduated from the First Faculty of the Military Diplomatic Academy, which trained extractive officers and analysts of strategic intelligence. He went under deep cover, that is, into illegal extraction. His further fate is not known to me.

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